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ABSTRACT 
Data sharing domains have expanded over several, both trusted and insecure 
environments. At the same time, the data security boundaries have shrunk from internal 
network perimeters down to a single identity and a piece of information. Since new EU 
GDPR regulations, the personally identifiable information sharing requires data 
governance in favour of a data subject. Existing enterprise grade IRM solutions fail to 
follow open standards and lack of data sharing frameworks that could efficiently integrate 
with existing identity management and authentication infrastructures. IRM services that 
stood against cloud demands often offer a very limited access control functionality 
allowing an individual to store a document online giving a read or read-write permission 
to other individual identified by email address. Unfortunately, such limited information 
sharing controls are often introduced as the only safeguards in large enterprises, health-
care institutions and other organizations that should provide the highest possible personal 
data protection standards. 
The IRM suffers from a systems architecture vulnerability where IRM application 
installed on a semi-trusted client truly only guarantees none or full access enforcement. 
Since no single authority is contacted to verify each committed change the adversary 
having an advantage of possessing data-encrypting and key-encrypting keys could change 
and re-encrypt the amended content despite that read only access has been granted. 
Finally, the two evaluated IRM products, have either the algorithm security lifecycle 
(ASL) relatively short to protect the shared data, or the solution construct highly 
restrained secure key-encrypting key distribution and exposes a symmetric data-
encrypting key over the network. Presented here sticky policy with identity-based 
encryption (SPIBE) solution was designed for secure cloud data sharing. SPIBE 
challenges are to deliver simple standardized construct that would easily integrate with 
popular OOXML-like document formats and provide simple access rights enforcement 
over protected content. It leverages a sticky policy construct using XACML access policy 
language to express access conditions across different cloud data sharing boundaries. 
XACML is a cloud-ready standard designed for a global multi-jurisdictional use. Unlike 
other raw ABAC implementations, the XACML offers a standardised schema and 
authorisation protocols hence it simplifies interoperability. The IBE is a cryptographic 
scheme protecting the shared document using an identified policy as an asymmetric key-
encrypting a symmetric data-encrypting key. Unlike ciphertext-policy attribute-based 
access control (CP-ABE), the SPIBE policy contains not only access preferences but 
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global document identifier and unique version identifier what makes each policy uniquely 
identifiable in relation to the protected document. In IBE scheme the public key-
encrypting key is known and could be shared between the parties although the data-
encrypting key is never sent over the network. Finally, the SPIBE as a framework should 
have a potential to protect data in case of new threats where ASL of a used cryptographic 
primitive is too short, when algorithm should be replaced with a new updated 
cryptographic primitive. The IBE like a cryptographic protocol could be implemented 
with different cryptographic primitives. The identity-based encryption over isogenous 
pairing groups (IBE-IPG) is a post-quantum ready construct that leverages the initial IBE 
Boneh-Franklin (IBE-BF) approach. Existing IBE implementations could be updated to 
IBE-IPG without major system amendments. Finally, by applying the one document 
versioning blockchain-like construct could verify changes authenticity and approve only 
legitimate document updates, where other IRM solutions fail to operate delivering the 
one single authority for non-repudiation and authenticity assurance.  
 3 
1 Introduction 
Just in the last couple of years, people experienced transformation from the analogue into 
the digital world. This is not only a beginning of a new technological phase, it has started 
the new digital era. Today, the international ID2020 alliance plans to deliver one global 
digital identity to all living people, including over one billion people who have never been 
officially registered. Global digitalisation brings new digital threats with an impact never 
seen on such a scale. 
Reading news, we could observe a fascinating phenomenon, enormously rapid digital 
body growth driven by demands for more functionality, size, speed, and features. This 
new living organism is not alone and requires intelligence to protect itself from the 
surrounding environment. Without the immunity, it will experience more severe 
damages. The recent cyber-attack at German government systems [1] caused not only 
exposure of sensitive intelligence information but also weakened the trust citizens have 
for the institution that supposed to protect them. Furthermore, we see that trusted channels 
providing decent security boundary fail in trying to assure the data protection. 
Information lost its protection shield since it entered into a shared cloud space. It is not 
about network firewalls anymore, which like veins could keep the bit of information 
within a closed stream. In recent years information security has rapidly changed from a 
network being a security boundary to an identified information as the only true security 
boundary that has left. In 2017 one of the most significant cyber-attacks compromised 
the security of the major credit reporting agency in the United States [2] causing personal 
data leakage of over 140 million citizens. Just a few months later, the largest Swiss 
telecommunication company reported one million Swiss citizen records being stolen [3]. 
In both cases, attackers easily managed to take an advantage over the security of the 
system. Hardly any attacks on such a scale used sophisticated cryptographic techniques 
to gain an advantage within a protected system. 
1.1 Author Publications 
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Identity and Identity Meta-Data: Secure and Control of Data in Globalization Era,” Int. J. 
Reliab. Qual. E-Healthcare, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 49–66, 2014. 
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G. Spyra, P. W. J. Buchanan, and D. E. Ekonomou, “Sticky policy enabled authenticated 
OOXML for Health Care,” in BCS Health Informatics Scotland Research Conference 
2015, 2015, pp. 1–6. 
G. Spyra, W. J. Buchanan, and E. Ekonomou, “Sticky policy enabled authenticated 
OOXML,” in SAI Computing Conference 2016, 2016. 
G. Spyra and W. J. Buchanan, “Protecting Documents with Sticky Policies and Identity-
based Encryption,” in 2016 Future Technologies Conference (FTC), 2017, no. January, 
pp. 1–5. 
G. Spyra, W. J. Buchanan, and E. Ekonomou, “Blockchain and Git repositories for Sticky 
Policies protected OOXML,” in 2017 Future Technologies Conference (FTC), 2017, no. 
November, pp. 29–31. 
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1.2 Aim and objectives 
This thesis aims to deliver a model for secure information sharing in the cloud, leveraging 
common information rights management (IRM) architectures and modern cryptographic 
and access control techniques. 
The main research questions to answer in this thesis are:  
• How to build a secure cloud-ready file sharing framework using sticky policy? 
• Is there existing standard, mature and secure components ready to construct such a 
solution?  
• What are the challenges for secure cloud information sharing especially for 
organizations such as health-care, governments and large enterprises? 
• How the proposed sticky policy with identity-based encryption (SPIBE) construct 
could cope with secure cloud information sharing challenges in comparison to other 
IRM solutions? 
The research first has to highlight current security related problems when it comes to data 
sharing, new data protection regulations and latest global technical trends. Crucial part to 
justify the selected components of SPIBE framework are existing already in use 
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authentication and authorization standards. To synthetize the model design and produce 
evaluation with other existing IRM solutions research explains common cryptographic 
protocols and related security safeguards including advanced key management. 
Work critically asses existing popular IRM solutions to identify potential weak points, 
architectural gaps and challenges related to cloud computing and quantum technology. 
1.3 Contribution and novelty 
This work provides an overview of secure models, which combined, could give a solid 
foundation for a new reliable cloud-based secure data-sharing model. Many identities and 
personal identifiable information (PII) data hosting models recognise security issues that 
come with Cloud computing. Researchers try to propose methods to enforce 
accountability over data stored in the cloud shared space [4]. Many focus on data 
protection in the health-care context and propose to find the most suitable encryption and 
access control model, along with delivering a mature framework for Cloud-based 
implementations [5], [6]. Various information rights management (IRM) systems deliver 
solutions based on symmetric and both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography [7], [8] 
or [9]. 
While symmetric key-based solutions suffer from difficulty to exchange keys in 
distributed implementations [8], the combined symmetric and asymmetric solutions 
suffer from a low public key algorithm security lifecycle (ASL) [7], [9]. 
Proposed model, sticky policy with identity-based encryption (SPIBE) uses unique 
document identifier together with policy to identify and protect OOXML document. 
Unlike typical IBE construct [10] this work delivers identity from a sticky policy 
protecting the data like in [11]. Access policy is formatted with eXtensible Access Control 
Markup Language (XACML) standard, which highly constrains the access attributes, 
rules and conditions. In compare with non-standardized attribute-based access control 
(ABAC) models the SPIBE is simpler to use and to implement due to many existing 
XACML schemas. While the ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) 
schema [12] extends traditional key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [13] 
over access subject context, the SPIBE leverages concept of both, where global document 
identifier and its version together with role-based access control (RBAC) like rules are 
combined into a policy. Cryptographic construct currently uses AES symmetric 
encryption to protect the data and asymmetric identity-based encryption over isogenous 
pairing groups (IBE-IPG) [14] to encrypt the symmetric data-encrypting key. SPIBE 
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contributes significantly by aligning existing IRM models with new data protection 
demands and newly developed security techniques. 
1.4 Background 
1.4.1 Data Loss Prevention (DLP) 
A major problem of data protection within the Cloud is that a data, which seems to be 
local and personal is in fact unencrypted once stored in the Cloud. Sooner or later this 
data might become a subject of direct or indirect processing by third parties. Lack of 
encryption mechanisms used to protect the information and the global character of the 
Cloud causes data leaks without data owner control [4]. Even encrypted data is still 
exposed to several data leakage risks because the encryption techniques cannot compete 
with increasing processing power [15]. This new processing power is needed to 
effectively encrypt live data in memory generate, release and revoke encryption keys to 
achieve a truly protected personal data in the Cloud [16]. 
Data loss prevention (DLP) is a common data protection programme more or less 
successfully adapted by many organisations and corporations. Since the first OECD 
recommendation on data protection [17] the data loss has been not only a concern for 
financial institutions taking higher precautions worrying to lose its reputation but also for 
companies having anything to do with a personal data. Data loss or leakage occurs when 
data is no longer under control of the responsible data custodian. Data loss could be an 
effect of an external or an insider attack. Unfortunately often we see it is negligence at 
the highest corporate C-level [2] [3] that allowed an adversary to take advantage of 
unprotected systems. Data loss, as with other security incidents, could cost organisations 
a signification amount of money due to indirect loses like reputation, intellectual property, 
trade secrets or more direct like stolen bank accounts or credit cards details and crypto-
currency units. Now financial losses will be also be relate to penalties that come into force 
on 25 May 2018 following the new Regulation (EU) 2016/680 of the European 
Parliament and the EU Council [18]. Furthermore, approved in June 2018, a new 
Assembly Bill 375 in California takes effect in January 2020 [19] will make companies 
that fail to follow the new privacy prior to data leakage incident liable for high civil 
penalties. 
Recently the Massachusetts Institute of Technology referred to existing safeguards, i.e. 
cryptography, as insufficient to protect data [15], when it comes to personal data shared 
in a cloud by governments, medical institutions and others, actually disqualifies any 
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encryption algorithms used. However, it does not encourage to protect data and to seek 
for modern information protection countermeasures. 
1.4.2 Sticky Policies 
Sticky policies group rules defining who, when, where and how can access the data. 
Unlike other access policy models, policies are bound to the data piece. This access 
control model could secure personal identifiable information (PII) with high 
accountability. Each personal data access attempt is a subject of extensive auditing where 
any security breach or a data leakage incident is reported by sticky policies framework. 
Detected incidents could be tracked and give solid evidence leading to legal 
consequences, e.g. where data is not properly governed under GDPR regulations. 
The data owners can feel owning the data released into the Cloud. Policies associated 
with the data are protecting and enforcing the data owner consent. E.g. sticky policy 
added to medical report about a patient by data owner would cover a data owner consent 
and define any subject rights to process that data. 
Data owner preferences regarding trust authority (TA) selection for policy management 
give possibility to choose only providers that ensure certification for all independent 
trusted parties behind TA, i.e. authorization authority and private key generator (PKG). 
1.4.3 Identity 
Identity can be seen as the unique information sufficient to perform operations on objects. 
The subject, owner of the digital identity, could be a living person or any digital actor that 
could initiate a digital transaction. Information related to an identity could be seen as a 
set of attributes. Attributes could be static in some identity models but can also vary 
depending on claims by specific service providers (SPs) [20]. Digital identity has to 
uniquely identify the subject in some contexts. However, not all contexts require unique 
identification [21]. Most common attributes used for identity identification are email 
address [22], international phone numbers [23], in some countries national identification 
number or national insurance number. Some governments and institutions conducted 
research on RFID implants to identify a living person uniquely. 
Technologically advanced biometric measurements could deliver physical characteristics 
vector representing unique, immutable identity attributes [24]. The last could potentially 
replace all existing identity attributes required to initiate identification and authentication. 
Considering non-living subjects, the identity attributes could be constructed from legacy 
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hardware numbering [25], [26]. However, identifying attributes of a device could be 
successfully derived similar to a living person biometrics vector, from a hardware 
physical characteristics vector [27]. The process where the subject claims a digital 
identity is called authentication (AuthN). Authentication verifies various authenticators 
required to complete a digital identity claim. Subject during authentication attempts to 
access an authentication service that is in control of authentication technologies. Digital 
authentication presents subject with a challenge to solve relevant to security boundaries 
and access context of the digital identity. The authentication process could use both 
physical and digital channels. The subject can fulfil authentication claims in person or 
over the network. Authenticators are also connected with all required entities over the 
network, very often this is an open Internet network. 
1.4.4 Health-care 
In healthcare, medical organisations store and process mostly sensitive personal 
information, and also need persistent access to a sensitive data [28] to save their patients 
life at any time, without technological and jurisdictional constraints [18]. Unfortunately, 
access to such a data is mostly restricted to one institution or very often a single building. 
Currently, healthcare services are still concentrated around medical institutions rather 
than the patient [29]. Furthermore, most of the legacy systems suffer from lack of 
standardisation, therefore, are neither ready for a global integration nor for full personal 
health record (PHR) and electronic health record (EHR) enablement. 
Even when personal data is stored and processed within secure and well-defined 
boundaries, problems can arise because there is no oversight by the data subject (i.e. the 
patient). There are strong indications that PHR owners would also like to have full access 
to their information [30] and also to be able to control the rights of access to the records. 
PHRs and even more so the EHR, which aggregate them require a platform that will allow 
secure data exchange [31] preserving privacy across Cloud-based systems [32]. Similar 
problems can be found in educational institutions where pupil [33] or student information 
cannot be shared due to legal and technological limitations, despite the data subject’s 
expectations. 
Several works [34], [35] aim to deliver a unified model, which can be adapted under 
several security contexts like health-care, education institutions, enterprises and others. 
Here is worth mentioning the Microsoft HealthVault development project, which defines, 
in detail, several XML schemas ready to adapt in medical institutions. The World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) aims to address quality of XML language and related schemas 
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what includes delivery of basic secure standards that guarantee integrity and 
confidentiality of information represented as an XML-structured piece of data. The W3C 
has created the W3C XML Signature Working Group focused on digital signatures and 
W3C XML Encryption Working Group specialised in encrypted content. The main 
technological problem with adequate data protection is the efficiency of encryption 
algorithms when the encrypted information requires e.g. indexing [4]. Several methods 
can be used in parallel for encryption to effectively index unencrypted XML data [36], 
although implementation would require further techniques to protect the health-care 
related part of personal identifiable information (PII) data which is an integral part of 
PHR and EHR data. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The following chapters cover: 
• Literature Review. This includes research background presenting the current 
situation demanding for secure cloud data sharing. It covers existing frameworks 
and open standards that integrate with the proposed Sticky Policies with Identity-
Based Encryption (SPIBE) model. It covers current research around 
cryptographic primitives that are ready for modern computing. 
• Sticky Policies Approach within Cloud Computing. This chapter covers the main 
contribution of this work shows how the proposed model protects, encrypts and 
decrypts data protected under SPIBE construct. 
• Evaluation Methodology and Implementation. This covers actual evaluation that 
has been performed to support SPIBE model, recognise its advantages and 
disadvantages in comparison to other existing IRM solutions. 
• Conclusions and Future work. Finally, the concluding chapter summarises the 
research and evaluation showing missing parts and space for further development 
and SPIBE model improvements. 
The thesis also contains appendixes which contain not only the code used for 
evaluation but also the Visual Studio solutions as some of the C++ projects require 
specific configurations to be hosted on the MS Windows platform. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the fundamentals for sticky policy with identity-based encryption 
(SPIBE) model evaluation. It should justify different standards and technologies used 
giving the reader a complete context. Starting from explaining the need for standardised 
identity, through secure authentication the model could finally authorise an individual to 
access the protected data. Protection requires access level countermeasures such as 
relevant access control model, access control expression language (i.e. XACML) and 
finally a cryptographic primitive that should address the actual demand for flexible and 
secure schemes. The final piece, the OOXML document format should introduce the 
reader to one but not the only possible SPIBE integration scenario. This chapter also 
discusses the IRM weaknesses and proposes potential architectural improvements by 
introducing single trusted blockchain tracking all legitimate information changes. 
2.2 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
European Union states agreed on adapting directives giving every person a right to the 
protection of own personal data [18]. Set of new regulations applied to all Member States 
aims to respond to new challenges brought by rapid sociotechnical development. Amount 
of collected personal data together with technological advance has exposed new threats. 
New scientific fields like the data science allow global processing of all sensitive data 
types, never available at this scale before. Both a private sector and public authorities 
could use that data for their advantage. Recent events show how new EU regulations may 
improve the legal perception of the personal data. British political consulting firm 
Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL Group) / Cambridge Analytica illegally 
used personal data of millions of Facebook users [37]. Furthermore, the same company 
consulted current United States president Donald Trump during the presidential election. 
Facebook owner Mark Zuckerberg confirmed [38] that the data has been sold to 
Cambridge Analytica knowing how it will be processed. In the face of the different 
charges effectively at 1st of May 2018 SCL Group closed operations also having new EU 
regulations hanging above as Damocles’ sword. GDPR highly constrains that freedom of 
uncontrolled data processing in favour of a natural person’s freedom. The regulation also 
highly constrains personal data processing techniques such as profiling, where personal 
preferences, behaviours and attitudes are analysed. 
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The regulation requires the strengthening of the data subject rights as well as data 
recipient obligations. The data recipient means a natural, a legal person or another body 
to whom the personal data has been disclosed including legal authorities responsible for 
monitoring and compliance with data protection rules. Regulations ease data processing 
although not except regulation compliance for scientific research on personal data. Data 
subjects should give their explicit consent allowing data processing to be completed, but 
only to some extent. This includes deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid 
(RNA) analysis, which is also defined as personal data processing. Data processing 
obligations are tightened when data relates in any way to a child, person of age below 16. 
This, as with adult person personal data, applies to any information that relates directly 
or indirectly to a subject. Any data processing not excluding marketing purposes, creating 
a personality or user profile is strictly regulated and requires a consent given or authorised 
by the holder of parental responsibility for the child [18]. Furthermore, such consent has 
to be explicitly verified by the controller. 
GDPR ensures and protects freedom in regard to religion, ethnic origin, political opinions, 
sexual orientation, philosophical beliefs and genetic data i.e. also historical ancestry data 
that could identify an individual. Any data processing that could reveal such information 
threatens these freedoms and is strictly prohibited by the regulation [18]. 
Regarding security countermeasures, the regulations give strong due diligence safeguards 
protecting the data at rest. Cryptographic algorithms security lifecycle makes any 
encrypted data vulnerable to tomorrow’s technology. Unlike any other sensitive or 
confidential data, the personal data should be protected during time exceeding algorithm 
security lifecycle. While protection of critical financial report or country tactical, or 
strategic information, is necessary mostly within a relatively short period, i.e. days, 
months or decades but the personal data protection is not limited to any period. The 
regulation, although, does not apply to deceased persons, and the historical data 
processing such as ancestry analysis if related to a living person [18] might fall within the 
scope of the regulation. 
2.3 IRM 
Information rights management (IRM) the document protection related domain of wider 
in scope digital rights management (DRM). DRM aims to protect digital intellectual 
property such as movies, audio, patents, documents and all types of multimedia where 
legal protection require technological safeguards. In other words, it is a collection of 
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hardware, software, services, and technologies that have been developed for persistently 
governing the authorized distribution and use of content and services according to their 
associated rights and managing consequences of that distribution and use throughout their 
entire lifecycle or workflow [39]. The IRM refers to safeguards for digital information 
i.e. digital documents that are either at rest or in transit. Digital documents could consist 
of actual documents like Office Open XML (OOXML) or Portable Document Format 
(PDF) package encapsulating multimedia content. The package is defined as a rich 
content combined into one single file. Depends on the context the digital information 
could also refer to an image, a simple text file, an email or even a short message service 
(SMS) message. 
IRM prevents protected information package from being printed, forwarded, saved, 
edited or copied without prior authorisation, ensuring information confidentiality, 
integrity, and non-repudiation. The greatest challenge for IRM systems is its 
interoperability across different platforms with different editing applications. As with 
DRM, missing standards are allowing decent security enforcement for digital data 
protection [39]. Existing products are either very homogeneous hence too hermetic for 
common use or are highly heterogeneous and are often user-friendly. However, offering 
an apparent acceptable level of data protection. 
IRM systems enforce data owner access preferences, where owner decides who, under 
what conditions and how could process the data. Access preferences follow the digital 
data that moves across different security boundaries. Such assigned rights could constrain 
access using discretionary access control (DAC) model, where data access is governed at 
all times by the data owner. Access could also be defined under mandatory access control 
(MAC) specifying document classification. Here, protected information is addressed to a 
group of individuals having sufficient level of privileges or the right clearance level that 
authorises the access. Finally, the access could be defined under non-discretionary access 
control (Non-DAC) model like role-based access control (RBAC) where the document is 
addressed to a group of people with a specific role within an organisation. For example, 
patient’s medical examination results initially have the patient information assigned (i.e. 
data subject), together with laboratory access preferences (i.e. data owner) and general 
practitioner (GP) role, giving GP access to read and provide own comments about the 
medical test results. Data owner has full rights over the report, but data subject who has 
the full legal rights over that data within the IRM system, the data subject could only read 
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the report. The general practitioner, although, has rights to read and write the report i.e. 
complete a diagnosis as the report is addressed for further medical analysis. 
2.4 Identity management 
Information does not stay within single corporate boundaries, but large, middle and small 
companies and organisations federate to collaborate efficiently. Still, digital identity 
moving across boundaries becomes often exposed to a threat of identity impersonation 
where the illegitimate subject becomes in control of a digital identity. It is important to 
design identity management systems following the latest recommendations for 
cryptographic techniques, authentication flows, and authentication protocols. To 
overcome new data protection challenges, there are existing assurance levels related to 
digital identity protection. The digital identity could be measured against several identity 
assurance levels [21]. 
There are two levels of assurance for non-federated identities the Identity Assurance 
Level (IAL) and the Authenticator Assurance Level (AAL). IAL consists of three levels, 
IAL1 where digital identity does not have to identify a living person uniquely. Any 
attributes verification during authentication has only technical context without any actual 
relation to real unique identity identification. IAL2 requires verification that digital 
identity is uniquely related to a real person identity. Identification of the identity provided 
during initial registration either delivered in person or remotely is a must. Either a 
credential service provider (CSP) or a relying party (RP) could assert attributes delivered 
as a claim for pseudonymous identity. IAL3 requires that individual proofs identity in 
person upon registration. Identity meta-data attributes have to be verified by authorised 
and trained CSP representative. For pseudonymous identity, attributes could be asserted 
via CSP or RP. The AAL has three distinct assurance levels for authentication procedures. 
With AAL1 a claimant needs an authenticator that is bound to the digital identity account 
[21]. Both single-factor authentication (SFA) or multi-factor authentication (MFA) 
techniques could be used. 
To complete the authentication the claimant via secure authentication protocol proves he 
is a legitimate owner of the authenticator. AAL2 proves that the claimant controls two 
distinct authenticators using MFA with a minimum of two distinct factors. Verification 
requires secure authentication protocols. All cryptographic techniques used at this level 
and above have to be approved. Unlike lower AAL levels the AAL3 requires from the 
claimant a proof, using cryptographic protocols, of a possession of a key. A hardware 
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authenticator and only approved cryptographic techniques could be involved at this level. 
Authentication methods used have to preclude any possible identity impersonation. 
Furthermore, AAL3 requires minimum two distinct authentication factors via secure 
authentication protocols. For federated identities, there is a separate measurement 
component called Federated Assurance Level (FAL) [21]. In FAL1 the relying party (RP) 
is allowed to receive the bearer assertion signed by the identity provider (IdP) using only 
approved cryptography. FAL2 level allows RP to receive signed and encrypted bearer 
assertion from IdP. Only RP should have the possibility to decrypt the assertion. The 
highest possible assurance level for federated identity is the FAL3. It requires on top of 
the lower assurance level safeguards that a digital identity owner the subscriber proofs of 
possession of a cryptographic key referenced in the assertion. 
2.4.1 SCIM Schema 
System for cross-domain identity management (SCIM) was created [40] in order to 
standardise the digital identity management including all the processes related to identity 
provisioning, meta-directory provisioning, identification, authentication, and federation. 
The rapid development of global cloud-based systems requires a completely new 
approach to identity management. Legacy identity management systems are monolithic 
often based on X500 directories [41] and directory metadata [42], where schema evolved 
to store not only identity-related information but configuration metadata from various 
applications and systems. Furthermore, lack of consistency in legacy implementations 
makes cloud data and information sharing a difficult challenge. Identity-related attributes 
are not following a single standard; hence any cross-enterprise identity federation requires 
a non-standard approach. Identity provisioning was partially standardised with service 
provisioning markup language (SPML) [43]. However, it was never easily adaptable due 
to different identity management data schemes. The new SCIM approach highly 
simplifies the identity management including cross-domain identity provisioning due to 
standardised skimmed schema [44]. SCIM defines a schema for different resource types, 
i.e. users, groups, configuration, and so on. 
For each resource type, it defines a standard attributes set, e.g. userName, password, 
userType, timeZone [44], which represent flat and non-complex attributes or constructed, 
complex or multi-valued attributes such as name, groups, x509certificates. Each standard 
attribute defined within SCIM schema has its type (e.g., string, dateTime), cardinality 
(e.g. singular, complex), mutability (e.g. readWrite, immutable or writeOnly), uniqueness 
(i.e. none, global or server), case-exactness (e.g. caseExact is equal to false when 
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exactness is case-insensitive) and returnability (e.g. password attribute has returnability 
equal never, however, id attribute is returned during each request due to returnability 
equal to always) [44]. Identity management schema following these provisioning 
baselines is ready for global identity federations. This schema constrains existing systems 
giving developers some guidelines regarding a standard set of attributes required to 
handle security enabled resources like users and groups. SCIM also provides security best 
practices and recommendations for sensitive security data (e.g. password attribute) 
protection also in the context of other authentication and authorisation security 
recommendations [45]. 
SCIM defines a provisioning schema and a provisioning protocol [46]. It is another 
successful standard (see Figure 1) after Service Provisioning Markup Language (SPML) 
[43]. 
 
Figure 1 Brief history of Identity Provisioning [47] 
This protocol operates at the HTTP application layer executing HTTP methods that 
represent CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete) activities exchanged between different 
parties [40]. SCIM 1.1 defines a cloud service provider (CSP), enterprise cloud subscriber 
(ECS) and cloud service user (CSU) as three distinct acting parties, actors that take part 
in protocol flow. 
Only well-designed identity and access management (IAM) system can ensure secure 
access to the data. Empowered with SCIM schema existing enterprise systems could 
federate and define common data access policies understandable by all parties. 
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Consistently provisioned and revoked identities across all interconnected environments 
highly increase the data security. Standardised single SCIM schema helps to build global 
heterogeneous IAM solutions with all heterogeneous systems advantageous. 
2.5 Identity metadata 
Data held by the identity provider (IdP) can most often be classified as either personally 
identifiable information (PII) [48] or personal data. PII includes home addresses, social 
security numbers or maiden name, what is enough to allow unique identification of an 
individual. Depending on the authentication architecture supported by the IdP, the PII 
metadata is exchanged as claimed verified attributes [30] between IdP and SP. 
Identity verification methods require a relevant level of assurance [21] with effective 
safeguards against unauthorised PII data divulgence. Secure cloud-based identity with 
corresponding related personal data requires a secure model that supports the personal 
responsibility of the object (i.e. data stored in the cloud) owner over their digital identity 
and its authenticity. 
While performing research around identity and identity metadata, it is crucial to search 
for the possibility of separating PII data from identity itself as well as securely joining the 
shared data with identity using unique anonymous or ephemeral links. In modern identity 
management implementations, where identity consists of an obfuscated unique identifier 
[4] with policies required for further authorisation, only an obfuscated piece of 
information [46], should be exchanged during service provider (SP) authentication claim. 
Authentication that involves PII data flow needs to face a lack of single globally 
established security baselines and certification for SPs and authentication, authorisation, 
and accounting (AAA) mechanisms [49]. On the other hand, the model itself is still 
vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks such as data inference [50]. 
Identity accessing object can act as a subject, depending on the activity context as shown 
in Figure 2. At the same time personal identity (user) may act as an object when the 
subject requires further information about the personal identity metadata. Furthermore, 
the SP and the cloud-based service require an identity (user). All access control actors 
require identity and identity metadata to be properly accounted for performed activities 
in the shared cloud space. With a generic identity and access management framework, all 
activities of the subject over an access object are logged for further legal audits. The 
technology can benefit from a single, secure model where each entity of access control 
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operation is equally accountable, as an identity instance inherits a generic schema whether 
it is a real person or an automated robot. 
 
Figure 2 Two different subjects access contexts with identity meta-data; f – function matching identity 
Id with its rights R in given context 
2.5.1 Identity Subject, Data Object and Predicate 
Despite the discussed security control identity always remains in the centre. Over the 
years very static and naive account-based access management evolved into a global 
problem, where legacy security boundaries based on network perimeters were extended 
into a public space called the cloud. Account-based security became identity-based 
security, with a boundary that cannot be protected by legacy safeguards. To justify this 
statement, one simply has to look at the data sharing context. A subject (see Figure 3) 
within a strictly defined network environment does not access a data document. However, 
an object passes several different network and security boundaries before the subject also 
defined within a different context (i.e. medical, governments, enterprises or 
organisations) attempts to access it. 
 
Figure 3 Access tuple with a subject (Identity), an object (data) and a predicate (permission). 
Publicly exposed data requires several safeguards, and, in this field, research work related 
to purpose-based access control models play an important role as they aim to fill an 
existing gap [51], [52] not addressed with any legacy access control models (see Section 
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2.7). Currently in Europe OECD conducts the most crucial non-technically related work, 
which addresses legal aspects of data security, [53]. It aims to deliver legal frameworks 
to ensure data protection and address privacy concerns related to cloud-based computing 
era. 
Data structure and access management model both play a crucial role in building a secure 
cloud-based data sharing framework [54]. Sticky-policies one of the most promising 
access control models effectively enforces owner rights assignments over the owned 
object. Recently the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NISC) published 
their access control framework called Policy Machine [55], which was one of the 
deliverables of Next Generation Access Control project and was proposed as a cloud-
based implementation [56]. Its major architecture components include core access policy 
elements, assignments and relations definition, obligations and finally access request 
decisions. Single policy framework can not only enforce access control policies 
comprehensively across distributed and centralized operating environments, but also 
comprise aspects involving the characterization, distribution, and control of implemented 
capabilities. Policy Machine aims to dramatically simplify administrative effort, policy 
enforcement, data interoperability, and usability challenges faced by every large 
organization and enterprise today [55]. 
2.5.2 Secure Distribution of Identity Metadata 
Because identity must securely span across different boundaries, it should provide cross-
platform integration abilities and capacity for identity and access management (IAM) and 
federated identity management (FIM). Although, this is not the core part of the SPBIE 
framework it has to be integrated if the solution should work on a global scale. There are 
existing methods of secure data distribution, and also there are technologies that 
compound together can be used to deliver an integrated identity meta-data framework. 
Considering XML as a standard for identity meta-data the XML schema would require a 
technique, which allows different parties to share an XML schema for a particular type 
of content that is attached to the main identity. As identity meta-data content will be 
spanned across different systems, it has to share the core identity element to maintain its 
unique reference to a single person, while also maintaining several different schemas for 
contextual interpretation. In this way, a person only needs to share a core identity element 
that subjects can use for self-identification in the process of accessing objects. For 
example, a patient registering for private medical treatment would not have to allow the 
medical institution to store own PII information but would grant access by reference to 
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own identity metadata that is hosted centrally by legal institutions. The core identity 
ontology should not only identify but also represent identity access and operations 
entitlements in the cloud for various services enabled for different access control models. 
Encryption with other safeguards delivers the security crucial for distributed identity 
metadata. Personal data before it is hosted by any cloud-based service should be 
encrypted by default. Furthermore, the encryption of identity metadata should be required 
for every single XML node [57], as they form a sensitive part of hierarchical identity 
metadata. Digital signatures should be used to ensure the authenticity of XML ontology 
definition and to ensure the access control granularity [58]. 
2.5.3 XML Schemas and Ontologies 
One such XML-based ontology is the Web Ontology Language (OWL), which was 
designed to define the semantics of the relationships between entities. OWL defines what 
is semantically correct in XML, and both deliver data framework for the Web as well as 
for Cloud-based systems. OWL has been successfully used for access control systems 
implementation [59] as well as with encrypted distributed XML content [57]. There exists 
an older alternative approach for delivering structures, the resource description 
framework (RDF) together with RDF Schema (RDFS) defining classes for RDF. 
Although, while it seems to be easier to adapt, semantic limitations mean RDF may not 
satisfy all cloud-based identity metadata framework requirements, although it can be 
successfully combined with an OWL in some implementations scenarios and suffice its 
constraints [60]. 
Using OWL ontology [57], a single ontology is defined by a class, a sub-class, properties, 
and relationships. There is also a possibility to define OWL class relationships, where 
different ontologies can share a common parent. Within OWL it is possible to define the 
ontology for our identity metadata, which would allow identity to refer to other identities 
with simple predicate definitions (see Figure 4). The identity meta-data, here as a 
compound XML model defined under several ontologies, can be spanned across several 
contexts (see Figure 5). In other words, different parts of personal data can be stored and 
processed by different organisations. XML parts can be defined under various ontologies 
with different OWL-defined, XML schemas. A model where different parts of identity 
metadata are distributed to different service providers enables it to make use of a range 
of existing XML schemas, for instance, Microsoft HealthVault XML. Only such an 
approach can guarantee that data access to personal information can be distributed and 
efficiently maintained by different cloud service providers (CSP). 
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Figure 4 Two subjects in reference to each other in a triplet (Subject – Predicate – Object) represent 
linked identities 
In the health-care sector, the identity metadata would align with the EHR concept, where 
a range of different and possibly competing health-care repositories can hold patient 
information [31]. Secure access to distributed data is possible thanks to one identity and 
identity metadata framework. Securely linked identity metadata is an assurance of data 
integrity and authenticity, which is what is required from new cloud-based systems. 
 
Figure 5 Linked identity with identity meta-data using obfuscated references across several security 
boundaries and contexts 
Distributed XML identity metadata parts need to be linked to refer only to one identity. 
This secure XML linking defines that part of the identity metadata that belongs only to 
one identity. Without security, such linking is highly vulnerable to several types of attack 
including impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack. In response, the identity-
based encryption (IBE) model has been successfully utilised to create a secure dynamic 
reference for hierarchical data structures as discussed later in this work. 
In summary, individual parts of the identity metadata share a common ontology designed 
to support secure links. A mandatory obfuscated link is maintained from the main identity 
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XML to subparts of the identity metadata and back from identity metadata to the main 
identity. Requests from separate parts of identity metadata could be hosted in a service-
oriented architecture (SOA) implementation as shown in Figure 6. Web service(s) 
exposed as part of dedicated cloud-based services could process distributed requests using 
encryption, obfuscation and anonymisation (see also Figure 7, which includes further 
SOA implementation details). Next, each cloud-based service could effectively support 
such distributed XML model with effective XML clusters [61], where a single XML 
document can be partitioned into several clusters. 
 
Figure 6 System architecture: calling identity meta-data by obfuscated reference under SOA (possible 
use case) 
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Figure 7 System architecture: Identity authentication in SOA 
2.5.4 Office Open XML – Standard Schemas 
Office Open XML (OOXML) standard is mostly built on top of XML files, which 
reference to each other to form a single document. XML files can be supplemented with 
other reach files to deliver graphic, multimedia and other elements [62]. OOXML data 
format can deliver data integrity using internal elements hashing, while confidentiality 
can be assured by a single ZIP wrapper password protection and content encryption. 
These techniques are sufficient to protect content that does not leave corporate network, 
however, when leaked this built-in protection may not be sufficient for personal data. 
Cloud-based identity metadata sharing solution to utilise OOXML standard would require 
additional safeguards from service providers. 
Distributed identity metadata requires a data structure that will allow a comprehensive 
view of the data. E.g. doctor checking patient’s medical record will look not only into a 
single laboratory result but would also need to see other medical opinions that the patient 
received after medical evaluations were made. Such an overview can be shared with the 
doctor using the standard functionality of OOXML. Parts of the overall report that could 
be edited could be natively controlled in the so-called Master document. Composite 
reports can be set to read-only state due to various factors related to document checked 
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out state or related to access rights that doctor has over the entire report and its 
subsections. 
Regarding OOXML data indexing, in large databases NoSQL-based it is an easy task for 
indexing engine as long as the document is not encrypted. This part requires further 
research related to OOXML data anonymisation and obfuscation for indexing purposes. 
Office Open XML (OOXML), here a XACML policy wrapper, is a ZIP package file 
consisting of one or more file sections followed by a central directory. Multiple XML 
document elements define the main document part. Each file section consists of an actual 
embedded file and a local metadata file that includes information such as a filename, a 
file directory, a timestamp, compression used and a data descriptor that includes a valid 
file checksum. Most of OOXML internal sections could be protected by built-in OOXML 
encryption. However, some sections are not covered by a native OOXML cryptographic 
techniques [63]. In sticky policy with identity-based encryption (SPIBE) concept, a 
XACML policy is added as an additional package content that remains in unencrypted 
XML format. This policy defines access rules over resources and implements attribute-
based access control (ABAC)-like with attribute values defining legitimate data 
processing subject, also role-based access control (RBAC) [64] where business or 
institutional roles define who can access the data and finally risk-aware access control 
(RAAC) expressions [65], the most dynamic access control technique making access 
decisions upon dynamically calculated risk. 
2.6 Cryptography overview 
Every cryptographic algorithm could be characterized by keys, algorithm and the 
message [66]. The perfect key is a truly random group defined at {0,1} of size n. Key size 
is often predetermined by the cryptographic algorithm. Larger key size gives lower 
probability to break the encryption. However, a  not truly random key highly lowers the 
security of the cryptographic algorithm as the predictability of the key is highly lowered 
due to a limited key space [67]. Common random key generators rely on physical 
deterministic hardware setup and machine boot up time to generate keys. These possible 
keys might seem hard to predict, however, does require only existing modern computing 
power to factorise all the possible keys generated by the underlying randomising 
computer library. Key length should be selected precisely for the model, considering key 
crypto-period, protected message characteristics such as other key or a data, a context 
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where the message is either in transit or at rest, or the available processing power, and the 
allowed energy consumption. 
2.6.1 Key Crypto-period 
Keys could have either static or ephemeral life, although all keys have to be revoked at 
some point of time the ephemeral keys have rather very short lifecycle in compare to 
static keys. Although a shorter key lifetime results in better security, it also reduces 
performance. Diffie-Hellman (DH) is a good example of a cryptographic primitive where 
the key is used to provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS). This ephemeral key encryption 
is often used to exchange other static keys for long-term cryptographic algorithm 
lifecycle. PFS property ensures that having two cryptographic primitives one used to 
protect communication channel and the second used for the long-term message 
encryption, in the case where the long-term key is compromised, the ephemeral session 
will not be automatically compromised. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is an 
example of a static key use, where the single secret key could be kept in hardware security 
module (HSM) for a longer period of time. Such key requires increased safeguards as it 
is often used to encrypt a larger number of keys and messages. Another approach is to 
define different keys life-type within the same system are public key certificates (PKC) 
or public key infrastructures (PKI). Certificates consist of RSA key pair [68] and other 
key metadata such as a certificate expiry date and a key usage. If the key expiry date is 
defined, the system using such a certificate should reject it for further use and revoke it. 
Certificate templates based on different certificate purposes specify whether and when 
keys should expire. Normally such a key life-time is defined with days, months, 
sometimes years. Rarely RSA keys are set without an expiry date under the PKC. 
2.6.2 Symmetric and Asymmetric Keys 
The most common cryptographic key categorisation is derived from symmetric and 
asymmetric algorithms. In symmetric encryption such as AES [66], the same key could 
both encrypt and decrypt the message. This key is also referred to as a secret key because 
it requires higher security safeguards to keep it secret and exchange with parties to encrypt 
and decrypt the message. History shows that symmetric encryption has a significant 
disadvantage when it comes to the key exchange between parties. This cryptographic 
construct weakness helped Polish mathematicians during World War II breaking Enigma, 
the cryptographic hardware-based algorithm used by Germans to exchange strategic 
information [69]. French counterparts managed to steal symmetric shared keys what 
helped Polish cryptographers breaking the algorithm. Fortunately, modern symmetric 
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algorithms follow the Kerckhoff’s principle, where the encryption algorithm is known to 
parties, although decryption keys are kept secret. Unlike Enigma, the AES cryptographic 
primitive is an official open encryption standard, where the security boundary starts and 
ends at the key itself. AES algorithm does not leave much space for tampering giving 
limited adversary surface for backdoor implementation [70]. 
On the contrary to symmetric cryptography, the asymmetric algorithm uses two different 
keys, one to encrypt and the other to decrypt the message, or to sign and then verify the 
message authenticity. Keys used by this cryptographic primitive are often referred as a 
public and a private key. The divulged key used for initial encryption or signature 
verification is called a public key. The other that is kept a secret is referred to as a private 
key and could be used to decrypt or sign the message. DH, RSA and elliptic-curve 
cryptography (ECC) [71], [72] are one of the most commonly implemented public key 
cryptographic algorithms. 
2.6.3 Algorithm Security Lifetime 
From the data perspective, the data kept at rest is exposed not only to current 
cryptographic vulnerabilities. Encrypted data stored for a time exceeding algorithm 
security lifetime (ASL) [73] is exposed to potential future threats. The time length during 
which the data has to be protected should be taken into account [66] when selecting the 
cryptographic algorithm. ASL for asymmetric encryption is relatively short in 
comparison to symmetric encryption mostly due to a public key that by design is known 
to different parties. The greatest challenge that shortened ASL of all the commonly used 
cryptographic algorithms is quantum computing and the high computational power that 
comes with it. 
2.6.4 Quantum Computing 
Although quantum computing does not pose a direct threat to all modern cryptographic 
algorithms, it could be successfully used to break most of the commonly used asymmetric 
key algorithms [74] and also symmetric encryptions if too short key sizes are used. 
Quantum computers, unlike traditional binary machines, use quantum bits. The qubits 
could exist simultaneously in two states representing 0 and 1, what is called 
superposition. High parallel processing power quantum computer achieves via 
entanglement, a state of two initially completely independent qubits that became 
entangled [75]. Such qubits cannot change states independently hence if one qubit 
changes state the other changes the state as well. In n qubits [qb] computer the 
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entanglement allows 2" simultaneous operations. This implicates the most obvious attack 
on a cryptographic construct by efficiently factorizing all possible keys. A more 
sophisticated challenge for cryptography is a Shor’s algorithm [76] allowing factorization 
of large prime numbers m is making RSA algorithm vulnerable to the first actual Shor’s 
algorithm quantum implementation. 
The RSA algorithm strength comes from a difficulty to produce large prime factors [68], 
therefore even with large keys, this algorithm is no longer secure under quantum 
processing paradigm [74]. Shor’s algorithm could be used to solve discrete logarithm 
problems what could be leveraged to break elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) over Galois 
Fields (GF) [77]. It would require 1000[qb] to efficiently factorize 160-bit ECC GF keys. 
In regard to symmetric cryptography, the quantum computer could be used to factorise 
data encryption standard (DES) keys. Although DES is not considered to be a secure [78] 
it is still being used by many organisations. It could be broken using current 
computational power, however, with Grover’s algorithm [79] applied on a quantum 
computer, the adversary could construct tables for every possible DES key finding all 
possible collisions with √𝑛 searches over 𝑛 unsorted database records. 
2.6.1 Key Management System (KMS) 
Security of cryptographic schema is not only about algorithms but mostly about the 
implementation. Insufficient safeguards behind key management give the adversary an 
advantage over the most sophisticated and secure cryptographic primitive [73]. Key 
management systems (KMS) aim to keep key management under strict governance. The 
key management should be aligned with a protected data type, algorithm security lifetime 
(ASL), a key crypto-period and a cryptographic schema itself. Quantum computing is the 
threat with the highest concern for cryptographic keys security [80]. It has been proven 
that the efficient keys factorisation [76] and highly efficient searching over unsorted data 
sets, i.e. factorised key tables [79], allow an attacker to compromise the security of legacy 
as well as cloud-based systems. KMS system consists of different Crypto modules that 
are components extending KMS cryptographic functions and constraining key security 
boundaries. 
A hardware security module (HSM) provides both physical and logical security 
boundaries for the protected key. However, KMS could consist only of logical software 
layer module. HSM implements several cryptographic safeguards including 
cryptographic modules and random number generators (RNG) and some of the products 
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already implement quantum number generators (QRNG) [81]. Unfortunately, mostly 
financial instructions and governments, rarely medical care and enterprises consider HSM 
implementation. Most often KMS boundary starts and ends at the single database level 
where either entire database is encrypted or only specific sensitive tables [82]. The keys, 
however, that encrypt this database is either cached locally, stored in rights-protected files 
or are kept in the system registry. HSM is an appliance that often keeps key–encryption 
keys in a dedicated security boundary with own security procedures and own network. 
From GDPR perspective, often legacy logical software KMS gives better protection than 
the protection offered by cloud service provider (CSP) due to legal and jurisdictional 
issues. Proper identity federation could provide sufficient security boundary for cloud 
identity, where actual credentials are kept either on-premises or are hosted by certified 
local CSP [21]. 
Considering commercial cloud-based KMS that is a part of some corporate grade cloud 
suite, Microsoft has implemented HSM support for its information rights management 
(IRM) solution, MS Rights Management Services Online or Azure RMS [7]. It supports 
key and data encryption using both cloud-based and on-premises HSM modules. 
Unfortunately, only limited data scope could be covered with on-premises HSM, what in 
most cases provides sufficient safeguards for keys integrity and confidentiality [73]. Keys 
stored outside of a legal jurisdiction in countries like Switzerland could cause concerns 
as the local data protection law is considered equal or even more restrictive than existing 
European Union regulations [83]. 
2.6.2 Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) 
Encrypted data require secure key repositories able to perform revocation when 
necessary. In cloud-based implementations, IBE works efficiently by introducing 
ephemeral cryptographic keys. In IBE, with public key encryption, the public key can be 
derived from a unique identity identifier. Therefore, this approach reduces the need for 
certificate authorities and public key certificates [84]. While public key cryptography 
(PKC) successfully protected data in large environments offering high scalability across 
various security boundaries, the IBE can simplify the encryption management offering 
sufficient security at the same time [85]. 
As an example, one institution can release an encrypted report with keys to other 
institution, which can only access it during the strictly controlled period. Identity-
based cryptography (IBC) is a technology already considered for secure data sharing in 
the cloud. Identity-based encryption (IBE) could be [10] easily scalable across several 
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security boundaries. Considering the fact that most of private cloud service providers 
(CSP) offer trusted or semi-trusted platforms to store data, the combination of both native 
CSP security and IBE applied by data owner through access control framework might 
deliver an acceptable level of security required to protect personal and non-personal data. 
The concept where the public key could be derived from any arbitrary text was proposed 
in 1984 [86], however, the first practical IBE implementation waited until early 2000. 
Different types of IBE schemes provide benefits for different system models. The first 
working IBE scheme relies on Weil pairings with security based on the computational 
Diffie-Hellman assumption [10]. Another IBE schema dated around the same time as BF 
is based on the difficulty of distinguishing quadratic residues from non-residues in the 
ring with RSA two large primes products [87]. This model outputs long ciphertexts as a 
product of relatively slow bit by bit encryption. 
One approach to effective key lifecycle management is forward-secure hierarchical 
identity-based encryption (fs-HIBE) with self-expiring keys. fs-HIBE has been 
successfully used for several identities and access management for IAM implementations. 
It allows secure dynamic joins between identities, making use of time constraints and 
dynamic key revocation [84]. Multiple hierarchical ID-based encryption schemes 
(MHIBE) is another concept derived from a generalisation of fs-HIBE. MHIBE is not 
only highly suitable for federated identity management systems such as this but, because 
of the ability of encryption with multiple ID-tuples, it can be efficiently used with the 
role-based access control (RBAC) systems implementations [84]. 
While most of the currently used public key-based schemes are easily breakable using a 
quantum computing, there are public key primitives based on lattices that could stand the 
new computing power challenge. Lattice-based cryptography was proposed by Ajtai in 
1996 [88] although it waited two decades to be recognised as one of the most promising 
long-term methods to protect information. Following lattices, the NTRU was the first 
open source public key system based on Ajtai work. By changing the setup, it was 
possible to create an IBE over lattices such as relatively small the key and the cyphertext 
sizes are acceptable for actual real-life implementation [89]. 
Last and the most promising approach to amend the IBE construct for post-quantum 
computing was made by defining IBE pairing over isogenous pairing groups (IPG) [14]. 
The IBE-IPG does not change the initial IBE construct but only amends the way the 
curves are evaluated for morphisms. Isogeny, in other words, looks at elliptic curves 
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morphisms not only as regular curves but curves that have a specific shape. Thanks to 
this observation the Weil pairing used in IBE BF [10] could also be constructed under 
isogeny and with a reduced schema amendment the existing system could be adapted as 
the new quantum safe construct. 
2.6.3 IBE with Authenticated Encryption 
Authenticated encryption with authenticated data (AEAD) was initially introduced as an 
extension of authenticated encryption (AE) where cryptographic construction could 
deliver not only message confidentiality but also data integrity. AE ensures 
confidentiality against an active adversary that can decrypt the ciphertext. The product of 
AE authenticated message is only a ciphertext, while in AEAD an encrypted message is 
accompanied by a plain text data that can be used to efficiently evaluate the message 
authenticity before any other crypto techniques are involved. 
Authenticated identity-based encryption (Authenticated IBE) delivers both message 
confidentiality and integrity on top of IBE [90]. To empower security of our model data 
integrity should have additional safeguards, this is where we decided to use Authenticated 
IBE. Authenticated IBE could ensure that both XACML policy and OOXML document 
content cannot tamper. In cloud space only digitally-signed documents give a non-
repudiation assurance. In other words, author of a document, e.g. general medical 
practitioner (GP), can be sure that document content after being signed has not been 
falsified by any adversary [5]. The only bottleneck of Authenticated ABE is that unlike 
standard AE here encryption and signing are separate operations, therefore, are more 
expensive operations, although this crypto approach satisfies security requirements. 
2.6.4 Obfuscation 
Obfuscation methods aim to hide data, so it cannot be directly processed. Obfuscated data 
allows the object owner to reveal only the necessary information required to execute an 
operation on that information without exposing PII part. For example, a health cloud-
based services provider (CSP) could introduce a technique where patient’s identity is not 
a subject of an exchange between parties; instead, unique pseudonyms are exchanged 
between parties to securely satisfy claims [4]. 
Obfuscation uses basic cryptographic techniques to hide rather than encrypt a data. These 
methods use keys and functions to derive obfuscated information that corresponds to 
sensitive information, i.e. identity metadata, but which do not disclose actual information 
[4]. To decide which part of identity metadata should be obfuscated, policy-based 
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obfuscation can be used, where different policies enforce obfuscation of specific fields 
before these are made available for cloud-based processing. The privacy manager 
implementation proposed in [4] for personal data obfuscation can almost transparently 
integrate with existing applications. Thus, this is a reasonable safeguard that ensures data 
security due-care principals. 
2.6.5 Anonymisation 
Another approach is anonymisation. Several types of research suggest that personal data 
requires further safeguards, where actual information cannot be simply linked with an 
individual, therefore, can protect personal rights and, at the same time, following relevant 
legal consent, deliver useful research or other materials. Access to the anonymised part 
of identity metadata mostly applies to medical research [91], where medical staff and 
research students can benefit from previous medical records to save peoples’ lives. 
Technically, in research, it is acceptable to process an anonymised data. K-anonymisation 
techniques are widely studied as part of artificial intelligence research. They apply to 
dataset processing where sophisticated attack techniques like data linking (data inference) 
can be used to uniquely identify individual from among other records that are not directly 
exposed for processing [92]. Quasi-Identifiers (QIs) can be derived using k-anonymity 
from the table of k number of records, where the k-anonymous table ensures anonymity 
of the QI from among other k-1 records [93]. K-anonymisation can be effectively used to 
deliver statistical data securely. Therefore, all personal data processing, which requires 
generalised information rather than identity-specific data should be delivered via 
anonymisation. Here, as an example, effectively anonymised information exchanged 
between parties or exposed to the general public for research purposes will help others to 
base their work on personal data, that when non-anonymised would be restricted for 
processing because of the data protection. Students who need to study patients’ history 
rather than an individual patient’s case would have access to extensive knowledge-base 
of securely indexed and anonymised data. 
Existing XML obfuscation [4] and anonymisation [93] are techniques, which provide 
high-performance searching and indexing algorithms, ensuring the accessibility required. 
Both techniques could be potentially used for most of the implementation. However, 
complexity of efficient obfuscation or anonymisation platform may be much higher than 
any encryption applied on top of the protected data. 
 31 
2.7 Integrity and Authenticity 
Identity meta-data must provide the most accurate information possible. It should ensure 
not only data quality but also data integrity and authenticity. Data quality can be 
maintained with well-designed XML ontologies applied at different identity metadata 
contexts. Data integrity gives assurance that data has not been amended since the last 
valid data change was committed. Authenticity ensures that the subject identified as the 
last data processor initiated the data transaction. Because changes made over the identity 
metadata are not accountable at the identity metadata level, they require dedicated 
functionality responsible for accounting. Identity metadata itself needs to deliver a basic 
integrity and an authenticity assurance. This assurance could be guaranteed with a digital 
signature applied to the part of the information that requires data integrity. As the digital 
signature could be derived not only from the information but could be bound with a 
unique identifier, it is used for information, which requires data authenticity [94]. 
As an example, in medical report authenticity of information is crucial to verify that 
diagnoses made have not been amended by the illegitimate party. When a patient’s 
personal record was updated by some medical personnel, and afterwards the same 
information was changed either by a patient or another healthcare staff member, this later 
change has to be uniquely distinguished from all previously made changes. For identity 
metadata, we need to ensure that a malicious or ignorant subject did not amend the 
information, that information was changed in the current identity context, and an entitled 
subject processed that information. 
The access control models we described here use signing for non-repudiation and 
integrity enforcement; however, identity meta-data requires the same enforcement at the 
level of actual data. For instance, using an emergency access example, where a medical 
professional need to access a patient’s data to check their medical history if an 
unauthorised subject (including the data owner) amended medical history, it may have 
critical consequences leading to patient’s death. 
Digital signing cryptography requires secure keys to derive a signature. Public-key 
infrastructure (PKI) and ID-based signing (IBS) are two different approaches we can use 
to deliver keys [95]. While PKI involves trusted certification authorities (CAs) to certify 
public keys and bind them with a digital identity, in IBS the public key consists of an 
identity unique identifier. Therefore, it simplifies the implementation model by 
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eliminating CA entity from key management lifecycle However, it introduces other 
required by IBS system entities. 
To keep the identity metadata model as homogeneous as possible and therefore potential 
framework simple, we will focus on IBS as a preferred digital signing technique. IBS and 
IBE share the same concept for secure key management. IBS, unlike PKI, can use 
certificates issued by an involved trusted authority (TA) based on identity identifier and 
the assigned public key. IBS certificate does not require a CA, as it is a simple digital 
signature derived from a public key and a unique identity identifier [95]. As an alternative 
to certificates, IBS can utilise the hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) discussed 
above as a preferred identity metadata encryption method. Hierarchical IBS (HIBS) 
schemas become very useful when combined with HIBE [96] as HIBE schema derived 
from content encryption can be transformed into HIBS schema. The digital signing and 
verification processes are therefore simplified. 
2.7.1 XACML Accountability and Auditing 
Furthermore, not only data, i.e. OOXML, but also access policy may require 
accountability allowing incident identification showing when, how and by whom the 
initial data owner access rights were tampered or simply legitimately changed. XACML 
policy could be signed. However, it does not guarantee non-repudiation and does not 
provide any historical information [97]. Same functionality used for OOXML could be 
leveraged for XACML policy as XACML data incorporated as a part of the OOXML 
package inherits security safeguards from its wrapper. 
2.7.2 Merkle Trees applications 
Various applications are leveraging Merkle trees construct designed to ensure distributed 
data or database integrity like in [98]. Blockchain and git repositories, the most popular, 
have the required functionality available already as a cloud-based service. For secure 
construct, the consistent OOXML data versioning requires a single globally available 
chain of all the changes. Document changes have to be consistent and relate only to one 
previous version. Users should not be able to commit the same version updates with two 
different contents simultaneously. Merkle Trees could ensure that and allow quick and 
efficient verification of data and its version in large data structures. Simple hashing, a 
cryptographic primitive leveraged by Merkle trees ensures the integrity of the current and 
the preceding tree leaf. 
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2.7.2.1 Data Versioning with Blockchain 
Blockchain maintains one central chain of all the transactions. The single chain usually 
consists of the latest blockchain hash. XACML policy instance and OOXML package 
versions could be located on a centralised blockchain what guarantees document 
integrity. Data editor who wishes to commit a new version has to ensure that the version 
committed is a direct ascendant from the latest committed version. In the case where new 
version from a different version ancestor has to be committed to the chain, a new 
transaction for version cancelation has to be added to the blockchain by the authorised 
actor. Classical blockchain implementation maintains basic transaction metadata unlike 
Git repositories, where the entire data history is stored. Excluding the consensus available 
in blockchain, these are both very similar. 
2.7.2.2 Changes History via Git Repository 
In Git everyone may have several branches ascendant from the same data. Consequently, 
everyone could commit the latest version into a chain by resolving conflicts with the latest 
committed version. Unlike blockchain, in Git the content matters regardless of the branch 
while in blockchain the final consensus matters regardless of the content. Entire OOXML 
package and XACML policy history can be stored and hosted simultaneously using single 
Git repository. Package data could be either stored in unencrypted format, what has many 
functional features compared to a single branch consisting only encrypted versions. 
2.8 Authentication 
Identity as an access attempt subject identifies itself and initiates authentication flow. 
Before the authentication decision is made, a target system needs to meet basic 
requirement namely it has to support the same authentication protocol. Several factors 
will determine whether an authentication framework will suit end-user, medical 
institutions, organisation or enterprise needs. Multi-factor authentication model 
empowers authenticity and can be an enhancement to the most common username and 
password exchange. Something you know is the Type 1 authentication factor specifying 
anything that identity owner knows and what can be verified like password, passphrase, 
mother’s maiden name, ATM PIN, and so on. Something you have constitutes the Type 
2 factor allowing authentication authority to verify whether the person owns physical 
object during authentication flow. This can be any electrical device like a one-time token 
generator, memory stick, smart card, and so on. Finally, the last Type 3 factor, the 
something you are verifies the identity of the owner physical unique features, that 
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includes all types of biometrics like fingerprints, hand geometry, retina and iris patterns, 
body movement, voice prints etc. [99]. On top of these three basic authentication factors, 
there is an additional identity specific factor somewhere you are, which, in a cloud 
environment, can be simply verified, and additional claims are often transparent to the 
authentication initiator. 
Authentication system usability is often achieved with a single sign-on (SSO) model 
where the subject, here identity once authenticated is allowed to pass other trusted 
systems authentication challenges without being prompted. The bottleneck of SSO is that 
when implemented without well-defined authenticator policies and with lack of multi-
factor authentication can expose even highly secure systems. If identity is compromised, 
all SSO-enabled systems will accept subject authentication claims as legitimate without 
further verification [99]. Recently Microsoft warned about new Zero-Day vulnerability 
allowing an attacker to take control over active end-user session through crafted MS 
Office document using built-in Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) functionality. Such 
compromised session in SSO enabled environment maintains unsecured access to all 
interconnected systems. 
Cloud-based data sharing model to perform any activities as an access attempt subjects 
or simply as a passive accessed object should support several authentication technologies 
and methods including multi-factor authentication and SSO. Only by re-authentication or 
progressive identity authentication using different factors the data can be effectively 
protected and hosted in a shared cloud space. 
In a cloud computing era any closed trusted environments can provide the best possible 
security in terms of information confidentiality and integrity, however, such 
environments fail to deliver high availability. Therefore, these solutions will have 
difficulties to sustain. New global identity and data sharing models require authentication 
that will bring data securely into the shared cloud space, where global organisations and 
institutions such as medical, financial, educational, government frameworks aiming to 
protect shared data require a reliable and efficient authentication method. Furthermore, 
cloud computing seeks for authentication protocols that are easy to integrate with existing 
internal infrastructures. Kerberos is one of the most popular authentication protocols, 
which successfully secured large infrastructures. However, since it was challenged with 
cloud-based authentication, it never adapted to new open cloud space [100] without the 
use of new protocols like Secure Assertion Markup Language (SAML) or WS-Security. 
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2.8.1 Kerberos 
Kerberos is the most popular authentication protocol implemented by some of the largest 
world organisations and institutions. Many medical institutions use Kerberos as a 
standalone authentication technology or adapted it as a part of Microsoft Active Directory 
Domain Services (MS AD DS) product suite. Because of Kerberos architecture, it is often 
used for single sign-on solutions within relatively closed security boundaries. Any non-
kerberized and not joined environment has to maintain its identity repository and 
authentication, and authorisation systems. Let assume a medical doctor or a general 
practitioner (GP) have an account in Kerberos federated institutions environment (see 
Figure 8) and is coming to use X-Ray medical facility where GP does not have any 
credentials, therefore due to Kerberos constrains the GP is not able to use the facility with 
currently owned federated account [100]. 
 
Figure 8. A trusted subsystem – no Kerberos token exchange possible (source Bertocci, 2011) 
In terms of cloud-ready technologies, the Kerberos relies on private-key cryptography 
where all involved sides have to protect a shared private-key [99]. Even though 
technically cloud service can be integrated with existing internal Kerberos based 
authentication systems, in a real-life scenario, for a cloud-based service provider, it 
becomes difficult to obtain approval from customer’s information security officer for 
firewall policy amendments. To operate Kerberos requires additional network ports to be 
open (TCP/UDP 88), what should include Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services 
(MS AD DS) LDAP ports (TCP 389, 636), as having these two technologies together 
customer can receive comprehensive access control service. 
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2.8.2 SAML 
Looking at other modern authentication protocols SAML is one of the promising cloud-
friendly standards offering very high cross-platform compatibility. SAML was 
successfully used for global single sign-on (SSO) solutions and was implemented in 
several products offering federated identity functions [100]. It is interoperable with 
various legacy authentication and authorisation systems, and it communicates at a high 
HTTP protocol layer. Therefore, it does not require any modifications to egress firewall 
access policies at the customer side. SAML will leverage TCP ports 80 and 443, which 
by default are open in most of the networks passing in the World Wide Web (WWW) 
contents. It defines a protocol and token XML structure schema including the use of 
simple object access protocol (SOAP) wrapper to exchange standardised messages 
between involved authentication flow parties [101]. 
SAML assertion consists of several features, and in the most generic simplification, it 
contains information about the issuer of the token and most often it is expressed using 
Distinguished Name format from X509. It has the subject information of all assertion 
statements including subject confirmation for relying party (RP) to verify the assertion 
relationship between the sender and the subject. Additionally, the assertion is a constraint 
with conditions that are part of the assertion. These constraints validate the time frame 
when assertion can be evaluated as well as define a recipient or an audience of the 
assertion (e.g. RP). SAML assertion also includes an attribute statement related to the 
subject, which in WS-Federation are equivalents of claims [100]. Authentication 
statement informs parties about initial authentication of the subject. Assertion also 
includes information about authorisation against the object for which access was claimed 
and this part is called an authorisation statement. It indicates whether a subject can access 
an object (resource) the way it is specified in the request. Finally, a digital signature 
verifies the integrity of the token contents, so RP is assured of the authenticity of the 
assertion. Advice is optional information related to the authorisation itself. 
2.9 Access Control 
2.9.1 Role Based Access Control 
Most of the mature modern access control models that are ready to securely protect the 
asset (such as PII) from unauthorised access hardly span outside a simple boundary [42]. 
The well-known model, role-based access control (RBAC) can be easily adapted for 
highly secure end-to-end identity provisioning and revocation within specific security 
contexts. A role is assigned with an identity for a set of transactions, for example, as the 
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ability for a general practitioner (GP) to access patient data and take further actions 
according to new circumstances and patient history [102] then update the patient record. 
This access control model controls the subject access over the object, based on roles 
assigned to the subject in the organisation, which defines a security boundary [58]. 
Often roles can span across several systems; here, well-integrated infrastructures can 
ensure role change enforcement on the end system. Furthermore, well-defined roles and 
consistent RBAC system implementation are safeguards against several security threats 
such as collusion, creeping privileges, and excessive privileges. Enforcement of 
separation of duties is a countermeasure for collusion attack [103], while the principle of 
least privilege overcomes problems of creeping privileges and excessive privileges [99]. 
Although RBAC ensures high security within an organisation, it does not introduce a 
namespace that can be implemented across organisations, for example, in open cloud 
space. 
The identity metadata requires the RBAC concept with its several variations to enforce 
control and secure identity with its metadata in the cloud. To protect a policy that is 
applied to the object in the cloud and accessed as a part of RBAC transaction the part that 
exposes the policy can be encrypted [58]. 
The new concept of Cryptographic RBAC for the cloud addresses several security threats 
that have roots in early RBAC architectures, where this access control model had closed 
security boundaries such as enterprises, organisations and institutions. Role-based 
Encryption is a model that allows data encryption before it is handed-over to the cloud 
service provider (CSP), thus ensuring that only data owners and identities that hold the 
required access role can decrypt the information. 
Identity metadata requires also clearly defined ontology to reach Cloud maturity for 
RBAC. Several approaches are emerging that introduce standardised RBAC in different 
sectors, one, the Enhanced RBAC, is focused on clinical education, biomedical research, 
and patient care [35]. This work highlights the fact that there is a need to define strict 
ontologies where Enhanced RBAC could be applied. These ontologies would constrain 
and help to define ontology dedicated for personal data and sensitive personal data (e.g. 
related to patient medical history or personal assets) to allow only secure access control 
over such data in the cloud. 
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RBAC implementations have a couple of disadvantages such as a lack of global public 
standard defining roles in a public sector, also roles aging, where business changes outrun 
actual roles implementations, and one the most important one is the single point of failure. 
In case of an attack, the adversary could compromise the central access management 
system. XML-based data where RBAC is used to control access can still be protected 
using a distributed access control system [104]. Distributed access control systems can 
be scaled and adapted for cloud-based implementations. This problem was also addressed 
with cryptographic RBAC (C-RBAC) [58] and, unlike the distributed access control 
approach; this model was designed for cloud-based IAM systems implementation. C-
RBAC uses policies that are enforced via cloud services, which can be controlled in a 
decentralised manner by the data owner. 
Finally, to deliver the fully homogeneous model, the ARBAC97 and SARBAC models 
can be used to provide control over RBAC systems including granular role hierarchy 
amendments, new policy definitions and all other administrative operations which are 
fully controlled via a dedicated roles set [58]. 
2.9.2 Attribute-Based Access Control 
Recently widely discussed data protection approach is access models based on attribute-
based encryption (ABE). The concept itself combines cryptography and elements of 
access control. The attribute-based access control (ABAC) provides another approach to 
govern access, by giving the data owner full control over their data. In the ABAC model, 
roles are bound to role attributes and are attached to a data element through attributes 
based encryption (ABE) [105]. The ABAC model can coexist with RBAC and easily 
enables RBAC beyond a single security boundary [42]. 
ABE allows the data owner to encrypt the personal data under specific attributes. Same 
attributes are attached to subjects who will process the data [6]. The identity metadata 
model and especially PII part have to use access control system with encryption applied 
to access control properties that are attached to data. The ABE model has been proposed 
as the most suitable technology for cloud-based global data access [105], although ABAC 
among other access control models described here have specific features in combination 
that can satisfy the identity metadata. There seems to be an increasing interest in ABE as 
demand on electronic health-care systems has grown in the last few years [6]. 
Attribute-based infrastructures have been proposed as ready for handling PII information, 
for instance, a special implementation of ABE called ciphertext policy ABE (CP-ABE) 
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with message broadcasting enables an ABAC system to perform ad-hoc direct revocation 
[106]. As with RBAC, the main problem with CP-ABE is that a single trust authority 
(TA) that can be used to decrypt data. Key escrow enables a single TA to decrypt all the 
information and a compromised TA provides the potential attacker access to all the 
protected data. A way to overcome this problem is multiple-authority ABE (MA-ABE) 
where each TA releases only a partial secret key that is used to encrypt information. On 
the other hand key revocation under this approach creates a bottleneck where each TA 
needs to be involved in a keys lifecycle [6]. 
While CP-ABE allows data owners to decide on attribute structure defining permissions 
before encrypting data sent into the cloud, the other approach key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) 
uses policies to define permissions, and the data owner assigns attributes to define 
encrypted data [106]. Service managing policies for KP-ABE automatically generates 
access structure for the data then combines access policies into keys [6]. 
Early ABAC implementations [11] suffered from dynamic membership control. 
However, later [107], [108], [106] ABE was reviewed and empowered with attribute 
revocation functionality that enabled the fundamental access control functions required 
for cloud-based access management. Each ABE construct [11], [84], [108], [106], [105] 
concentrates on cryptographic operations under several attributes. ABE makes cloud-
based authorisation a cryptography-centric due to highly constrained implementations by 
selected ABE primitives. ABE implementations leverage many fundamental access 
control techniques like Break-Glass [6] where data could be accessed in an emergency 
scenario with a post-factum approval or a justification. Also, time-constrained attributes 
[106], [105] technique that compliments the access control system using ABE. Despite 
the fact that ABE is functionally related to attribute-based access control (ABAC) model, 
it seems it has never been wider discussed in the context of standardisation to simplify 
global integration for secure and flexible access control. 
2.9.2.1 XACML 
XACML is a policies standard from OASIS. Attached to a data piece could represent a 
sticky policy. This policy model defines tuple relationships where a subject performs a 
particular action against an object (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Access Tuple 
Actions or access attempts are strictly controlled with XACML policy, which introduces 
the concept of obligations. Traditional discretionary access control (DAC) models come 
rather with static conditions where access decisions are made upon subject entitlements 
gathered in technically constraint security boundary. Here policy includes obligations 
separating stateless access conditions from stateful security context oriented conditions 
[109]. In other words, authorisation decisions can depend on subject attributes such as 
location-somewhere you are factor, relationship to other subjects, time, previous 
authorisation decision and others. It is also dependent on object state including a target 
system or resource state. 
 
Figure 10 XACML Policy Construct 
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Figure 11 Policy language model [97] 
This policy data model comprises of three elements (see Figure 10 and Figure 11): rule, 
policy and policy set [97]. The rule is the most fundamental piece of policy defining the 
target, which is an object in the access attempt tuple, the effect that can be expected after 
evaluation of the rule. E.g. rule ensures, that highly confidential content object, i.e. target 
can be processed by the subject located only in countries specified by the policy 
condition. XAML condition is representing a Boolean expression resulting in True or 
False. Policy, the next XACML element, is a rules wrapper that can be passed amongst 
data-flow entities. It is constructed with a policy target, where, in a sticky policy model, 
the Target delivers only additional classification meta-data for the enclosed document. 
The rule-combining algorithm defines how the composite rules results are combined. 
XACML version 3.0 defines several policies and rule-combining algorithms [97]: 
• Extended Indeterminate values – used to hide potential inconclusive decisions 
allowing only Permit or Deny while the PDP needs to enumerate “indeterminate” 
values to combine rules and policies. 
• Deny-overrides – used to take logical Deny decision if any rule or policy results in 
Deny. Execution of all rules is stopped immediately after the first encountered Deny 
result. Permit result is only possible when none of the evaluated policies and rules 
gave Deny result (see Table 5). Policies, policy sets or rules may be executed in any 
order. 
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• Ordered-deny-overrides – same as Deny-overrides used to take logical Deny 
decision if any rule or policy results in Deny. The only difference is that the rules 
evaluation order is predetermined by the policy containing rules listed in strictly 
predefined order (see Table 6). Same policies are evaluated in the order specified in 
the policy set. 
• Permit-overrides – used to take logical Permit decision if any of rules or policies 
results to Permit. Evaluation of all rules or policies will stop immediately if at least 
one results to Permit (see Table 7). Policies, policy sets or rules may be executed in 
any order. 
• Ordered-permit-overrides – same as Permit-overrides used to take logical Permit 
decision if any rule or policy results in Permit state. The difference is the rules 
evaluation order; it is predetermined by the policy containing rules listed in strictly 
predefined order (see Table 8). Same policies are evaluated in the order specified in 
the policy set. 
• Deny-unless-permit – used to hide potential inconclusive decisions allowing only 
Deny decision before any rule or policy evaluates to Permit (see Table 9). Algorithm 
never results to either “Indeterminate” or “NotApplicable”. 
• Permit-unless-deny – unlike Deny-unless-permit, here all rules or policies evaluate 
to Permit unless the first Deny occurrence (see Table 10). Algorithm hides the non-
conclusive results hence results to neither “Indeterminate” nor “NotApplicable”. 
• First-applicable – stops evaluation if any of the rules or policies resulted in 
conclusive Permit or Deny state (see Table 11). If an error occurs while evaluating 
the condition of a rule, then the evaluation stops, and the policy evaluates to 
“Indeterminate”, with the appropriate error status. 
• Only-one-applicable – unlike other combining algorithms this applies only to Policy 
Set; algorithm evaluates to Permit or Deny only when only one child returns valid 
Permit or Deny decision (see Table 12). 
• Legacy Deny-overrides – designed for all the cases where Deny result should have 
precedence over Permit decision (see Table 13). This combining algorithm is 
depreciated. 
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• Legacy Ordered-deny-overrides – same as Deny-overrides, used where Deny result 
should take precedence over Permit decision (see Table 14). The rules evaluation 
order is predetermined by the policy containing rules listed in strictly predefined 
order. This combining algorithm is depreciated. 
• Legacy Permit-overrides – here Permit result should take precedence over any Deny 
decision (see Table 15). This combining algorithm is depreciated. 
• Legacy Ordered-permit-overrides – same as Permit-overrides, Permit result takes 
precedence over other Deny decisions (see Table 16). The rules evaluation order is 
predetermined by the policy containing rules listed in strictly predefined order. This 
combining algorithm is depreciated. 
Finally, the last XACML element, the policy set (see Figure 10) is constructed with the 
target and set of policies. The possibility of Policy and PolicySet nesting gives many 
possibilities to represent access conditions, however, from an architectural perspective, it 
seems reasonable to keep the policy relatively flat and constrained by templates from a 
given TA context same as in [8]. Considering time required to evaluate complex policies 
and PolicySets the despite available XACML features, the policy words should be 
reduced to a minimum [110]. The interesting functional part that is defined by XACML 
is obligations and advice. The obligation is a must requirement compared to non-
obligatory advice, which can be considered during access control decision. 
Obligations are stateful actions that must be taken upon authorisation decision. Only the 
possibility to evaluate context distinguish obligations from regular stateless access 
conditions [111]. Obligation expressions are evaluated by Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
into obligations and passed onto PEP and the advice expressions, which is the same as 
obligation expressions that are resolved into advice and passed to PEP. The obligation for 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) enforces additional stateful conditions and similar to 
obligation the advice, which is optional (unlike obligations). Obligations and advice were 
distinguished in XACML Version 3 to separate the obligation that is must statement for 
PEP from the advice that can be considered by PEP, e.g. Bob can be denied access 
because he does not have a valid email address from the educational ac.uk domain. 
OASIS empowered XACML with health-care system authentication architectures [112] 
and defined entities, i.e. Access Control Service (ACS) responsible for taking access 
control decisions. Proposed here model integrates existing architectures with an identity 
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provider (IdP) and identity-based encryption (IBE) key generator. The IBE as a preferred 
encryption method leverages XACML policy as an encryption key that attached to the 
OOXML package remains in plaintext and follows the package ensuring data 
confidentiality before successful data access authorisation. 
To enforce access rules in real productive implementations, it is reasonable to consider a 
way to efficiently transform XML-formatted policies from and to an abstract object-
oriented construct that delivers all programming interfaces required to automate policy 
creation and evaluation. One of the most applicable techniques that could be used here is 
a data serialisation. This is the encoding method where objects of any type are effectively 
translated into series of bytes, words or even into higher level formatted JSON and XML 
language structure. Serialisation techniques are widely used in programming to share 
objects between services implemented under Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). 
Dedicated serialisation methods can improve the performance of data translation or 
transposition from relational databases into XACML [113]. Well-designed serialisation 
components can deliver interface between legacy systems used in medical institutions, 
enterprises or governments and modern cloud-based services. Frameworks or systems 
that provide cloud-based access control services should provide functionality that allows 
migrations or co-existence with legacy systems as the most of existing data, what includes 
medical data, is still hosted outside of the cloud. 
2.9.2.2 XrML 
XrML policy format created and patented by Xerox in 1994 with a purpose of digital 
rights management (DRM) [114]. Currently, XrML is owned by ContentGuard a private 
software company. Similar to traditional discretionary access control (DAC) XrML 
condition, access decisions are made in technically constraint security boundaries. XrML 
2.0 policy defines a principal an access control subject that is given some right defining 
predicate actions over a resource. The license is the top policy level (Figure 12) under 
which all the grants, license issuer principals and other meta-data. Grant consists of the 
remaining policy elements (see Figure 13), subject principal, the rights, resource objects 
and conditions. 
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Figure 12. License Model [114] 
 
Figure 13. Grant Model [114] 
A Principal could either define the license issuer or a subject. Among other accepted 
identifiers the principal accepts a public key cryptography-based identity allowing subject 
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definition using public and private key pairs. The principal is then defined under 
keyHolder describing identity using the public key information (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. Principal a private keyHolder having temporary print rights over e-book under URI 
Next, the principal is given certain legacy rights that are very specific for DRM systems. 
XrML 2.0 defines the following rights model: accessFolderInfo, backup, copy, delete, 
edit, embed, execute, export, extract, install, loan, manageFolder, play, print, read, 
restore, transfer, uninstall, verify and write (see Figure 15). 
<license> 
    <grant> 
        <keyHolder> 
            <info> 
                <dsig:KeyValue> 
                    <dsig:RSAKeyValue> 
                        <dsig:Modulus>Fa7wo6NYfmvGqy4ACSWcNmuQfbejSZx7aCibIg 
kYswUeTCrmS0h27GJrA15SS7TYZzSfaS0xR9lZdUEF0ThO4w==</dsig:Modulus> 
                        <dsig:Exponent>AQABAA==</dsig:Exponent> 
                    </dsig:RSAKeyValue> 
                </dsig:KeyValue> 
            </info> 
        </keyHolder> 
        <cx:print/> 
        <cx:digitalWork> 
            <cx:locator> 
                <nonSecureIndirect URI="http://www.contentguard.com/sampleBook.spd"/> 
            </cx:locator> 
        </cx:digitalWork> 
        <validityInterval> 
            <notAfter>2018-12-31T23:59:59</notAfter> 
        </validityInterval> 
    </grant> 
</license> 
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Figure 15. Right Model [114] 
 48 
 
Figure 16. Resource Model [114] 
A resource could be an e-book, audio, video or image file or any piece of information that 
could be owned by a principal (see Figure 16). Under custom setup, XrML could define 
access for an OOXML or a portable document format (PDF) file as well as email content 
[7]. 
A policy defines very basic conditions similar to XACML obligation, specifying 
circumstances under which subject could access the object (see Figure 17). Via 
conditions, the XrML could grant temporary access or access based on territory 
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preferences to the subject, e.g. movie could be only watched in the United States of 
America. 
 
Figure 17.Condition Model [114] 
2.9.3 Purpose-Based Access Control (PBAC) 
All the above access models control access based on entitlements granted and detailed 
access policies. Another model, purpose-based access control (PBAC) allows long-term 
maintenance of access granted at some point in time [52] and efficiently enforces need-
to-know and need-to-have principles. In more traditional access control model from the 
moment when access is granted to a subject via either role or direct assignment, this 
access relationship from a subject to an object is preserved over time unless relevant 
auditing procedures enforce access control review and revoke so-called creeping 
privileges [99]. This purpose justifies the subject to store, process or access an object 
[52]. It could be defined under intended purpose and access purpose categories. 
Therefore, the access decision is made based on the correlation between the intended 
purpose and the access purpose. The intended purpose falls into three components: 
allowable intended purpose (AIP), conditional intended purpose (CIP) and prohibited 
intended purpose (PIP) [51]. Where AIP defines unrestricted data access, CIP conditional 
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data access and PIP denies any access for given purpose. Combined with access purpose, 
which could consist of a single RBAC assignment, the data access is enhanced by a very 
granular control [51]. 
As the RBAC model is successful in delivering effective access control functionality and 
became widely adopted in many enterprises, it is reasonable to consider the integration 
of RBAC with policy-based access control model [51]. 
The concept of access purpose is not an integral part of any of the previously described 
access control models. This does not mean that related security procedures cannot define 
circumstances where the subject becomes entitled to process data under the defined access 
control model. The purpose-based access control model shows that there is a need for 
legal baselines and guidelines for cloud-based IAM implementations. In a global context, 
there is a risk of inconsistencies between access management systems caused by 
conflicting definitions of legally justified access purposes. It may, therefore, be simplest 
for access to PII to be governed by a single legal framework, e.g. one based either in 
Europe or the USA. This is a challenge in a world of conflicting attempts by the USA 
through FISA, Privacy Shield [115] and similar and the EU through Data Protection law 
to establish a worldwide jurisdictional reach. 
2.9.4 Break-Glass – Emergency Access 
A complete identity and access management (IAM) system consist not only of 
technologies but also of relevant security policies and procedures built to support access 
control and provide reliable accountability of a subject’s activities over an object. In most 
generic scenarios, a subject is entitled to process data when it is granted rights at some 
point in time. Rights are granted based on subject roles assignment or based on direct 
permissions applied to the object. In a secured environment, before PII data can be 
processed, the subject requires a consent [116]. 
Now let us analyse a person’s experience of an accident abroad, and where a medical 
professional need to access the patient’s personal record, which is a part of identity 
metadata and due to serious injuries, the patient is unable to approve medical access to 
that data. This scenario requires a dedicated and strictly controlled Break-Glass process 
allowing access to personal data to be subject to post-processing approval [6]. Such an 
access attempt should trigger communication channels that inform the relevant authorities 
e.g. authorized personnel of a local health-care practice where the patient is registered. 
Next, in most cases, access needs to be justified by the person performing the emergency 
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access, and then afterwards by the relevant authorities. Break-Glass action thus requires 
legal enforcement to account for each occurrence of the emergency access. 
Lightweight Break-Glass Access Control System (LiBAC) has been designed explicitly 
to take any access decision upfront and next claim the legitimate approval [117]. 
Whichever access control model is used with new identity and access control models, 
there is an increasing demand to deliver positive authorisation decision before the service 
provider evaluates entire access context. Finally, a service provider (SP) that needs to 
deliver such specialised authorisation, depends on data classification, should obtain a 
legal approval and certification proofing that it meets all security requirements. 
2.10 Conclusions 
Cloud computing to serve its purpose requires compatible standards. Consistent identity 
implementation like SCIM schema across different cloud systems, together with support 
for XACML authorisation highly improves currently weak cloud systems 
interoperability. SCIM schema facilitates identification of access control entities 
expressed in XACML policy. Therefore, it simplifies actual implementation, reduces 
system customisations and hence imposes additional economic advantageous. 
Constrained XACML dictionary compliments this research objective. OOXML however, 
has been already adapted as a standard for word processing document format. A number 
of features supported by OOXML accelerates this research around IRM and impacts the 
final SPIBE model evaluation. Various cryptographic primitives depending on 
applications could improve the IRM security. From ASL perspective symmetric 
encryption has an advantage over other asymmetric schemes. However, any key exchange 
weakens the security of the entire model. The IBE as a cryptographic scheme seems very 
flexible in terms of ASL, where actual cryptographic algorithm could be replaced with a 
new crypto primitive. Finally, IBE requires a symmetric algorithm to encrypt the data. 
Therefore, it still could have an advantage of relatively long ASL. To complement the 
proposed SPIBE construct, the blockchain that addresses integrity, non-repudiation and 
authenticity of the information, safeguards the entire information lifecycle. 
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3 Sticky Policies Approach within Cloud 
Computing 
3.1 Introduction 
Since XML was accepted as a data structure among scientists, institutions and 
organisations there were several approaches to define globally accepted schemas and 
standards. The Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards 
(OASIS) works on building standards mostly based on XML. They have standardized 
many XML-based schemas and delivered a suite of namespaces for Web Services, 
authentication and authorisation [101]. OASIS created an open standard for access 
management XACML that almost entirely implements the concept of access policies 
[97]. While sticky policies can be easily expressed with any other XML schema and 
ontology [118] we see potential in using an open standard that can be adapted across 
several institutions, organisation and enterprises as a common language in the Cloud. 
We have already mentioned the OASIS created several open standards, what includes 
security assertion markup language SAML, an open format suitable for authentication in 
the cloud [119]. Considering XACML [97] as a granular access control language SAML 
will complement the final access control framework [109] for secure data sharing in the 
cloud. 
Following open standards, Office Open XML (OOXML) is a data format created by 
several parties [62]. OOXML content can be delivered to end-user as a standalone file or 
as an online rendered document, spreadsheet, presentation or other. This standard offers 
high transparency for data conversions and data storing [120]. This data structure is easy 
to index or pre-process for efficient indexing with various database types. 
Combination of XACML, SAML, OOXML and optionally IBE delivers functionality for 
cloud-based access control framework where personally identifiable information can be 
securely stored in a public cloud space. These technologies support several best security 
practices for access control systems. In the literature review, we show that system suitable 
for medical institutions, organisations and enterprises should provide such information 
security functionality as: break-glass temporary access granted based on a policy owned 
by subject; dynamic access key revocation; and a key lease for a constrained period of 
time. 
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3.2 Identity-Based Cryptography 
Proposed here construction rearranges IBE schema model entities like in [11], where 
author proposes new approaches for IBE schema. SPIBE does not leverage Fuzzy-IBE, 
however it shares the functional concepts with a non-primary Fuzzy-IBE application. 
Since, e.g. Alice’s data access preferences, including document version are attached to a 
document in a form of a sticky policy they constitute a unique characteristic of this 
document, its identity under IBE schema. Alice, the author, does not use Bob’s, the 
recipient’s identity, but only the XACML-formatted sticky policy identifying the data in 
a security context is mapped into a public key. Finally, Bob does not use his private key, 
but after he is authorized by the trust authority (TA) policy engine the private key is 
calculated from the document sticky policy and a TA master key. 
The major SPIBE feature also described in Fuzzy-IBE is that a document shared by Alice 
does not have to be stored on a trusted storage server instead it could be hosted on any 
untrusted server, which could be freely accessed by Bob and Eve. This is a status quo for 
efficient cloud data sharing. Data could securely change its primary location without a 
major data migration. Both Bob and Eve could maintain a local copy of the document 
securely protected and shared by Alice. 
The content of the policy definitions could be encrypted using identity-based encryption 
(IBE) [85]. Both policies and data encrypted with IBE add security on top of the sticky-
policies model. However, the bottleneck of this method is that encryption applied this 
way makes data heavy-weighted [121]. 
This specific IBE implementation shares the same sticky policy concept with cyphertext 
attributes based encryption (CP-ABE) [122], however while CP-ABE is almost entirely 
focused on subject access context the IBE here, used over XACML policies requires a 
XACML policy defining also object global unique identity and its distinguished version. 
3.3 IBE-Enabled Sticky Policy 
The proposed solution combines several identity-based encryption (IBE) and policy 
framework components into a simplified model [123]. XACML policy tightens the 
security boundary for IBE and constrains the involved parties to trusted and certified 
parties only. Simplified trust authority (TA) entity is responsible for both policy 
management as well as for key management, while in actual framework these 
responsibilities should be handle by two distinguished TAs. It maintains policy templates 
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(see Figure 18) for TA responsible contexts, e.g. internal medical templates, private 
banking customer templates or human resources external candidate templates. 
 
Figure 18 Sticky Policy IBE encryption 
Policy templates together with the TA delivers IBE parameters to the editor application 
required to generate a policy public key. Based on a policy request the TA also makes an 
access decision or delegates part of the decision to a third-party TA. TA stores master key 
{s} for its domain (see Figure 19) and after positive access request decision it generates a 
policy private decryption key that is leased to the policy enforcement editor application. 
Client or server-based editor application handles a read or read-write document access 
based on the response from the TA. 
 
Figure 19 Sticky Policy IBE decryption 
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How Sticky Policy-enabled OOXML protects files? Authenticated against verified 
identity provider (IdP) Alice, in order to protect the document, selects preferred trust 
authority (TA) from a list of registered TAs, this way she receives a template of possible 
policy rules in a given security context (see Figure 20). After defining policy access rules, 
the policy set is extended by Alice rights, and together with document global unique 
identifier and a TA reference, the sticky policy is ready to protect the document. 
Alice to encrypt the document using IBE BF [10] setup requires policy public key 𝑄&'(  
therefore she generates 
𝑄&'( = 𝐻+(𝑃𝑂𝐿01) (1) 
where 𝐻+ is a hash function defined on the group 𝔾+  of prime order q such as 𝐻+: {0,1}∗ ⟶ 𝔾+∗ , which maps sticky policy 𝑃𝑂𝐿01  into a single point on an elliptic-
curve. 
Having 𝐻<:𝔾<" ⟶ {0,1}"  for some 𝑛  where under bilinear map ê  Alice generates 
random 𝑟 via random generator 𝑃 from group ℤ@ = {0, … , 𝑞 − 1} under modulo 𝑞 and 
calculates parameters: 
D 𝑈 = 𝑟𝑃𝑉 = ℯ H𝑚,𝐻< JêK𝑅MNO, 𝑟𝑄&'(PQR (2) 
where ℯ is a symmetric AES encryption function over message 𝑚 and bilinear map ê. 𝑟 
could be generated during initial setup and added to sticky policy as a document unique 
identifier. Bilinear map ê  over Alice’s public key 𝑄&'(  and a TA public key 𝑅MNO	generated from TA master key. Secret key as per IBE is derived from bilinear 
mapping ê where ê:	𝔾+ × 𝔾+ ⟶ 𝔾<. 
Both AES algorithm and function modulo are symmetric, therefore used in IBE BF [10] 
modulo operation shown in (3) is replaced with symmetric encryption function (2)	𝑒. 
𝑐 = 𝑚⨁𝐻< JêK𝑅MNO, 𝑟𝑄&'(PQ (3) 
Next, both values U, V are stored inside the OOXML document wrapper and together 
with the embedded sticky policy are shared in the cloud. Parameters same as other 
OOXML wrapped data should be protected by cloud provider at rest and in transit. 
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How Sticky Policy-enabled OOXML opens the protected file? Authenticated by the 
verified identity provider (IdP) Bob accessing the document presents the policy with the 
access request to trust authority (TA) using TA reference from the sticky policy. TA takes 
access decision and assuming its positive TA uses secret master key 𝑠 and computes 
private key (see Figure 21) for given sticky policy as follows: 
𝑆&'( = 𝑠𝑄&'( , 𝑠 ∈ ℤ@  (4) 
Next TA sends policy response together with sticky policy private key 𝑆&'(  to Bob. 
Bob can now use symmetric AES decryption function 𝒹  on parameter 𝑉  and hash 
function 𝐻<:	𝔾< → {0,1}" and decrypt the document as follows: 
𝑚 = 𝒹 J𝑉, 𝐻<Kê(𝑈, 𝑆&'()PQ (5) 
The access right specific decision is made by policy framework based on policy response 
details. However, all possible permissions are interpreted as a read or read-write rights. 
3.4 Symmetric Data-Encrypting Key 
Within the discussed IBE model a ciphertext is a product of symmetric encryption over a 
plaintext message and a public key derivate in 𝐻<:	𝔾< → {0,1}" . Hashed value 𝑘 is a 
symmetric key equal to: 
𝑘 = 𝐻< JêK𝑅MNO, 𝑟𝑄&'(PQ = 𝐻<Kê(𝑈, 𝑆&'()P (6) 
3.5 Security of Sticky Policies IBE 
In evaluated Boneh-Franklin IBE the model security depends mostly on the difficulty of 
solving bilinear Diffie Hellman problem (BDHP) [10] and also correct parameters 
selection that is must for making discrete logarithm problem (DLP) hard to solve. Based 
on the assumption that probability 𝑃𝑟  of finding message m using algorithm 𝒜  is 
negligible it has an advantage 𝜖 defined as: 
𝑃𝑟[𝒜(𝑃, 𝑎𝑃, 𝑏𝑃, 𝑐𝑃) = 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑃)cde] ≥ 𝜖 (7) 
An adversary can get an advantage in the selected model if BDHP is easy despite of DLP 
security. 
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Having {𝑃, 𝑎𝑃, 𝑏𝑃, 𝑐𝑃} 	∈ 	𝔾+, find 𝑒(𝑃, 𝑃)cde  Alice encrypts a document m and selects 
Bob as a receiver using tailored policy under selected trust authority (TA). Document is 
shared via cloud services and now only Alice – the data owner and Bob should be able to 
decrypt the data. 
Eve, the adversary, illegitimately obtained the protected document and unpacked the U, 
V parameters. Therefore, she knows the following: 
h 𝑟𝑃	 ⇐ 𝑄𝑠𝑃 = 	𝑅&jkℎ𝑃 = 𝐻+(𝑃𝑂𝐿01) = 𝑄Mmn ⇐ ∃	ℎ ∈ 	ℤ@, 𝑄Mmn ∈ 	𝔾+ (8) 
Because of (1), (2), (4), (8) having 𝑟𝑃, 𝑠𝑃 and ℎ𝑃 Eve now can derive ê(𝑃, 𝑃)pqrfrom 
the following: 
ê(𝑈, 𝑆&'() = êK𝑟𝑃, 𝑠𝑄MmnP = 	ê(𝑟𝑃, 𝑠ℎ𝑃) = ê(𝑃, 𝑃)rpq (9) 
With BDHP easy to solve we compute message 𝑚: 
𝑚 = 𝑑J𝑉, 𝐻<((𝑃, 𝑃)rpq)Q ⇐ ê(𝑃, 𝑃)rpq, (10) 
what shows that Eve can get an advantage in the selected model only if parameters are 
incorrectly selected. 
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Figure 20 Sticky Policy IBE Secure Sharing  
 
Figure 21 Sticky Policy IBE Secure Access 
3.6 Sticky Policies IBE Authenticity 
An adversary cannot tamper a policy attached to the data using the proposed method. 
Acting as a public key, the sticky policy is authenticated by IBE scheme. As in any 
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symmetric or asymmetric encryption, only the right key can be used to decrypt the cipher-
text. IBE is a public key asymmetric cryptographic primitive therefore for a given public 
key encrypting the message exists one private key decrypting the cipher-text with this 
message. If an adversary tries to change the sticky policy attached to the data in this 
construct after trust authority (TA) authorises the request, the received private key cannot 
be used to decrypt the cipher-text. Adversary having the advantage in a policy engine 
authorisation flow, that is, the TA still cannot divulge the message by tampering the sticky 
policy. 
The accepted security notion for the model [78] that could provide data non-repudiation 
assurance with an extra cryptographic operation is an Authenticated Identity-Based 
Encryption (Authenticated IBE). It delivers both message confidentiality and non-
repudiation on top of IBE scheme [90]. To implement this authorship safeguard either 
sticky policy or OOXML document metadata should carry information about the data 
owner. Sender - Alice - using her own private key can authenticate the encryption. Albeit 
it requires policy private key being leased by the TA during the initial encryption. If data 
integrity is required, there are existing Identity-Based Signature (IBS) schemes [124]. 
3.6.1 IBE Signatures 
IBE scheme can be immediately converted into a public key signature scheme. The 
private signing key is the master key {s}, while the public key is a derivate from public 
IBE TA parameters. Verification of signature 𝑆t where: 
𝑆t = 𝑠𝑄t, (11) 
is a result from both encryption of any random message 𝑚′, e.g.: 
𝑃𝑂𝐿01	Ü	𝑚′ (12) 
under IBE scheme: 
𝑐′ = 𝑚′⨁𝐻< JêK𝑅MNO, 𝑟𝑄tPQ (13) 
and successful decryption using private key 𝑆t as the decryption key: 
𝑚′ = 𝒹 J𝑉, 𝐻<Kê(𝑈, 𝑆t)PQ (14) 
 60 
This safeguard is more expensive than non-repudiation as requires separate encryption 
and signing operations, while Authenticated IBE is faster also in compare to actual IBE 
encryption. 
3.6.2 IBE Digital Signature for XACML 
Access request and especially response, if to be available across different trust authorities 
require additional safeguards. XACML response wrapped with SAML object could be 
signed and securely exchanged between parties [125].  
Furthermore, SPIBE leverages the SAML XML signing profile to deliver a private 
decryption key to policy enforcement point (PEP). Policy decision point (PDP) upon 
positive access decision sends to PEP not only signed response but also the sticky policy 
itself. Using fact that IBE digitally signed sticky policy under IBE digital signing is 
actually a SPIBE data decryption key.  
PE after policy decision point (PDP) makes positive access decision, before it is sent to 
PEP (i.e. BOB), the PE requests PKG to sign the XACML sticky policy. Under IBE 
signing (see section 3.6) sticky policy signature generation results in deriving a private 
data decryption key 𝑠𝑄&'( . The SAML authorization response would contain not only 
XACML response but upon positive access decision, the actual XACML sticky policy 
and its signature (i.e. decryption key). 
Finally, for higher security the XACML response could be also signed if other entities 
(i.e. PEP) require higher authenticity assurance. 
3.7 Sticky Policies Authorisation 
Sticky policies carry authorisation information required to protect the data. Unlike 
conventional policy framework where policy is centrally stored and referenced to data, 
here policy is attached to the data and follows it to enforce access control rules. Policy 
evaluation upon access request can check who you are, what you have, what you know, 
where you are and when and how you can access the data. For example, in countries that 
adapted OECD data protection directives [53] owner consent related to data access can 
be represented as an access rule and combined into a policy set. As mentioned before, 
data access can be constrained by time. For example, a sticky policy added to a financial 
report would define any subject rights to process the report within a defined time slot and 
before or after a specific date. 
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XACML policy defines multiple subjects construct with more than one subject involved 
in access control decision [97]. This technique implements separation of duties security 
principle. This non-cryptographic safeguard can have a functional application similar to 
attribute-based encryption (ABE), or Shamir shared secret [126] concept. While the entire 
access model document is not cryptographically protected the TA still can reject 
document access and its decryption if not all policy conditions are met. I.e. document 
could be accessed only if all subjects agree to open the file. 
XACML access request construct represents access tuples, with the subject, object and 
predicate. The subject is the data owner or data processor who wish to access the object. 
The object is the resource document that can be represented by cloud data hosting 
provider path and a unique data identifier. Predicate defines an action that subject is 
entitled to, based on the policy rules. Because of its internal XML structure, XACML 
policies are defined via attributes represented by name/value pairs. XACML sticky policy 
subject can be constrained by a technical Role [127] represented as a group in a target 
system, where, e.g. Role is equal BusinessEngineering. Because sticky policy remains 
unencrypted, its attribute values could be anonymised or obfuscated as a further 
safeguard. BusinessEngineering role could be represented by a unique global identifier 
(see Figure 22) from within given trust authority (TA) context. Several attribute-based 
encryption (ABE) work with an attribute representation using binary-state attributes 
where attributes unlike in arbitrary-state binary attributes do not directly disclose any 
information about the content of the protected message. XACML rules may remain in 
arbitrary-state However, in a form that requires attributes mapping to some predefined 
encoded unique attributes. 
 
Figure 22 XACML rule example 
The obligation is a directive specifying obligatory operation after access request decision. 
For example, an obligation can instruct to raise a security incident after Eve was denied 
access to the data. Advice can instruct Bob to use his academic email identity because he 
does not have a valid educational ac.uk domain address. An important feature of both 
obligations, as well as advice, is the fact that these can enforce data re-encryption under 
a larger key space or even different cryptographic method. In case of a newly discovered 
cryptographic vulnerability, the TA upon every policy evaluation request, may send 
<Policy> 
    <Rule Effect="Permit"> 
        <Target> 
            <Subject "GROUP(BusinessEngineering):{956EFF…}"/> 
            <Resource "TA_URI/{8781F074-FAB1-4D5D-BBF0…}"/> 
            <Action "Read"/> 
        </Target> 
    </Rule> 
</Policy> 
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respond to the access subject requiring policy templates update as well as the document 
re-encryption under a new cryptographic algorithm. TA to respond to the first successful 
implementation of quantum decryption computer may enforce IBE based on IBE - 
Isogenous Pairing Groups (IPS), which would result in re-encryption of all the data under 
new cryptographic safeguard. 
Data access control implementation based on XACML sticky policy can efficiently 
secure confidential information and personal identifiable information (PII), provide high 
accountability, where single data access attempt is a subject of auditing [85]. 
Comprehensive implementation of sticky policy model could support advanced security 
auditing where security breach or a data leakage incident is reported and collected, giving 
significant evidence for a further legal investigation. The policy construction is highly 
simplified with policy templates that could be pre-defined by each TA. Policy template 
can represent a required access evaluation context to be included in the policy (see Figure 
23). 
 
Figure 23 Policy template part for the location-based access rule 
Policy template (see Figure 24) will use attribute designators to set the correct rules in the 
right context, e.g. country jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 24 Policy template data representation defining access location in ISO 3166-2 for attribute 
designator 
Constrained XACML policy template simplifies policy generation and reduces 
complexity on the client-side allowing only a pre-defined set of rules to be configured. 
XACML policy defines which individual or group of individuals in what configuration 
(i.e. location, time) can be granted permissions to access the protected data in the cloud. 
Sticky policies implemented based on XACML suffice wide range of access control 
implementations. This includes modern cloud-enabled authentication and authorisation 
frameworks which leverage SAML and claims-based authentication like in [128] where 
individual prior to authorisation would be a subject of authentication (see Figure 20 and 
Figure 21) involving third-party identity providers (IdP). 
<Apply xsi:type="AtLeastMemberOf" functionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-at-
least-one-member-of"> 
    <Apply functionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-bag"> 
        <AttributeValue ParameterId="location" 
DataType=http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string/> 
    </Apply> 
    <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="http://schemas.tscp.org/2012-03/claims/ISO-3166-2" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" /> 
</Apply> 
<Parameter ParameterId="location"> 
    <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">UK</AttributeValue> 
    <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">PL</AttributeValue> 
    <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">CH</AttributeValue> 
</Parameter> 
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3.8 Trusted Parties 
Sticky-policies make use of trust authorities (TA), which validate compliance with 
policies in order to lease decryption keys. Policies likewise cover data owner consent give 
subject rights to process data. A model where a TA has to be contacted by the service 
provider (SP) to access the PII data delivers high accountability as each personal data 
access attempt is a subject of auditing [85] and could be tracked in case of a data leakage 
incident. The data owner can then feel that they own the data released into the cloud 
because of not only the policies associated with data following data owner approval, but 
also for the TA, which specifies where the policy can be interpreted and is pre-selected 
by the data owner [121]. Information about the TA is attached to the policy and is passed 
to the SP. An XML schema that can store sticky-policy definition can be easily integrated 
into identity metadata. 
TA as an abstract entity needs to represent one or more actual trust parties that take part 
during initial authentication, authorization, key management and actual document 
management. Different TAs could exist independently and provide service do many other 
service providers, not necessary related to SPIBE. All trusted parties as recommended for 
Policy Machine architecture [55] have to authenticate one another. SPIBE recommends 
that trusted parties are certified and authenticated but that the actual sticky policy is 
signed. Furthermore, to the separation of duties principle recommends that one party 
should not be able to compromise model security. 
The private key generator (PKG) [129] is the most sensitive TA as it could deliver 
decryption keys for every given public key. It is important to inspect the PKG system and 
its logs to ensure only that certified PKG implementations are used and only legitimate 
decryption requests are processed. The PKG should never hold the same master key for 
two independent frameworks, this will eliminate scenarios where private data decryption 
key is illegitimately generated without prior authorization. This is a part of core SPIBE 
architecture, however there are other safeguards required that would ensure framework 
compliance. It is necessary to allow a public audit through third party auditor (TPA) to 
certify all the trusted parties. 
Policy engine and its sub-entities cannot decrypt data directly, however incorrect false 
positive access decisions made could also compromise security of the SPIBE model. 
Same as PKG it requires external TPA to verify whether the provider delivers secure 
service. 
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3.9 Comparison 
Most of the currently studied IRM solutions are primarily focused around health care 
record privacy protection. Among them SPIBE has several distinguished features giving 
it functional advantage over other research works. Use OOXML for the actual 
implementation makes this solution adaptable by any organization or institution, or even 
individual using popular wordprocessing applications. Furthermore, CP-ABE based 
solutions [130], [131], [132], [133] , [134], where policy does not contain globally 
uniquely identified document with an incorrect setup could lead to situation that CP-ABE 
keys are same for different documents. When one of the keys is divulged it could 
compromise several unrelated documents. Finally, most of the compared solutions 
(see Table 1) do not consider quantum computing as a threat therefore it does not provide 
relevant safeguards. It is only possible to assume that research work that does not refer to 
any specific cryptographic primitive leaves space for cryptographic quantum hardening. 
Solution Strength Weakness Safeguards Cloud-ready 
A
ccess C
ontrol 
C
ryptography 
C
onfidentiality 
Integrity  
A
ccountability  
N
on-repudiation  
Standards-based 
Im
plem
entation  
Q
uantum
 ready  
CHISTA
R [135] 
Interoperabilit
y, scalability, 
maintainability 
Inflexible 
access control 
RBAC; 
AES-256; 
SSL; MAC; 
SSO 
         N/A 
VistA 
[136] 
none Client-server 
architecture 
RBAC 
         N/A 
G. Hsieh 
and R.-J. 
Chen 
[130] 
Flexible access 
control and 
integrity 
control 
Lack of 
prototyped 
architecture 
ABAC(XA
CML); 
XML 
Security (on 
policy); 
AES; CP-
ABE 
         N/A 
F. 
Rezaeibag
ha and Y. 
Mu [131] 
Scalability, 
confidentiality, 
and secure 
data 
outsourcing 
Data sharing 
problems can 
be caused by 
increasing the 
complexity of 
EHR data 
policies 
RBAC; CP-
ABE 
         N/A 
U. 
Premarath
ne et al 
[137] 
Perform access 
control 
through 
context and 
location 
awareness 
Key exchange 
problems 
between 
various parties 
RBAC; PKI 
          
M. Peleg 
et al 
[138] 
Structured 
specification 
of patient data 
access 
scenarios via 
situation 
models 
Scalability 
issues 
Situation-
based access 
control 
N/A         N/A 
R. 
Gajanaya
ke et al. 
[139] 
Combines 
three existing 
access control 
models 
none MAC; 
DAC; 
RBAC; 
PBAC 
N/A         N/A 
A. 
Lunardelli 
et al [140] 
Provides 
solution to the 
situation of 
policy conflict 
Lack of 
security aspect 
issue 
ABAC(XA
CML) N/A         N/A 
J. 
Calvillo-
Flexible access 
control 
No 
consideration 
of 
ABAC(XA
CML) N/A         N/A 
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Arbizu et 
al [141] 
confidentiality 
or integrity 
issues 
P. Gope 
and R. 
Amin 
[142] 
Practicality, 
Robustmess 
Inflexible 
access control 
ABAC, 
MAC 
         N/A 
S. 
Alshehri, 
S. P. 
Radziszo
wski, and 
R. K. Raj 
et al. 
[132] 
High 
performance 
over time 
overhead and 
storage 
overhead 
Lack of non-
repudiation 
ABAC; 
ECC; CP-
ABE 
         N/A 
K. Yang 
et al [143] 
Flexible access 
control, 
dynamically 
changing user 
attributes 
Lack of 
implementatio
n 
ABAC; 
Time-
domain 
ABE 
         N/A 
A. 
Mohandas 
And S. S 
[133] 
Fine grained 
access control, 
anonymization 
None ABAC; CP-
ABE; k-
anonymizati
on 
         N/A 
T. 
Neubauer 
and J. 
Heurix 
[144] 
Provides a 
methodology 
for the 
pseudonymizat
ion of medical 
data 
No cover for 
digital 
signature 
Pseudonymi
zation; 
RSA-2048; 
AES-256 
N/A          
M. T. 
SandIkka
ya et al 
[145] 
Performed the 
pseudonymizat
ion and can 
break-glass 
procedures; 
self-protect the 
data in case of 
breached 
access using 
biometrics 
Inflexible 
access control 
Encryption 
signature; 
RBAC; 
pseudonimiz
ation N/A          
S. Sharma 
and V. 
Balasubra
manian 
[146] 
Self-protect 
the data in 
case of 
breached 
access using 
biometrics 
none Biometrics 
Encryption; 
SHA-256 
          
R. Au and 
P. Croll 
[147] 
Considers 
various factors 
for privacy 
protection 
Inflexible 
access control 
Pseudonymi
zation; PKI; 
RBAC; 
digital 
signatures 
N/A          
K. Seol et 
al [134] 
Supports all 
evaluative 
requirements 
none ABAC(XA
CML); 
XML 
Security 
          
SPIBE Integrates into 
common word 
processing 
systems; 
resistant to 
non-or-full 
access rights 
vulnerability  
none ABAC(XA
CML); 
AES-256; 
IBE; IBE-
IPG; CP-
ABE 
          
Table 1 Comparison with existing privacy preservation studies in e-health [134]. 	  
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3.10 Conclusions 
Sticky policies in the described cryptographic setup carries the potential to decentralize 
data access definitions for modern applications. With IBE the entire construct is not 
limited to one specific cryptographic algorithm implementation. It could quickly adapt to 
new requirements not only by increasing key sizes but also by replacing actual 
cryptographic primitives. Under IBE-IPG the actual model is quantum computing ready 
and with sticky policy evaluated under a TA, the security upgrade would only require re-
encryption under a new cryptographic protocol without actual change to entire IRM 
architecture. Having several certified TAs separating core responsibilities including 
authentication, authorization, PKG and key management system (KMS) ensures that the 
SPIBE framework cannot be compromised at a single point. Single TA can not have 
power to decrypt all protected documents without having legitimate request approved by 
all trusted parties, i.e. TAs. The added blockchain part would efficiently authenticate all 
the changes complementing model with document changes authenticity, non-repudiation, 
and integrity. OASIS authentication standards with possible XACML profiles show the 
selected sticky policies model has solid foundations. 
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4 Evaluation Methodology and 
Implementation 
4.1 Introduction 
Evaluation is focused on selected architecture components. Model evaluation has been 
prepared to see how the rights could be enforced and visible to the end user. The OOXML 
document wrapper was configured as a single standalone document and as a master 
document constructed with several subdocuments. The master document evaluation aims 
to show how a group of authors could collaborate in writing a single report made out of 
several subdocuments. Unlike the single document, the master document could be 
leveraged to simplify access management over different document elements. Otherwise, 
a single document required a custom approach if granular access authorisation to different 
document parts is required. The XACML policy embedding and unpacking into and from 
OOXML document is not a core part of the evaluation. However, it was added and 
removed for each of the other tests performed. The JSON formatted XACML policy 
comparison with XML format has to prove that same policy could be expressed to save 
the storage space as well as potentially suit future encryption schemes with relatively 
larger keys that are limited by plain text message length. 
By implementing several XACML policy engine components, it is possible to identify 
problematic points and recognise advantageous and disadvantageous of both PEP designs 
with the fat-client application and with the web-based application. 
SPIBE has been compared to other popular IRM solution from Microsoft, the Azure RMS 
and the IONIC Secure Files. Azure RMS same as SPIBE uses both asymmetric and 
symmetric encryption. IONIC is based only on symmetric AES encryption. Both other 
solutions show strong and weak sides of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography based 
IRM approach. Therefore, the comparison with SPIBE helps in to find how the construct 
could get the best from existing solutions. 
4.2 Architecture 
The evaluation of XACML sticky policy with IBE (SPIBE) has been conducted on a 
simple, single domain setup (see Figure 25). This is sufficient to see IBE applicability for 
sticky policies as well as a potential of leveraging OOXML as an efficient data wrapper. 
XACML entities could be deployed in a standalone or a distributed model. By distributing 
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authorisation entities, dedicated components have to handle authentication to ensure 
request and response non-repudiation. Simplified policy engine (i.e. AUTHZ) delivers 
XACML policy templates within a given context. Assuming AUTHZ is deployed by an 
organisation with strictly defined access policies, policy templates could be retrieved 
from policy information point (PIP) based on relationship type between identity and 
organisation. OOXML editor application (APP) extended with a custom plug-in for 
embedded XACML policy management could retrieve the correct templates based on the 
authenticated user using OAuth or SAML tokens. For the evaluation purposes, XACML 
templates management has not been implemented on AUTHZ component nor on the APP 
side. XACML embedding functionality that is handled by OOXML plug-in is prototyped 
(see Appendix O and Appendix X) to pack and unpack predefined XACML policies. 
The editor application could be deployed either at a client-side or at a web server side. 
Both APP implementations were evaluated. The first APP proof of concept (PoC) used 
Microsoft Word as the editor, where access decisions were enforced using file metadata 
permissions. Client-based editor implementation is a challenging part of the evaluation. 
There are various OOXML compliant editors available. In order to deliver a 
comprehensive solution, the client-side extension should support various OOXML 
processing suites. An implementation that would support all different applications 
including different versions would require the complete understanding of the application 
itself. In many cases, vendors do not deliver libraries or software development kit that 
would support such a complex integration. Therefore, due to limited supervision over an 
OOXML document and the policy the approach requires control at the low driver level. 
Under Microsoft Windows system the handler and buffer for file access management has 
to implement Universal Windows Driver (UWD) at the Minifilter Driver level. The only 
bottleneck of the solution is that driver has to be designed for the exact Windows 
distribution and CPU architecture. Despite these drawbacks, the driver-based 
implementation seems more consistent and secure as all cryptographic operations are 
performed at the lower level where any potential key tampering is relatively limited. It 
requires a skilled individual to take an advantage within the selected architecture. 
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Figure 25 SPIBE components and interfaces 
The second APP component PoC was conducted using the limited functionality of the 
online web-based OOXML editor (see Appendix Y) with both SPIBE and APP integrated 
as one component. Unlike Minifilter driver solution, the web-based editor could be hardly 
tampered to give adversary advantage in SPIBE. Direct access to memory that would give 
access to extract keys used to protect the document like in MS RMS [148] is limited or 
simply impossible as the hardware is not under control of the data processor. 
4.3 Model Implementation 
4.3.1 Introduction 
SPIBE system component (see Figure 25) has been evaluated without modular 
implementation that is required to deliver fully functional customer ready framework. 
Only mandatory modules required for evaluation were prototyped and integrated. AES, 
IBE, PKG components were implemented together under a single program tool reading 
configuration from files stored under local file system. KMS and HSM have not been 
used. DRV module has been implemented as a standalone driver library, however 
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integration with existing IBE libraries was not possible with current Visual Studio 
solution architecture. PEP, PIP together with PDP were running under separate solution 
instance and only the actual XACML policies were shared with IBE component over a 
file system. The EDITOR application was implemented as HTML editor, however only 
Microsoft Word successfully interpreted rights set on the file IO level (see Figure 40). 
OOXML PLUGIN component has not been required for the actual evaluation as all the 
XACML policies were pre-generated for actual RSA and IBE performance evaluation. 
4.3.2 Policy Encapsulation 
The main policy wrapper challenge is to allow efficient and visible to end-user access 
rights enforcement. While custom OOXML editor application would deliver the most 
comprehensive solution, its maintenance over years would become a bottle neck of the 
framework. That is why architecture considers existing Microsoft Office SDK or open 
source popular libraries. Microsoft libraries work relatively stable with Microsoft 
products and there are many other systems designs has to consider giving it higher priority 
due to main objectives, making actual framework standardized for secure cloud data 
sharing. The second way to handle OOXML wrapper is to leverage HTML based 
application, where the access to the document content would happen on a trusted sever 
side. While in a fat-client scenario the document access does not require high machine 
power, central server-side implementation needs very efficient back-end that would 
handle hundreds of thousands simultaneous read/write requests as well as access decision 
requests. Therefore, for server-side application it the SPIBE considers use of either flat 
databases that actually host basic document descriptor attributes or classic relational 
database. While the document descriptors might vary from the long-term database 
maintenance perspective it will be beneficial to use semi-structured No-SQL document 
database. For this research, however, we use transactional database with FileStream 
feature enabled. Databases work well with document data stored directly with other data, 
but it also depends on the size of the actual document and the frequency of access 
attempts. FileStream is not the best solution to handle large amount of small frequent 
updates, however OOXML is on the border where document is smaller than 1[MB] 
suitable for Binary Large Objects (BLOB) table field and document storing rich media 
meta-data highly exceeding 1[MB] is suitable to be hosted directly by the file system. 
Due to encrypted content that will be stored the direct updates are not recommended as it 
will cause various performance issues, where changed data before saving always has to 
be encrypted in the buffer. Actual initial access to the stored document should be highly 
efficient but the application need to use a cached document version in order to optimize 
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actual operations on the document and align with overall database performance capacity. 
Modern No-SQL databases, like MongoDB have already various features that improve 
file access performance, therefore the used underlying database type will highly depend 
on the target market and the scale of the implementation. OOXML files, when encrypted 
cannot be efficiently hosted as an integrated part by semi-structured database, however 
the XACML policy and other unencrypted document meta-data could be efficiently 
stored and indexed in XML format. The entire document should be referenced directly 
from files. Same time, the policy before saved together with a document could be 
deserialized by the object layer and exported as a normalized set of attributes to be finally 
stored in the relational database next to the BLOB data-type.  
The first part of the implementation reviewed possible ways of efficient storing, 
managing, opening and controlling access to OOXML document. To simply encapsulate 
and extract XACML policy into and from the OOXML document and to evaluate how 
the OOXML ZIP format aligns with standard libraries the basic compression functions 
were used (see Figure 26 and Figure 27). 
 
Figure 26 XACML policy encapsulation, Python 
 
Figure 27 XACML policy extraction, Python 
For the initial evaluation, the policy enforcement point (PEP) has been implemented as a 
part of a Web-based editor application with policy related to a document as a reference. 
The application was editing OOXML word processing content after policy decision was 
made therefore access rights were already determined during the initial file access (see 
Figure 28). 
#****************************************************************************** 
#!/usr/bin/python 
 
 
#***********************************Functions********************************** 
 
#*********************************** 
#zip_word_doc_path encapsulates doc section into OOXML file 
#*********************************** 
def zip_word_doc_path(full_doc_path, full_word_doc_path, word_doc_path): 
 with zipfile.ZipFile(full_doc_path, 'w') as zip_file: 
  zip_file.write(full_word_doc_path, word_doc_path, zipfile.ZIP_STORED) 
#****************************************************************************** 
#!/usr/bin/python 
 
 
#***********************************Variables********************************** 
CONST_WORD_DOC_PATH = 'word/document.xml' 
 
#***********************************Functions********************************** 
#*********************************** 
#extract_word_doc_path extracts doc section from OOXML file 
#*********************************** 
def extract_word_doc_path(full_doc_path): 
 file_handle = open(full_doc_path, 'rb') 
 with zipfile.ZipFile(file_handle) as zip_file: 
  for arch_elem in zip_file.namelist(): 
   if arch_elem.startswith(CONST_WORD_DOC_PATH): 
    zip_file.extract(arch_elem) 
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Figure 28 XDocument Constructor, C# 
Documents were stored in SQL FileStream for efficient access (see Figure 29). Every 
data request was followed by XACML policy retrieval. 
 
Figure 29 Opens SQL FileStream with OOXML content, C# 
This approach is suitable for HTML-based OOXML editing, however, to use Microsoft 
Office SDK the regular file stream suits better the 
DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Wordprocessing library. 
4.3.3 Cryptography 
The core evaluation of IBE-BF and RSA is based on a model construct that allows key-
encrypting key operations. However, the complete end to end SPIBE cryptographic 
operations including AES256 data encryption are implemented. The main objective for 
evaluation was to create a single consistent solution where programming languages would 
not have impact on the overall performance measures. Decision regarding programming 
language for the actual solution is crucial because it has to consider further consequences 
when it comes to integration with different SPIBE components. If policy enforcement 
/// <summary> 
/// Creates an instance of a single OOXML document supporting basic access control 
functionality 
/// </summary> 
/// <param name="singleStream">Document file stream</param> 
/// <param name="fileAccess">Access type</param> 
public XDocument(SingleStream singleStream, FileAccess fileAccess) 
{ 
 this.singleStream = singleStream; 
 this.WrapDocument(fileAccess); 
} 
private SqlFileStream GetData() 
{ 
 const string SQL_TRANS_QUERY = @"SELECT GET_FILESTREAM_TRANSACTION_CONTEXT()"; 
            //byte[] buffer; 
            //UInt32 position = 0; 
 
 string sqlQuery = String.Format(@" 
SELECT TOP 1 
 [MetaDataFile].PathName() 
FROM 
 [NEHST].[dbo].[MetaData] 
WHERE 
 [MetaDataID] = '{0}'", this.metaDataID); 
 if( this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection.State == System.Data.ConnectionState.Closed) 
 { 
  this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection.Open(); 
 } 
 using (SqlCommand sqlCommand = new SqlCommand(sqlQuery, 
this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection)) 
 { 
  //using (SqlTransaction sqlTransaction  
  this.sqlTransaction = 
this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection.BeginTransaction(this.metaDataID.Replace("-", String.Empty)); 
  sqlCommand.Transaction = this.sqlTransaction; 
 
  string filePath = (string)sqlCommand.ExecuteScalar(); 
  //SetRemoteSecurityContext(filePath); 
 
  sqlCommand.CommandText = SQL_TRANS_QUERY; 
 
  this.streamHandle = (byte[])sqlCommand.ExecuteScalar(); 
  return new SqlFileStream(filePath, this.streamHandle, this.fileAccess); 
 } 
} 
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point (PEP) application would be running on Unix machine there should be existing not 
only set of OOXML editing libraries but also XACML libraries together with all 
cryptographic primitive implementations that could work under Unix system. If the 
editing application should have option to run as a client or server-side solution it is 
important to make underlying libraries generic written in the same programming language 
and configured for one single system. Such an approach simplifies the maintenance where 
critical changes could be quickly tested and deployed without need to maintain 
functionally identical solutions separately because of the programming architecture 
limitations. 
Cryptographic libraries implemented as under Visual Studio solution allow further 
integration with XACML PEP component, but the aim is that popular MS based OOXML 
editor application part could be easily evaluated under the same software architecture.  
There are two main C++ evaluation methods, one ibe_eval for IBE-BF with Sticky 
Policy mapping into key space and the other rsa_eval for RSA evaluation (see Appendix 
H). Actual implementation C++ methods could wrap the underlying C cryptographic 
libraries and expose them for all other programming language projects under one single 
Visual Studio solution.  
 
Figure 30 XACML Policy mapped into Public Key space via SHA256, C 
static int ibe_bf_set_public_key(const unsigned char *id, long id_size, unsigned char *key, 
const int key_size, char *err) 
{ 
 const int HASH_LEN = 32; 
 unsigned char hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 }; 
 
 key = (unsigned char *)malloc(key_size+1); 
 
 if (SHA256(id, id_size, hash) == NULL) 
 { 
  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
  printf("%s\n", err); 
 
  return -1; 
 } 
 for (int i = 0; i < key_size; i++) 
 { 
  key[i] = hash[i % HASH_LEN]; 
 } 
 key[key_size] = '\0'; 
 
 return strlen((char *)key); 
} 
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Figure 31. IBE-BF Public Key generation evaluation, C 
 
Figure 32 IBE-BF Private Key Generation Performance Evaluation, C 
static void ibe_eval(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 //... 
 for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
   ++++BEG_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
   ----BEG_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  element_from_hash(mapped_id_hash_Qid, key, pkey_sz); 
  /******** 
   ++++END_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
 
  time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC / 
frequency.QuadPart; 
  printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
  fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
  /******** 
   ----END_TIMING 
   *********/ 
 } 
 //... 
} 
static void ibe_eval(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 //... 
 for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
   ++++BEG_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
   ----BEG_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  element_mul_zn(Ppub, gen_P, master_key_s); 
  element_printf("++s: %B\n", master_key_s); 
  element_printf("++P:  %B\n", gen_P); 
  element_printf("++Ppub: %B\n", Ppub); 
   
  /******** 
   ++++END_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
   
  time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC / 
frequency.QuadPart; 
  printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
  fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
  /******** 
   ----END_TIMING 
   *********/ 
 } 
 //... 
} 
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Figure 33. RSA key pair factorization, C 
 
Figure 34 RSA key-encrypting key encryption evaluation, C 
static RSA *rsa_create_key_pair(unsigned char **public_key, int *public_key_size, unsigned 
char **private_key, int *private_key_size) 
{ 
 const int KEY_SIZE = 1024; 
 const int PUB_EXP = 3; 
 RSA *key_pair; 
 
 key_pair = RSA_generate_key(KEY_SIZE, PUB_EXP, NULL, NULL); 
 
 BIO *bio_private_key = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 
 BIO *bio_public_key = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 
 
 PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio_private_key, key_pair, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); 
 PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(bio_public_key, key_pair); 
 
 *private_key_size = BIO_pending(bio_private_key); 
 *public_key_size = BIO_pending(bio_public_key); 
 
 *private_key = (unsigned char *)malloc(*private_key_size); 
 *public_key = (unsigned char *)malloc(*public_key_size); 
 
 BIO_read(bio_private_key, *private_key, *private_key_size); 
 BIO_read(bio_public_key, *public_key, *public_key_size); 
 
 return key_pair; 
} 
static void rsa_eval() 
{ 
 //... 
 for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
  ++++BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
  ----BEG_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 
  int size_enc = RSA_public_encrypt(AES_KEY_SZ, aes_key, cipher, key_pair, 
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 
  /******** 
  ++++END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
  /******** 
  ----END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 
  time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC / 
frequency.QuadPart; 
  printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
  fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
    } 
 //... 
} 
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Figure 35 RSA key-encrypting key decryption evaluation, C 
The cryptographic evaluation is mostly focused on key-encrypting key cryptographic 
operations. For IBE-BF the public key is derived directly from the policy (see Figure 30, 
Figure 31 and Figure 32) therefore there is no need to perform key-encrypting key 
operations like in RSA, where asymmetric keys have to be derived from prime numbers 
factorization (see Figure 33) and symmetric data-encrypting key encrypted or decrypted 
under RSA (see Figure 34 and Figure 35). 
The further IBE-BF evaluation work itself is focused more on simple model workflows 
and looking at the actual performance of overall SPBIE cryptographic operations (see 
Figure 36, Figure 37, Figure 38). Here the policy into key space mapping under IBE-BF 
and data encryption using AES256 are evaluated together in various setups. 
static void rsa_eval() 
{ 
 //... 
 for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
   ++++BEG_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
   ----BEG_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  int size_dec = RSA_private_decrypt(size_enc, cipher, aes_key_v, key_pair, 
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 
   
  /******** 
   ++++END_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
  /******** 
   ----END_TIMING 
   *********/ 
 } 
 //... 
} 
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Figure 36 IBE-BF encryption over AES256, C 
 
Figure 37 IBE-BF decryption over AES256 evaluation, C 
static int ibe_bf_aes256_encrypt(element_t r, element_t U, element_t P, element_t gid, 
element_t mapped_id_hash_Qid, element_t Ppub, unsigned char *data, long data_len, unsigned 
char *cipher, char *err) 
{ 
 const int HASH_LEN = 32; 
 char hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 }; 
 unsigned char *gs; 
 
 element_random(r); 
 element_mul_zn(U, P, r); 
 
 element_pairing(gid, mapped_id_hash_Qid, Ppub); 
 
 element_pow_zn(gid, gid, r); 
 gs = (unsigned char*)malloc(element_length_in_bytes(gid)); 
 
 element_to_bytes(gs, gid); 
 
 if (SHA256((unsigned char*)gs, element_length_in_bytes(gid), (unsigned char *)hash) == 
NULL) 
 { 
  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
  printf("%s\n", err); 
 } 
 unsigned char iv[128] = { 0 }; 
 int cipher_len = aes_evp256_encrypt((unsigned char*)data, data_len, (unsigned 
char*)hash, iv, cipher); 
 
 free(gs); 
 
 return cipher_len; 
} 
static void ibe_eval(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 //... 
 for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
   ++++BEG_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
   ----BEG_TIMING 
   *********/ 
   
  //ENCRYPTION 
  ibe_encrypt(r, U, P, gid, mapped_id_hash_Qid, Ppub, data, data_sz, cipher, err); 
  cipher_sz = ibe_bf_aes256_encrypt(r, U, gen_P, gid, mapped_id_hash_Qid, Ppub, data, 
data_sz, cipher, err); 
  char *b64MsgHash; 
  to_base64(cipher, data_sz, &b64MsgHash); 
  element_printf("++m: %s\n", b64MsgHash); 
   
  /******** 
   ++++END_TIMING 
   *********/ 
  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
  ///******** 
  //----END_TIMING 
  //*********/ 
   
  time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC / 
frequency.QuadPart; 
  printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
  fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
 } 
 //... 
} 
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Figure 38 IBE-BF decryption over AES256, C 
4.3.4 Policy Engine 
XACML policy engine was evaluated with 400 XACML policies to receive a valid access 
response (see Appendix P) and to see the actual policy decision point (PDP) behaviour. 
All policy engine components but policy enforcement point (PEP) could be easily 
deployed under single system architecture using the same programming language. The 
PEP if deployed on a client-side it brings many challenges. To simplify actual SPIBE 
deployment it might be easier to create server-side PEP first with web-based editor 
application. If PEP should be deployed to client, the actual cryptographic operations 
should be handled on as low level as possible to avoid any possibility of intercepting the 
keys and making illegitimate changes to the protected document and the access policy. 
The Windows system Minifilter driver acting as a PEP has been partially implemented to 
see the possible use cases and the implementation complexity (see Appendix JJ). 
By comparing XML and JSON formatted XACML policy sizes it is possible to see some 
benefits of using JSON formatted expressions as well as possibilities of using some 
cryptographic primitives with larger keys that could additionally encrypt the policy to 
increase the model security. Larger mapping key space for IBE BF close to policy size 
would reduce possible collisions in the long term. Some cryptographic primitives limit 
the size of the plaintext to the key size. If encryption of the actual XACML policy should 
be considered it is important to see what the largest and the average policy size is. This 
static int ibe_bf_aes256_encrypt(element_t r, element_t U, element_t P, element_t gid, 
element_t mapped_id_hash_Qid, element_t Ppub, unsigned char *data, long data_len, unsigned 
char *cipher, char *err) 
{ 
 const int HASH_LEN = 32; 
 char hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 }; 
 unsigned char *gs; 
 
 element_random(r); 
 element_mul_zn(U, P, r); 
 
 element_pairing(gid, mapped_id_hash_Qid, Ppub); 
 
 element_pow_zn(gid, gid, r); 
 gs = (unsigned char*)malloc(element_length_in_bytes(gid)); 
 
 element_to_bytes(gs, gid); 
 
 if (SHA256((unsigned char*)gs, element_length_in_bytes(gid), (unsigned char *)hash) == 
NULL) 
 { 
  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
  printf("%s\n", err); 
 } 
 unsigned char iv[128] = { 0 }; 
 int cipher_len = aes_evp256_encrypt((unsigned char*)data, data_len, (unsigned 
char*)hash, iv, cipher); 
 
 free(gs); 
 
 return cipher_len; 
} 
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part of the evaluation may have many implications for the future work and should be 
beneficial for other researchers working on similar problems. 
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5 Evaluation 
5.1 Introduction 
Evaluation of the SPIBE model is based on research progress where initial policy and 
later sticky policy implementation components, where possible, were tested and 
compared to other functional alternative components (see Table 3). Solutions simplicity 
was favoured over complexity. At the same time, easily adaptable standards that were 
previously successfully implemented on a global scale were preferred over homogeneous 
and closed systems. Finally, used algorithm security lifecycle (ASL) was considered as 
the highest priority due to IRM purpose and the emerging quantum computing. The 
concept of cloud-based data sharing will be only possible when open standards are used 
the construct is following Kerckhoff's principle for protection algorithms. The principle 
states that a cryptographic algorithm could be known to leave protected data safe under 
unknown cryptographic keys. Cloud protection cannot rely on corporate trade secrets as 
the only true cloud implementation enables different parties to provide the same 
standardised services. 
5.1.1 Microsoft Rights Management Services (RMS) 
Different available information rights management (IRM) products are currently 
available on the market, however, where data protection is a core competency either very 
homogenous custom solution is used to protect documents or companies use products 
from market leading vendors. In this group, Microsoft Rights Management Services 
(RMS) took over other similar products establishing its high position in this market niche 
providing services, e.g. to UK Ministry of Defence [148] but also to international 
financial institutions, governments, health-care institutions, and large enterprises. 
Although Microsoft has managed to introduce its product as a cloud service its internals 
seem, have never been changed except couple minor adjustments to make it more 
interoperable. 
5.1.2 IONIC Security 
On the cloud market, there are different information rights management (IRM) products 
that more or less successfully conquer legacy markets. However, their advantage over 
predecessors is the proper use of modern application programming interfaces (API) and 
cloud-ready standards. Among these IONIC products entered the existing large 
enterprises market successfully collaborating with Microsoft on empowering the cloud-
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based Azure suite [149]. IONIC seem to deliver a complete software development kit 
(SDK) for its products including documentation for multi-platform integration via API’s 
and different programming languages. 
5.2 Access Policy vs Sticky Policy 
Sticky policy, unlike access policy, is attached as additional document metadata. Sticky-
policies integrate into existing policy frameworks. It has a major advantage over another 
approach where the policy is kept separate from the object. It combines both a policy and 
an object (resource) under sticky policies model similar to discretionary access control 
(DAC) model. It reduces the number of model entities and also increases the database 
access response (see Figure 39). In transactional databases query response time 𝑡M  is 
equal to natural logarithm of total records number. 
𝑡M = ln(𝑎), (15) 
In access policy-based access control model, implementation database maintains not only 
a document information, which is claimed by the subject, but it also maintains access 
policies. XACML-like policy keeps a reference to an actual resource, i.e. document. 
However, in access request scenario subject claims object based on resource information 
before the policy is evaluated. One can calculate query time 𝑡M	assuming we have to query 
policy each out of 𝑝 policies and each document out of 𝑛 documents separately as in: 
∀𝑎 = 𝑝	 × 	𝑛, (16) 
𝑡M = ln(𝑎) = 𝑙𝑛(𝑛) + ln(𝑝) (17) 
In the sticky-policy model, the policy is attached to the resource, and both are claimed in 
one single request. Therefore, the query time 𝑡M is derived as following: 
∀	𝑝 = 𝑛 (18) 
𝑡p = 𝑙𝑛(𝑛) (19) 
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Figure 39 Access Policy (tp) and Sticky Policy (ts) DB query response time [150]  
5.3 OOXML ZIP Wrapper 
5.3.1 Policy Wrapper 
Office Open XML (OOXML) standard is mostly built on top of XML files, which 
reference to each other forming a single document. XML files can be supplemented with 
other reach files to deliver graphic, multimedia and other elements [62]. OOXML data 
format can deliver data integrity using internal elements hashing, while confidentiality 
can be assured by ZIP wrapper password protection and content encryption. These 
techniques are sufficient to protect content that does not leave corporate network. 
However, when, leaked this built-in protection may not be sufficient for personal data. 
Cloud-based data sharing solution in order to utilize OOXML standard would require 
additional safeguards from service providers. 
5.3.2 Master Document with a Single Sub-Document as a Security 
Boundary 
As the additional OOXML with embedded XACML evaluation was performed using an 
explicit relationship and master document model [62] from WordprocessingML 
subclause. This part showed that described here granular access control method can be 
used to control access to sub-documents. Whereas policy access response denied resource 
Write access model added a read-only attribute to master document what was represented 
as a padlock on the document outline (see Figure 40). By representing OOXML sub-
sections as individual documents, it is possible to control access to different document 
sections, i.e. sub-documents using one single access enforcement model. Other 
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techniques would require a customised approach that leverages a single OOXML 
document internal XML schema. 
 
Figure 40.Master Document with two sub-documents 
Granular access model built for this evaluation is just a proof of concept as various 
sources discourage using master document model due to several integrity problems with 
complex documentation. 
5.4 XACML Evaluation 
5.4.1 XML and JSON Formatted Policy 
Following tendencies to simplify and reduce the size of a data, the JavaScript Object 
Notation (JSON) a skimmed alternative of the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) has 
been successfully used to format XACML policy [8]. This research leveraged XML based 
XACML policy engine libraries to evaluate the access control model. JSON formatted 
policies could reduce the size of the protected document, what considering protection 
attached to every piece of information could highly reduce the storage space required to 
host the data. Furthermore, the policy cannot be simply encrypted using basic key-
encrypting RSA or ECC algorithms. Currently, the only model to encrypt the policy under 
public key algorithm that could be considered are either special public key algorithms 
allowing larger messages or partial policy encryption, or policy attributes anonymisation 
and obfuscation. With relatively large keys that might be required in the future 
considering increasing computing power, the JSON formatted policy could also be a 
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subject for encryption [7]. To show size differences between JSON and XML formatted 
policy the evaluation took 400 XACML policies with internal complexity from low to 
complex. The policies fall within different size ranges (see Figure 41), where 3% of all 
evaluated XML formatted policies exceed the size of 16[KB] but most 70% of JSON 
formatted policies do not exceed the size of 2[KB]. 
 
Figure 41 Policy sizes comparison formatted with XML and JSON. XACML policies [123].  
5.4.2 Minifilter Driver – Security 
The editing application will reject any OOXML modification requests if file metadata is 
set with a read-only permission. Access control implemented at mini driver level it is only 
a deterrent safeguard protecting a document from rights elevation. IRM systems fail to 
enforce strictly only the rights that are assigned to documents [148]. Minifilter driver will 
give sufficient protection at the client-side only if supported with additional safeguards 
like Blockchain ensuring data versioning. From an interoperability perspective 
overwriting file-level access control using a policy enforcement point (PEP) makes this 
part of SPIBE implementation transparent to the client editor application. Implementation 
at the driver level operates same as anti-virus software intercepting all open file events 
based on the specified filter at the file meta-data level. Driver development is not 
complicated, however, under Microsoft Windows systems, it requires exact Software 
Development Kit (SDK) version installed together with exact Windows Driver Kit 
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(WDK) and Microsoft Visual Studio version. Microsoft delivers official templates-like 
examples for WDK development where SwapBuffer File System Minifilter Driver covers 
exact scenario that is required for driver evaluation. Although driver development is 
relatively complex and requires rather a quality approach, the final solution reacted for 
OOXML document access requests despite editor application or editor application 
version. 
The solution at this level could handle only limited interface implementation, although it 
exposed most of the operations related to policy enforcement point (PEP). Upon an open 
request (see Figure 42), it has to intercept a document access attempt, read the sticky 
policy, read the current identity information, send an access request to a trust authority 
(TA) for evaluation with the identity and enforce the response (see Figure 21) by either 
returning default empty document template upon deny response or replacing decrypted 
data buffer with file metadata flag set either to read-only or read-write. Upon an update 
request (see Figure 43), it contacts the TA for encryption parameters (see Figure 20) to 
encrypt the document and write it back to the buffer. Due to possible delays with 
productive implementations, minifilter should cache the TA parameters for later 
cryptographic operations. The part related to document policy management should be 
handled at the higher, application layer. 
 
Figure 42 APP document access with Driver MiniFilter 
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Figure 43 APP document protected with Driver MiniFilter 
5.4.3 Web Application 
To solve client systems interoperability problem, the OOXML document could be edited 
with a web-based application hosted online. Same as with the minifilter driver approach, 
any safeguards aiming to limit the possible data leakage after the document is decrypted 
have only a deterrent character. To limit illegitimate document amendments the online 
editor application, have to maintain document history metadata to ensure changes in 
authenticity and non-repudiation. This part could be achieved either via Git repositories 
or same as for minifilter driver; the data versioning could be hosted by blockchain (see 
2.7.2). 
5.4.4 Microsoft Office Add-in 
Editor application plug-in is required to handle document policy edition based on TA 
templates. The only responsibility of the plug-in is to recognise the identity TA or allow 
addition TA registration to retrieve contextual policy templates. While some of the 
templates might be valid across different security boundaries and be accepted by different 
cloud services, some could be restricted to the specific trusted realm. Focusing on 
Microsoft Windows, a Word Add-in could be developed at the higher programming level, 
and, in comparison with previous MS Component Object Model (COM) or Visual Basic 
for Applications (VBA) implementations, the Add-in could be added to different MS 
Office distributions including distributions dedicated for different operating systems. 
Actual complete Add-in development is not part of the evaluation; however, the basic 
solution has been created to compare possible implementation scenarios. 
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5.5 RMS vs SPIBE 
5.5.1 Key Management 
The core Azure MS RMS feature is the support for bringing your key (BYOK) 
architecture. Customers could secure own root infrastructure keys leaving cloud service 
provider, i.e. Microsoft with almost no possibility to export keys outside of the strict 
boundaries. Using hardware security module (HSM) synchronisation functionality, the 
cloud-based HSM synchronizes keys only into specific regions. Technology is based on 
Thales Security World concept [151], although unlike with standard HSM Security World 
setup, Microsoft amended the master key sharing flow allowing non-physical master key 
transfer over the Internet. This model, if secure, would be already in place instead of 
physical safeguards. Hence authors assume this implementation weakens the model 
security as hardware HSM ensures security not only by protecting the keys in a secure 
appliance but also be enforcing strict procedures involving a physical, administrative key 
management. 
Azure MS RMS by default uses RMS 2048 [bit] key sizes for applications. It seems 
currently secure, however, from the security perspective, the entire model has to be either 
completely reviewed or replaced with a construct that might be more quantum computing 
safe considering RMS algorithm security lifetime (ASL) as well as other vulnerabilities 
[148]. 
The SPIBE evaluation could only leverage soft key management system (KMS) vaulting 
via Microsoft Cryptography Next Generation (CNG) certificates with the private key-
encrypting key. For actual implementation authors would leverage standard HSM 
implementation with no master key exchange over non-dedicated networks. The IBE 
scheme [10], however, is designed with the concept of using the distributed master key, 
which is never available in one piece in one single location. Using simple Shamir shared 
secret construct [126] master key could be distributed across different KMS locations and 
servers. Although authors have not yet evaluated this component on a large scale, there 
are several sources proposing this schema as a simple cryptographic primitive that solves 
complex security problems. 
Another key management feature of SPIBE is that unlike other popular cryptographic 
constructs [7] for IRM the key	𝑠 like shown in (8) does not have to be randomly generated 
prior IBE operations in order to encrypt the data. The XACML policy, a major secret key 
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factor, follows the ciphertext. Upon an access request the XACML sticky policy 
authorizes the operation and authenticates the key generation. 
5.5.2 Generate Keys Timing (Additional keys for RMS) 
Prototyped sticky policies of size between 1[KB] and 32[KB] were used to protect the 
document, which was encrypted using IBE BF and AES256. Furthermore, IBE 
performance was compared to other more legacy RSA encryption - the same public key 
cryptographic model that Microsoft used for Azure RMS [7]. In the presented model 
sticky policy is used to generate a secret key under IBE for AES encryption of the data 
part. In MS RMS the AES secret key for data part encryption is generated separately and 
together with a policy to follow the data it is encrypted using RSA and then attached to 
the encrypted data. Therefore, here evaluation looks only into the initial process of policy 
setup including key-encrypting key operations without actual data-encrypting key 
operation (see Table 2). 
 
Figure 44. Times of Sticky policy mapping into 256 [bit] symmetric key space using IBE-BF compared 
to RSA3072 and RSA4096 operations applied to pseudo-random symmetric key 
Results show (see Figure 44) that RSA with key size 4096[bit] requires more time than 
Pairing-based Cryptography, i.e. IBE to pair XACML policy of size between 1[KB] and 
32[KB] into AES key space. RSA-3072 performs better and requires less time to complete 
cryptographic operations. However, soon it might need to be replaced with RSA of higher 
key size 4096 [bit] due to early quantum computing threats. Individual tests also show 
that RSA performed better during encryption compared to IBE pairing. RSA decryption, 
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however, performed much slower, whereas IBE completes within similar time as in the 
previous pairing with the public test. The overall performance of RSA-4096 might be 
comparable to IBE. However, RSA-2048 performed much better overtaking all other 
evaluated cryptographic setups. 
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12.745588 10.976774 0.055943 0.019828 0.274331 16.815242 0.402116 35.084968 0.011074 0.012746 
12.330375 15.910127 0.018766 0.025493 0.135219 14.960057 0.20743 33.565706 0.012392 0.0131 
11.795164 12.431612 0.019474 0.031158 0.135573 15.501286 0.193978 34.200738 0.015224 0.013808 
10.782795 12.637626 0.026555 0.300961 0.134511 14.831918 0.225836 34.386575 0.009914 0.015932 
13.138855 10.546694 0.018766 0.01133 0.133449 15.469782 0.192209 35.108331 0.013808 0.0131 
11.489330 12.052504 0.010268 0.009914 0.134511 14.788379 0.194332 34.057732 0.012746 0.01487 
13.028060 12.683996 0.013455 0.010622 0.133449 16.338083 0.190085 34.093837 0.0131 0.292448 
11.161549 11.280838 0.022661 0.010622 0.133449 14.530685 0.211677 34.940546 0.013454 0.01487 
10.695363 10.760141 0.022307 0.026201 0.133095 15.967471 0.20566 34.354363 0.033635 0.010976 
13.482919 12.010735 0.288923 0.03045 0.133449 15.455269 0.202474 44.690088 0.012746 0.012746 
13.012131 11.463136 0.023723 0.024077 0.133095 14.899174 0.191855 35.984419 0.011684 0.012038 
12.004364 11.761891 0.020536 0.029034 0.133095 15.471552 0.191147 34.165694 0.011684 0.012038 
10.922261 11.269865 0.025493 0.023723 0.133449 14.920412 0.191147 34.240029 0.016286 0.015578 
34.011007 10.667399 0.075771 0.016641 0.133095 16.526752 0.190793 34.426574 0.013808 0.013808 
11.915870 31.227346 0.023369 0.034699 0.133095 14.66909 0.189731 34.386929 0.016641 0.0131 
11.063498 10.469881 0.021244 0.03045 0.150439 16.052779 0.193271 34.738072 0.015578 0.012746 
12.421701 10.298203 0.021598 0.181993 0.135927 16.109061 0.192917 34.700905 0.013454 0.014162 
11.721892 11.297829 0.322206 0.025493 0.134865 14.934217 0.192917 34.683914 0.01133 0.012392 
11.273051 10.50988 0.282904 0.026201 0.134865 16.304102 0.193271 34.331355 0.017349 0.012746 
11.783837 10.273779 0.033283 0.033991 0.135573 18.167781 0.205306 36.145832 0.015578 0.013454 
11.873747 11.129691 0.256348 0.171017 0.134511 15.209964 0.191855 34.864796 0.012392 0.01487 
10.767574 10.331477 0.026201 0.006727 0.136634 16.142689 0.22442 35.210983 0.012392 0.012746 
12.568600 11.503135 0.027264 0.016995 0.134865 14.650683 0.189731 34.452414 0.0131 0.012392 
10.912704 10.951641 0.036824 0.212089 0.134865 16.036496 0.190439 34.674003 0.012038 0.013808 
13.487874 11.123673 0.01912 0.011684 0.145838 16.305871 0.190439 34.717896 0.014516 0.013454 
12.207900 10.852174 0.022307 0.032575 0.134865 14.573162 0.190439 34.911874 0.014516 0.012392 
12.035160 11.394464 0.03045 0.014163 0.135573 16.760376 0.191147 34.452414 0.012392 0.015578 
11.021374 10.544924 0.01735 0.027618 0.135927 14.566437 0.190793 35.667966 0.009914 0.006019 
11.361191 10.334662 0.016287 0.016287 0.145838 16.425869 0.189377 34.674357 0.016995 0.012038 
10.630232 11.002614 0.026909 0.014517 0.134511 15.681459 0.191147 34.810991 0.020535 0.012392 
12.091088 10.557667 0.024785 0.632019 0.13628 15.219521 0.191147 42.231729 0.008497 0.064792 
11.284024 11.37181 0.014517 0.014871 0.151147 16.117557 0.191855 34.970988 0.005311 0.1048 
10.638373 10.822086 0.00956 0.014517 0.135573 17.380894 0.192917 36.629008 0.006019 0.005311 
13.198676 10.541738 0.008144 0.012747 1.448113 15.405358 0.189377 35.362485 0.008497 0.445045 
10.828104 11.970028 0.00956 0.013101 0.204598 15.670132 0.189377 34.866919 0.013454 0.012392 
12.010735 10.343866 0.00956 0.282904 0.183359 15.27368 0.191501 34.515422 0.006373 0.006019 
11.191991 14.075473 0.212797 0.247497 0.156103 15.997559 0.242473 42.925521 0.011684 0.012746 
10.653594 10.65855 0.021598 0.014871 0.139112 14.706611 0.271145 34.587279 0.013808 0.016286 
12.367188 12.547008 0.019828 0.050278 0.150439 16.55153 0.217341 34.529581 0.01133 0.005665 
12.232678 10.423156 0.026909 0.22519 0.141236 16.528522 0.191501 36.2053 0.007435 0.008851 
12.237987 11.654636 0.270511 0.023015 0.139112 14.798291 0.227252 35.479651 0.017703 0.013808 
10.887572 11.825606 0.029034 0.01133 0.14159 17.191872 0.194686 34.436132 0.012746 0.012392 
12.459930 10.615719 0.0956 0.00779 0.136988 15.991541 0.196102 35.962473 0.01487 0.014162 
11.140664 11.912684 0.008144 0.00779 0.153271 16.338437 0.199996 34.573828 0.016580 0.013454 
12.124007 10.379971 0.009206 0.00779 0.139112 16.364631 0.192563 34.189411 0.014162 0.007435 
12.172502 11.293227 0.008144 0.007436 0.13982 17.770267 0.208845 35.05488 0.006019 0.004957 
11.929675 10.841909 0.033637 0.008144 0.263358 16.52746 0.192563 34.412415 0.008851 0.007789 
12.645413 11.989143 0.008852 0.012393 0.134511 14.940943 0.335569 34.336664 0.004957 0.004249 
27.699982 10.503155 0.568994 0.018412 1.179092 16.367463 0.190793 37.018735 0.005311 0.004603 
12.848595 11.564019 0.035761 0.044613 0.177342 15.670486 0.204952 34.724267 0.004249 0.004249 
10.639789 11.062436 0.035407 0.928378 0.17805 16.52392 0.189731 34.389761 0.004603 0.005665 
11.859234 10.398732 0.020182 0.039656 0.145484 17.259127 0.191501 39.990712 0.004957 0.005311 
12.300995 11.574638 0.259535 0.030096 0.143714 16.997185 0.189377 34.443919 0.004249 0.003895 
10.982791 10.645453 0.026909 0.015225 0.134511 16.988336 0.22265 35.049925 0.030449 0.018057 
12.480461 11.371102 0.145524 0.018766 0.134865 16.374897 0.192917 36.278573 0.007435 0.006727 
10.798724 10.91235 0.007081 0.047092 0.134865 16.172423 0.213447 35.187267 0.006019 0.004603 
12.028788 11.762245 0.008498 0.01735 0.134511 16.378436 0.190439 35.17948 0.007789 0.009914 
10.882262 10.775008 0.00779 0.02089 0.14336 24.672785 0.189023 40.24522 0.007435 0.007081 
12.563645 12.960805 0.00779 0.029034 0.150439 17.289569 0.189731 35.209214 0.004249 0.004249 
10.633772 10.697487 0.026909 0.033637 0.153625 16.708341 0.235748 34.336664 0.004249 0.004249 
11.941710 11.423136 0.320435 0.014871 0.16566 16.259147 0.344418 37.862612 0.003895 0.003895 
10.994118 12.11268 0.020536 0.00779 0.135927 14.6344 0.221589 34.589049 0.004249 0.004249 
10.817839 11.702069 0.239707 0.016641 0.157519 16.306933 0.191855 35.117888 0.021243 0.02443 
12.432320 12.114804 0.033991 0.031867 0.134865 14.778468 0.202828 46.262446 0.005665 0.004603 
10.645807 10.802264 0.01735 0.034699 0.134865 16.660909 0.204598 37.26581 0.004249 0.004249 
11.909498 12.090734 0.02868 0.008852 0.135573 15.099878 0.207783 34.259144 0.005311 0.008143 
11.567204 11.46172 0.021598 0.00956 0.164599 16.065522 0.223358 37.425099 0.004957 0.004957 
10.697841 11.064913 0.015225 0.008852 0.14336 14.607498 0.20566 34.448875 0.005311 0.006019 
13.119032 10.326875 0.018412 0.008144 0.142652 17.134882 0.259464 34.17596 0.004249 0.004603 
13.227348 12.047903 0.021244 0.628832 0.135573 15.649247 0.207076 38.159244 0.004249 0.003895 
12.138520 10.716602 0.33212 0.024431 0.135927 15.298812 0.202828 34.171712 0.004957 0.202873 
11.855340 11.828792 0.007081 0.035407 0.143006 18.698036 0.201412 34.309762 0.004957 0.004249 
12.523292 10.901023 0.236874 0.017704 0.157519 16.483567 0.191147 37.990751 0.004249 0.003895 
10.979959 10.382449 0.019474 0.205362 0.163537 16.582326 0.191855 34.541616 0.004249 0.004957 
12.844347 12.189847 0.195802 0.015933 0.156811 16.283925 0.191855 34.318966 0.012038 0.008497 
10.691469 10.684744 0.011684 0.008498 0.159643 15.760042 0.189377 38.518528 0.004603 0.004249 
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11.763307 11.288272 0.020536 0.013101 0.140528 16.420559 0.191147 34.71117 0.004249 0.004249 
11.070223 10.714832 0.020536 0.006727 0.20035 16.359676 0.20035 34.267639 0.004249 0.004249 
12.171086 11.608619 0.044967 0.00956 0.138404 18.620162 0.189731 36.597859 0.004957 0.015224 
10.669523 10.572534 0.02089 0.010976 0.136988 16.144105 0.189731 35.05488 0.014516 0.010268 
11.975338 11.261016 0.029388 0.033283 0.136634 16.274014 0.190439 34.289232 0.004957 0.004603 
11.133939 11.889322 0.00956 0.04001 0.13805 16.074726 0.191501 36.327775 0.004603 0.004249 
10.842263 10.694655 0.009206 0.016287 0.137342 14.991561 0.193624 34.77701 0.004249 0.004249 
12.416037 11.80543 0.009206 0.021598 0.136634 15.579868 0.228668 34.419849 0.004957 0.006727 
10.770406 11.429154 0.01133 0.012038 0.135573 15.534913 0.3384 36.309369 0.009205 0.007435 
12.058168 12.187723 0.21563 0.00779 0.134865 16.060567 0.258756 35.078951 0.005311 0.005311 
11.369686 10.718372 0.035761 0.009914 0.134865 14.8036 0.212739 34.269763 0.004957 0.004603 
10.638727 11.667025 0.044967 0.00779 0.217341 16.114371 0.190793 36.295918 0.014516 0.015224 
12.532849 11.408269 0.01912 0.008144 0.171678 16.407816 0.223358 34.557899 0.007435 0.004249 
10.934650 11.757643 0.018412 0.00779 0.1469 14.561835 0.194686 34.392239 0.003895 0.003895 
11.948436 10.681558 0.009206 0.083561 0.144068 20.473222 0.19504 46.720844 0.003895 0.003541 
12.651785 14.365379 0.009206 0.01133 0.144776 16.262332 0.198934 34.683914 0.003541 0.006727 
12.060292 10.552357 0.00779 0.033637 0.13628 14.734221 0.192563 34.489228 0.007081 0.008143 
12.846117 11.223494 0.009206 0.033991 0.157519 15.086073 0.192209 35.193639 0.008143 0.004957 
11.300307 11.321545 0.009206 0.038948 0.134865 15.241114 0.193271 34.873645 0.004249 0.003895 
14.911917 10.583153 0.020536 0.01735 0.134865 16.145167 0.194686 34.875061 0.014516 0.017703 
10.665275 11.648265 0.037886 0.013809 0.134865 19.189708 0.192209 38.625075 0.008497 0.006373 
11.471631 10.450058 0.044613 0.008144 0.134511 15.088904 0.190793 34.254188 0.004957 0.004249 
11.974630 11.467737 0.022661 0.006727 0.135573 16.174901 0.194332 34.609579 0.004249 0.006019 
11.151991 10.770052 0.013809 0.00779 0.135573 16.153662 0.189377 38.195703 0.006727 0.004249 
          
≈12.151734 ≈11.516674 ≈0.060309 ≈0.058011 ≈0.169816 ≈16.100445 ≈0.206789 ≈35.693356 ≈0.009659 ≈0.019693 
Table 2 IBE and RSA performance comparison results (on CPU Intel Core i7 2.9[GHz]) 
5.5.3 Sticky Policy 
RMS IRM construct uses eXtensible rights Markup Language (XrML) the rights 
expression language that was designed for closed environments [152] where could 
implementation was not considered. SPIBE is fully based on XACML policy format. 
XrML [153] and XACML [97] are very similar. However, the semantics used to express 
access rights are different. Both define tuples where the subject is permitted to perform 
specific activity defined by predicate against access object. In XrML a condition is a 
functional equivalent of XACML obligations, although what gives XACML advantages 
are complex expressions and predicates with negative and deny assertions. Note that 
XrML supports the only positive assertion. 
XrML defines basic rights and digital licensing where the issuer of the license is 
effectively an owner of the digital asset. Same as XACML, XrML supports basic 
cryptographic functions. While XACML leverages eXtensible Stylesheet Language 
Transformation (XSLT) to constrain the policy, XrML uses templates within a license 
document. Both standards support external references to internal policy elements. The 
flexibility of both regarding elements extensions is similar; these are terms that could be 
redefined to extend the schema. Despite XrML strengths fundamentally it is not suited 
for complex access policies and rules while XACML is intended to be suitable for a 
variety of application environments [97] what perfectly fits various cloud configurations. 
XACML itself formulates attribute-based access control (ABAC) phrases. Its profiles can 
support different access control models as per [127], [65]. This policy-based access 
control model delivers time-constrained access functionality as well as capabilities to 
handle emergency access requests like in Break-Glass scenario. Cross-Enterprise 
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Security and Privacy Authorisation (XSPA) [112] is a XACML profile dedicated for large 
enterprise use but mostly for healthcare institutions that exchange information across 
various security boundaries. Technically the XACML is not a part of any particular 
cryptographic primitive therefore actual implementation can quickly adapt any new 
functional requirements. XACML offers various features like JavaScript Object Notation 
(JSON) [154] profile to format the policy using light in size attributes representation in 
comparison to the heavier XML predecessor. Furthermore, it could represent legacy 
access control objects structure via efficient serialisation as described in [113]. 
5.5.4 Document Integration – Supported Formats 
Officially Microsoft RMS natively supports OOXML, Portable Document Format (PDF), 
plain text, CSV and image file formats. It provides integration for mailing client 
applications also allowing email protection. Protected file is identified by a changed 
extension. Original document file extension is prefixed with a ‘p’ letter, e.g. PDF 
document instead of .pdf has a .ppdf extension. 
SPIBE concept integrates security part into original OOXML document keeping its 
internal structure unchanged. Hence data XML section is replaced with an encrypted data 
file and the empty document template. SPIBE does not change the document extension. 
5.5.5 Security 
It has been proven that IRM system with higher interoperability considering currently 
commonly used operating systems, cannot deliver secure, granular access control. It is 
not only one IRM product related vulnerability but a logical inference considering facts, 
e.g. that read-only protected document could be read by an unauthorised individual 
simply using shoulder surfing social attack. Microsoft Azure RMS offers a handful of 
deterrent safeguards discouraging an individual from illegitimate document changes or 
by restricting message recipients. Despite the obvious IRM vulnerabilities MS RMS 
suffers from simple security flow giving adversary full rights over document if the 
adversary has even minimal rights to view the content [148]. There is another, a more 
serious security issue with the RMS model allowing an adversary to re-encrypt the 
amended document. Although Microsoft Office online editor applications do not seem to 
suffer from the described vulnerability. 
SPIBE aims to leverage Blockchain with document signatures and document versioning 
meta-data. The signature could be an incorporated part of XACML policy under 
Attributes. Encrypted document is bind to the policy, and even if tampered the change 
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cannot be submitted to the blockchain as the original updated document. Central 
versioning chain despite IRM model selected is the only way to ensure document 
authenticity, non-repudiation and integrity. 
5.5.6 Quantum Computing 
Azure RMS due to used cryptographic primitive has relatively low potential to become a 
quantum ready product [74]. The current construct is complex considering in-deep 
integration with different RSA key pair certificates. With large RSA keys, it might be 
possible to securely share the public key together with encrypted data. However, the key 
size might be larger than the policy and the protected file together. 
The SPIBE despite a public key encryption has been proved quantum computing ready 
[14], [89]. Preferred for SPIBE, the IBE-IPG construct based on pairing-based 
cryptography isogeny is a quantum safe encryption, although offers the same complexity 
as the evaluated here IBE BF scheme. Existing IBE BE based on Diffie-Hellman 
cryptographic primitive could be replaced with its quantum resistant supersingular 
isogeny equivalent [14]. IBE over NTRU Lattices [74], [89] is another quantum ready 
construct that could be potentially used under IBC scheme. Finally, a proposal to leverage 
IBE construct with quadratic residue gives SPIBE high chances to successfully compete 
with RMS if it comes to quantum computing. 
5.6 IONIC vs SPIBE 
5.6.1 Architecture 
Most modern solutions here also IONIC Secure Files are built as a framework with 
publicly available application programming interfaces (API) and software development 
kit (SDK) [8] for simplified cross-platform integration. The product is built under service-
oriented architecture (SOA) with various globally accepted open standards. Shortly it 
consists of a policy engine, key services including personal and technical identity on-
boarding (i.e. enrolment service), client SDK suite, management API and 
auditing/analytics APIs. 
5.6.2 Key Management – Trusted Architecture 
IONIC uses a master root key to encrypt a key ring. Key ring contains tens of thousands 
key-encrypting keys. These keys are then referenced considering key residency to 
relevant key stores. Keystore stores up to one trillion data-encrypting keys. Official 
documentation is missing information about key management system (KMS) 
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implementation details, and from the discussion, with IONIC developer community 
manager, it was hard to obtain such information including crypto modules in place or 
random key generation (RNG) hardware and software libraries. 
 
Figure 45 IONIC Solution architecture [8]  
To manage data-encrypting symmetric keys IONIC Secure Files same as SPIBE uses 
Trusted Authority (TA). In Secure Files, symmetric data-encrypting keys are generated 
at the TA, i.e. Key Servers side [8] (see Figure 45). IONIC also encrypts immutable 
attributes using the same data-encrypting keys and authenticated AES256-GCM. The 
model enables a set of mutable attributes to be defined by the data owner, which could 
change during a document lifecycle without having an impact on the cryptographic 
verification. All IONIC Secure Files data-encrypting keys are stored in a dedicated key 
space located at a key server. Therefore the symmetric key escrow is possible at any time 
allowing immediate decryption of trillions of protected documents [8]. 
SPIBE does not support mutable and immutable attributes, but here all attributes are 
immutable. A key advantage of SPIBE is its ability to generate a symmetric data-
encrypting key based on the policy itself. The initial protection of the document and the 
future re-encryption require the same operations including new key generation under IBE.  
The encryption key is generated every time the authorisation policy with its attributes 
changes. This is possible as keys could be generated dynamically under IBE algorithm 
without the need to upload and store them in the cloud. To decrypt the document upon a 
successful access request (see Figure 21) the decryption key is derived from the TA key 
and again from the access policy. 
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5.6.3 Sticky Policy 
IONIC Secure Files adapted XACML version 3.0 [97] policy to represent complex access 
control statements. IONIC Policy Engine uses several JSON formatted XACML 
elements. It is strictly constrained with features that are applicable for files protection in 
shared environments (i.e. cloud computing). It supports limited Policy Sets with single 
deny-overrides condition across all enclosed policies. The IONIC implementation makes 
use of Obligation element. However, it excludes a little bit newer XACML elements 
called Advice. Next, the IONIC policy does not implement the full Target element format 
most probably due to a selected model where a single sticky policy is attached to a single 
document. Unlike IONIC Policy Engine the SPIBE could leverage Target [97] element 
to granularly control OOXML document access. Although the final SPIBE evaluation 
excludes granular access control functionality from the scope although with the Target 
element this part of evaluation would not be possible. Both IONIC Policy Engine and 
SPIBE do not support AttributeSelector and Content elements, and the XPath resolver. 
The main reason is the sticky policy model, where the policy protects a single document 
piece rather than multiple enclosed attributes or XML document sections. Despite these 
differences, IONIC Policy Engine and SPIBE use the same XACML elements, although 
the IONIC implementation is JSON formatted and SPIBE still evaluates only XML 
formatted policies. IONIC policies are already constrained with different templates. 
SPIBE requires each TA to deliver its own set of constrained policy templates. IONIC 
defined own set of attributes, it limited the data types and the functions. SPIBE, as well, 
aims to use the slightly limited XACML functionality to simplify the policy management 
from the end-user perspective. 
5.6.4 Document Integration – Supported Formats 
IONIC Secure Files natively supports OOXML, Portable Document Format (PDF), text, 
CSV and image files protection. Same as SPIBE, the IONIC embeds encrypted content 
using native OOXML functionality. IONIC adds unencrypted cover-page instructing the 
end-user about the encrypted content. SPIBE could potentially extend supportability for 
other file formats, however, for the evaluation purposes, OOXML was sufficient to show 
how potentially sticky policy could be integrated into existing file formats. 
5.6.5 Quantum Computing 
Both solutions, the IONIC Secure Files and SPIBE use AES symmetric encryption. 
IONIC used key servers to store all symmetric data-encrypting keys, while SPIBE derives 
ad hoc symmetric data-encrypting keys using identity-based encryption (IBE) primitive 
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upon encryption or decryption request. Considering the fact that IBE construct could use 
different cryptographic primitives behind it has been proved that IBE as a construct could 
be quantum safe. With relatively large key space both constructs under AES encryption 
are post-quantum ready [74]. Since SPIBE could quickly respond to cryptographic 
primitive changes via policy obligations and advice the data is sufficiently protected upon 
re-encryption in case of new cryptographic vulnerabilities. Here security of the SPIBE 
model has to be considered as a comprehensive security solution rather than a simple 
cryptographic primitive. Only under this assumption, SPIBE security could be compared 
with IONIC Secure Files solution that uses only symmetric encryption. 
5.7 Conclusions 
SPIBE is an attractive construct for global cloud implementations. The IBE-IPG quantum 
ready schema in comparison to others used for IRM public key primitives offers a 
relatively long algorithm security lifecycle (ASL) providing reliable security for data at 
rest (see Table 2). The Microsoft RMS is more complicated than SPIBE. Therefore, it is 
hard to consider it as an adaptable framework. Overall key-encrypting-key operations 
performance evaluation (see Table 4) shows that IONIC Secure Files outmatch both RMS 
and SPIBE as it uses only AES symmetric encryption. RMS, despite of its double 
asynchronous encryption operation is faster than SPIBE, which performs only one actual 
bilinear mapping. The major operation cost will be the actual data encryption, which for 
all of the IRM solutions is nearly identical due to the same symmetric encryption 
algorithm. As a product the RMS has an obvious advantage, which is its market position. 
IONIC Secure Files, on the other hand, is a symmetric encryption-based product that 
despite all disadvantages of the symmetric key construct has a very high potential to 
become Azure RMS cloud-ready successor. SPIBE, unlike evaluated products, could 
become an open source IRM cloud-based ready framework. IBE does not constrain the 
solution to only one cryptographic primitive. Therefore, it could be following the 
technological changes. Well-defined XACML templates could make the solution very 
interoperable with different systems that could simply span across various cloud services. 
SPIBE, to become a fully valuable framework has to provide support not only for 
OOXML but also other file types and information formats, i.e. PDF, CSV, and emails. 	  
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 Characteristics Azure RMS IONIC SPIBE 
Specification 
Policy Standard XrML XACML XACML 
Information Type PDF, OOXML, CSV, 
mail, image 
PDF, OOXML, CSV, 
image 
OOXML, *PDF, 
*CSV, *mail, *image 
Cryptographic 
construct 
Asymmetric/Symmetric Symmetric Asymmetric/Symmetric 
Key-encrypting key RSA 2048 AES256-CTR IBE-IPG 
Data-encrypting key AES128/AES256 AES256-GCM AES256-CBC 
KMS (custom) HSM Thales (own Key Server) SSM HSM 
     
Property 
ASL Short Long Long 
Construct complexity High Mid Mid 
Key management 
complexity 
High High Low 
Quantum-ready No Yes Yes 
Integrity assurance N/A Yes Yes 
Authenticity 
assurance 
No No Yes 
Key-encrypting key 
protection at rest 
High High High 
Key-encrypting key 
protection in motion 
Mid (custom HSM) Low Mid 
Data-encrypting key 
protection 
Low High High 
 * - possible extension   
Table 3. IRM solutions comparison 	  
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 Operation Azure RMS IONIC SPIBE 
C
ryptographic O
perations C
ost 
C
alculation Equation 
Encryption 𝑐+ ← 𝑚+ 𝑒p + 2 × 𝑒M	 ← 	 𝑒p(𝑠+, 𝑚+)+ 𝑒M J𝑝M+,K𝑒MK𝑝M+, 𝑠+P, 𝑝M<, 𝑃𝑂𝐿PQ 2 × 𝑒p ← 𝑒p(𝑠+, 𝑠<)+ 𝑒p(𝑠<,𝑚) 𝑒p + êM+← 𝑒p(𝑠ê, 𝑚+) + JêK𝑝M+, 𝑃𝑂𝐿PQ	
Decryption 𝑚+ ← 𝑐+ 𝑑p + 𝑑M ← 𝑑pK𝑑M(𝑐+)P 2 × 𝑑p← 𝑑p(𝑠+, 𝑠<) + 𝑑p(𝑠<, 𝑐+) 𝑑p + êp+← 𝑑p(𝑠ê, 𝑐+) + Kê(𝑠+, 𝑃𝑂𝐿)P 
Signing 𝑆+ 𝑆M ← 𝑆M(𝑝p<, 𝑐+) N/A 𝑒p + êM+ ← 𝑒p(𝑠ê, 𝑃𝑂𝐿)+ JêK𝑝M+, 𝑚+PQ 
Signing 
Verification 𝑆+ N/A N/A 𝑑p + êp+ ← 𝑑p(𝑠ê, 𝑆+)+ Kê(𝑠+,𝑚+)P 
Key 
Generation 
𝑛 × 𝑠+ + 	𝑛 × K𝑝M+, 𝑝p+P+ 	 1𝑛 	 × K𝑝M<, 𝑝p<P 𝑛 × 𝑠< + 	
1𝑛 × 𝑠+ 𝑛 × K𝑝M+, 𝑝p+P + 	 1𝑛 × 𝑠+ 
     
*C
ryptographic 
O
perations C
ost 
[m
s] 
Encryption 0.009659 + 2 × 0.060309= 0.130277 2 × 0.009659 = 0.019318 0.009659 + 11.516674= 11.526333 
Decryption 0.019693 + 0.058011= 0.077704 2 × 0.019693 = 0.039386 0.019693 + 12.151734= 12.171427 
 𝑐– ciphertext 
 𝑚– plaintext 
 𝑆– signing product 
 𝑛 – number of client-side key pair generation requests 
 +" – denotes that the one-time key generation operation cost becomes negligible with higher 𝑛 
 𝑒p– symmetric encryption 
 𝑒M– asymmetric public key encryption 
 𝑑p– symmetric decryption 
 𝑑M– asymmetric public key decryption 
 𝑆M– asymmetric public key signing 
 𝑠 – symmetric key (x – key number) 
 𝑝M  – asymmetric public key (x – key number) 
 𝑝p – asymmetric private key (x – key number) 
 ê – bilinear mapping (s – on TA master key, p – on TA public key) 
 * – considering average operation cost from Table 2 
Table 4. IRM operations comparison 
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6 Conclusions and Future Work 
6.1 Achievement of Thesis Aim, Objectives and Research 
Questions 
It is possible to deliver a secure cloud-based information sharing framework. However, 
the development should incorporate only standardised solutions apply only the latest 
security techniques. Since legacy IRM products entered into a single global data sharing 
security boundary, they struggle with delivering both security [148] and interoperability. 
Proposed SPIBE framework, however, could quickly adapt to technological changes and 
new security threats. 
6.2 Recap of Contribution and Novelty 
SPIBE offers a highly flexible model for secure information sharing in the cloud. The 
model, unlike other IRM solutions [7], [8], offers relatively long ASL [73] due to IBE 
scheme that could integrate various cryptographic primitives consequently addressing 
future threats starting from emerging quantum computing. The model successfully 
leveraged XACML formatted [97] sticky policy acting as an identity for the information 
to compute a key for symmetric data encryption. XACML as a part of a standard 
integrates with authorization systems as well as authentication systems like SAML [119], 
[125] to deliver one single compatible framework. While other models require either 
symmetric or both symmetric and asymmetric keys to be factorized prior data protection, 
the SPIBE under IBE paradigm [10] derives keys from the constructed sticky policy. The 
possible collisions caused by deriving two identical keys in case same server parameters 
are distributed to different end-users in compare to CP-ABE are mitigated in SPIBE by 
adding actual document global unique identifier and the document version. Blockchain 
solves the most common problem with IRM [148], the data authenticity and non-
repudiation. Every information change made under SPIBE in order to pass into protected 
information lifecycle has to be versioned, authenticated and finally committed to a single 
global trusted blockchain of all legitimate changes. 
6.3 Main Findings 
Sticky policies as an access control technique satisfy systems where confidentiality and 
integrity of personal information are protected [49] based on policies set by the data 
owner. These secure policies follow the data and technically define possible scenarios in 
which data can be processed. Such a model is suitable for governments, financial 
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institutions systems, electronic healthcare systems where patients’ privacy policies would 
stick to a medical record [5]. Access policies can be expressed on top of different data 
structures. Modern computing powers made this relatively high level expressing language 
sufficient to compute complex rules. Cross-domain configurations are one of the 
XACML advantages over other policy languages [4]. The future work, especially in a 
cloud context, will aim to show the potential how XACML formatted sticky policy could 
securely span across various security domains and boundaries [155]. 
Like modern authentication methods, including OAuth, SAML, OpenID and other the 
XACML compliments suite with ready to use authorisation standard for large companies 
[97]. The future work needs to focus on showing that XACML could authorise subjects 
in global Business to Business (B2B) and Business to Consumer (B2C) cloud-based 
configurations. Furthermore, the proposed model consists of trust authority (TA) 
components, where authorisation and cryptographic modules are deployed as separate 
(sub) entities. For evaluation, both were implemented as two separate libraries called via 
a single application. However, the final solution would consist of two or more web 
services bound together using authentication where each service acts as an authenticated 
technical identity. Evaluation of the driver level architecture shown that this is a quite 
powerful approach with loads of potential for further development. Legacy file access 
control constructs [113] empowered with additional modern cryptographic and 
authorisation techniques give additional centralized, i.e. cloud-enabled control over the 
access management. For the evaluation purposes, Windows based driver has been 
developed and installed. The IBE encryption operations have been replaced with a 
symmetric XOR encoding against 0xFF value. The integration with XACML libraries 
was too complex for the scope of this evaluation. However, as a part of the research 
minifilter driver development has a high potential for a standard solution compatible with 
various editor applications. Due to difficulties to bound Windows Driver Kit (WDK) 
together with GMP crypto libraries, there was only a limited implementation completed 
towards the entire model evaluation. 
In compare with other IRM solutions and actual market ready products (see Table 3) the 
SPIBE have couple major advantages. It leveraged quantum ready public key 
cryptographic protocols delivering both the secure public key exchange functionality 
together with quantum resistant cryptographic algorithms. By empowering IRM with 
blockchain technology the major problem of authenticating data changes is solved. 
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Simply by maintaining common chain of changes for every document the author and 
other contributors are sure they work on the main branch of legitimate changes. 
6.4 Future Work 
All developed and evaluated components in order to become a ready framework would 
require major architectural alignment, considering policy enforcement point as a starting 
point where all SPIBE elements such as access control, encryption and document 
management interact together. It was challenging to implement consistent components 
integrated as per Figure 25 due to different solution architectures. Prototype is sufficient 
for Proof of Concept and actual evaluation, but there is a different approach required to 
deliver a customer ready framework. 
Online editor application could be the first prototyped artefact giving space for further 
platform/framework improvements. The final framework, however, has to consider 
different operating systems and protected file types. Therefore, architecture requires a 
modular approach where different core components could be referenced despite the 
underlying system architecture. Approach where only online editor application is 
considered simplifies interoperability challenges with PEP supporting different 
platforms. 
It has been proven that currently accepted information rights management (IRM) 
solutions not excluding Azure MS RMS cannot efficiently authenticate changes as well 
as differentiate legitimate from illegitimate data amendments [148]. Considering IRM 
systems that are designed for interoperability with different operating systems and across 
different platforms, the secure solution based on legacy assumptions have to compromise 
with very limited data access control. From the moment a policy enforcement point 
releases a positive access decision, the editor application that hosts decrypted information 
is the only security boundary for the document. In other words, despite the rights 
assigned, the data processor has either full access rights or none. The secure solution 
would have to maintain a legitimate chain of all the document versions. This would 
guarantee that only authenticated and properly signed documents version could be 
superseded with its new version. 
Considering available technologies for integrity and non-repudiation, a blockchain is a 
preferred option as unlike signature it verifies data in a historical context [156]. 
Furthermore, blockchain service together with Trust Authority (TA) may govern any 
illegitimate re-encryption attempt of the amended data. Changed document despite 
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initially defined sticky policy rights giving only read rights, can be rejected by the TA 
therefore and will not be added to the blockchain. 
Finally, a well-defined policy template could highly constrain a sticky policy in a given 
context as well as enforce the requirement to fill an authenticated originator attribute. 
Depends on the implementation each legitimate amendment made would require re-
encryption with a different, new document version and it would require unique identifier 
of an authenticated change originator. XACML policy defines two safeguards, an 
obligation and advice (see Figure 10). Both could carry further instructions for policy 
enforcement point behind editor application defining how to handle the initial 
authorisation including basic requirements for data re-encryption under updated policy. 
Regarding quantum tampering for SPIBE, the author would need another ten months to 
change used C libraries for IBE in the way it respects the other isogenous morphism as 
in IBE-IPG. Finally, there are newly developed cryptographic primitives [157] that could 
suit more platforms in terms of symmetric encryption efficiency especially considering 
low powered devices that do not provide native AES support. Chacha20 stream cypher 
seems to overrun AES when it comes to security. Cloud-based secure data sharing 
framework should be built on top of such cryptographic protocols. 	
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APPENDIX A XACML VERSION 3.0 POLICIES AND RULE-COMBINING 
ALGORITHMS 
2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Permit Permit Deny Permit I{D} Permit I{DP} 
Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
N/A Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I{D} I{D} Deny I{D} I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I{P} Permit Deny I{P} I{DP} I{P} I{DP} 
I{DP} I{DP} Deny I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 5 Deny-overrides 
2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Permit Permit Deny Permit I{D} Permit 
 
Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
N/A Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I{D} I{D} Deny I{D} I{D} I{D} I{DP} 
I{P} Permit Deny I{P} I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I{DP} I{DP} Deny I{DP} I{D} I{D} I{DP} 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 6. Ordered-deny-overrides 
2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit 
Deny Permit Deny Deny Deny I{P} I{DP} 
N/A Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I(D} Permit Deny I{D} I{D} I{DP} I{DP} 
I{P} Permit I{P} I{P} I{DP} I{P} I{DP} 
I{DP} Permit I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 7. Permit-overrides 
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2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit 
Deny Permit Deny Deny Deny I{P} I{DP} 
N/A Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I(D} Permit Deny I{D} I{D} I{DP} I{DP} 
I{P} Permit I{P} I{P} I{DP} I{P} I{DP} 
I{DP} Permit I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 8. Ordered-permit-overrides 
2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit 
Deny Permit Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
N/A Permit Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
I{D} Permit Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
I{P} Permit Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
I{DP} Permit Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 9. Deny-unless-permit 
2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Permit Permit Deny Permit Permit Permit Permit 
Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
N/A Permit Deny Permit Permit Permit Permit 
I{D} Permit Deny Permit Permit Permit Permit 
I{P} Permit Deny Permit Permit Permit Permit 
I{DP} Permit Deny Permit Permit Permit Permit 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 10. Permit-unless-deny 
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2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Permit Permit Deny Permit I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Deny Permit Deny Deny I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
N/A Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I{D} Permit Deny I{D} I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I{P} Permit Deny I{P} I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I{DP} Permit Deny I{DP} I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
 
Table 11. First-applicable 
2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Permit I I Permit I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
Deny I I Deny I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
N/A Permit Deny N/A I{D} I{P} I{DP} 
I{D} I{D} I{D} I{D} I{D} I{DP} I{DP} 
I{P} I{P} I{P} I{P} I{DP} I{P} I{DP} 
I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} I{DP} 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 12. Only-one-applicable – only for Policy Set;  
2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I I{D} I{P} 
 
Permit Permit Deny Permit Deny I I 
Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
N/A Permit Deny N/A Deny I I 
I Deny Deny Deny Deny I I 
I{D} I Deny I I I I 
I{P} I Deny I I I I 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 13. Legacy Deny-overrides 
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2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I I{D} I{P} 
 
Permit Permit Deny Permit Deny I I 
Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny 
N/A Permit Deny N/A Deny I I 
I Deny Deny Deny Deny I I 
I{D} I Deny I I I I 
I{P} I Deny I I I I 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 14. Legacy Ordered-deny-overrides 
2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I I{D} I{P} 
Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit 
Deny Permit Deny Deny I I I 
N/A Permit Deny N/A I I I 
I Permit Deny I I I I 
I{D} Permit I I I I I 
I{P} Permit I I I I I 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 15. Legacy Permit-overrides 
2nd 
ê 
1st 
è 
Permit Deny N/A I I{D} I{P} 
Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit Permit 
Deny Permit Deny Deny I I I 
N/A Permit Deny N/A I I I 
I Permit Deny I I I I 
I{D} Permit I I I I I 
I{P} Permit I I I I I 
I Indeterminate 
{D} Deny 
{P} Permit 
N/A NotApplicable 
Table 16. Legacy Ordered-permit-overrides 	
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APPENDIX C EXTERNAL LIBRARIES / PACKAGES Library	Name	 Rel.	 Comments	 Licensing	 Url	
The	Pairing-
Based	
Cryptography	
Library	
0.5.14	 	 GNU	Lesser	
General	
Public	
License	
https://crypto.stanfor
d.edu/pbc/files/pbc-
0.5.14.tar.gz	
OpenSSL	 1.0.2	 	 OpenSSL	
SSLeay	
https://github.com/op
enssl/openssl	
GMP	 6.0.0	 	 GNU	LGPL	
v3	
GNU	GPL	v2	
https://gmplib.org/do
wnload/gmp/gmp-
6.1.0.tar.bz2	
XACML.Core	 0.0.0.0	 Unknown	Source;	
Found	.Net	
executable	before	
research	started;	
Extracted	libraries	
and	modified;	
N/A	 https://github.com/Greg
Spyra/xacml-core 
Microsoft	
Windows	
Driver	Kit	
10.0.15063.0	 Required	for	
spibedrv	MiniFilter	
Microsoft	 https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/p/?LinkID=845980	
Microsoft	
Software	
Development	
Kit	
10.0.15063.468	 Required	for	
spibedrv	MiniFilter	
Microsoft	 https://go.microsoft.co
m/fwlink/p/?LinkID=8
45298		
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APPENDIX D IBE WITH ECC AND RSA EVALUATION – ENVIRONMENT 
SETUP 	
@SET PATH=%PATH%;C:\Projects\IBE\gmp-6.0.0; 
@SET PATH=%PATH%;C:\Projects\IBE\pbc-0.5.14; 
@SET GMP_Dir=C:\Projects\IBE\gmp-6.0.0 
@SET GMP_InstallDir=/c/Projects/IBE/gmp 
@SET PBC_Dir=C:\Projects\IBE\pbc-0.5.14 
@SET PBC_InstallDir=/c/Projects/IBE/pbc_install 
@SET OSL_Install=/c/Projects/IBE/openssl 
@SET OSL_Dir=C:\Projects\IBE\openssl-1.0.2d 
 118 
APPENDIX E IBE WITH ECC AND RSA EVALUATION – COMPILE 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC LIBRARIES 	
C:\MinGW\msys\1.0\msys.bat 
cd $GMP_DIR 
 
export CXXFLAGS="$CXXFLAGS --output-def" 
 
#configure --prefix=$GMP_INSTALLDIR --host=i686-pc-mingw32 
configure --prefix=$GMP_INSTALL --host=coreisbr-pc-mingw32 --disable-static --
enable-shared 
make & make check & make install 
 
cd $PBC_DIR 
#configure --prefix=$PBC_INSTALLDIR --host=coreisbr-pc-mingw32 
configure --prefix=$PBC_INSTALL --host=i686-pc-mingw32 --disable-static --
enable-shared ABI=64 
make & make check & make install 
 
#openssl-1.0.1q 
#Under Visual Studio CMD 
cd $OSL_DIR  
perl Configure VC-WIN32 --prefix=C:\Projects\IBE\openssl 
ms\do_ms 
nmake -f ms\nt.mak 
nmake -f ms\nt.mak install 
 
 
#NTSHELL - don’t generate libs under Visual Studio folder! 
SET PATH=%PATH%;C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio 12.0\VC\bin 
lib /machine:x86 /def:libgmp.def 
 
lib /machine:x86 /def:libpbc.def 	
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APPENDIX F IBE WITH ECC AND RSA EVALUATION – 
SBE\VC\SBE.SLN (VISUAL STUDIO SOLUTION) 	
Microsoft Visual Studio Solution File, Format Version 12.00 
# Visual Studio 2013 
VisualStudioVersion = 12.0.30501.0 
MinimumVisualStudioVersion = 10.0.40219.1 
Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "ConsoleApplication", 
"ConsoleApplication\ConsoleApplication.vcxproj", "{02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-
086A7AC4A955}" 
EndProject 
Global 
 GlobalSection(SubversionScc) = preSolution 
  Svn-Managed = True 
  Manager = AnkhSVN - Subversion Support for Visual Studio 
 EndGlobalSection 
 GlobalSection(SolutionConfigurationPlatforms) = preSolution 
  Debug|Win32 = Debug|Win32 
  Debug|x64 = Debug|x64 
  Release|Win32 = Release|Win32 
  Release|x64 = Release|x64 
 EndGlobalSection 
 GlobalSection(ProjectConfigurationPlatforms) = postSolution 
  {02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-086A7AC4A955}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = 
Debug|Win32 
  {02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-086A7AC4A955}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = 
Debug|Win32 
  {02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-086A7AC4A955}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 
  {02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-086A7AC4A955}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|x64 
  {02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-086A7AC4A955}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = 
Release|Win32 
  {02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-086A7AC4A955}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = 
Release|Win32 
  {02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-086A7AC4A955}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = 
Release|x64 
  {02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-086A7AC4A955}.Release|x64.Build.0 = 
Release|x64 
 EndGlobalSection 
 GlobalSection(SolutionProperties) = preSolution 
  HideSolutionNode = FALSE 
 EndGlobalSection 
EndGlobal 
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APPENDIX G IBE WITH ECC AND RSA EVALUATION – 
SBE\VC\CONSOLEAPPLICATION\CONSOLEAPPLICATION.VCXPROJ 
(VISUAL STUDIO PROJECT) 	
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<Project DefaultTargets="Build" ToolsVersion="14.0" 
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003"> 
  <ItemGroup Label="ProjectConfigurations"> 
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Debug|Win32"> 
      <Configuration>Debug</Configuration> 
      <Platform>Win32</Platform> 
    </ProjectConfiguration> 
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Debug|x64"> 
      <Configuration>Debug</Configuration> 
      <Platform>x64</Platform> 
    </ProjectConfiguration> 
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|Win32"> 
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration> 
      <Platform>Win32</Platform> 
    </ProjectConfiguration> 
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|x64"> 
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration> 
      <Platform>x64</Platform> 
    </ProjectConfiguration> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Label="Globals"> 
    <ProjectGuid>{02419819-AF2A-4E28-A2D9-086A7AC4A955}</ProjectGuid> 
    <Keyword>Win32Proj</Keyword> 
    <RootNamespace>ConsoleApplication</RootNamespace> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.Default.props" /> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|Win32'" 
Label="Configuration"> 
    <ConfigurationType>Application</ConfigurationType> 
    <UseDebugLibraries>true</UseDebugLibraries> 
    <PlatformToolset>v140</PlatformToolset> 
    <CharacterSet>Unicode</CharacterSet> 
    <UseOfMfc>Dynamic</UseOfMfc> 
    <CLRSupport>true</CLRSupport> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|x64'" 
Label="Configuration"> 
    <ConfigurationType>Application</ConfigurationType> 
    <UseDebugLibraries>true</UseDebugLibraries> 
    <PlatformToolset>v140</PlatformToolset> 
    <CharacterSet>Unicode</CharacterSet> 
    <UseOfMfc>Dynamic</UseOfMfc> 
    <CLRSupport>true</CLRSupport> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|Win32'" 
Label="Configuration"> 
    <ConfigurationType>Application</ConfigurationType> 
    <UseDebugLibraries>false</UseDebugLibraries> 
    <PlatformToolset>v140</PlatformToolset> 
    <WholeProgramOptimization>true</WholeProgramOptimization> 
    <CharacterSet>Unicode</CharacterSet> 
    <CLRSupport>false</CLRSupport> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'" 
Label="Configuration"> 
    <ConfigurationType>Application</ConfigurationType> 
    <UseDebugLibraries>false</UseDebugLibraries> 
    <PlatformToolset>v140</PlatformToolset> 
    <WholeProgramOptimization>true</WholeProgramOptimization> 
    <CharacterSet>Unicode</CharacterSet> 
    <CLRSupport>false</CLRSupport> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
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  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.props" /> 
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionSettings"> 
  </ImportGroup> 
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|Win32'"> 
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" 
Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" 
Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" /> 
  </ImportGroup> 
  <ImportGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|x64'" 
Label="PropertySheets"> 
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" 
Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" 
Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" /> 
  </ImportGroup> 
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|Win32'"> 
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" 
Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" 
Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" /> 
  </ImportGroup> 
  <ImportGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'" 
Label="PropertySheets"> 
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" 
Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" 
Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" /> 
  </ImportGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Label="UserMacros" /> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|Win32'"> 
    <LinkIncremental>false</LinkIncremental> 
    <IgnoreImportLibrary>false</IgnoreImportLibrary> 
    
<ExtensionsToDeleteOnClean>*.a;*.dll;$(ExtensionsToDeleteOnClean)</ExtensionsT
oDeleteOnClean> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|x64'"> 
    <LinkIncremental>true</LinkIncremental> 
    <IgnoreImportLibrary>false</IgnoreImportLibrary> 
    
<ExtensionsToDeleteOnClean>*.a;*.dll;$(ExtensionsToDeleteOnClean)</ExtensionsT
oDeleteOnClean> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|Win32'"> 
    <LinkIncremental>false</LinkIncremental> 
    
<ExtensionsToDeleteOnClean>*.a;*.dll;$(ExtensionsToDeleteOnClean)</ExtensionsT
oDeleteOnClean> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'"> 
    <LinkIncremental>true</LinkIncremental> 
    
<ExtensionsToDeleteOnClean>*.a;*.dll;$(ExtensionsToDeleteOnClean)</ExtensionsT
oDeleteOnClean> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <ItemDefinitionGroup 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|Win32'"> 
    <ClCompile> 
      <PrecompiledHeader>Use</PrecompiledHeader> 
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel> 
      <Optimization>Disabled</Optimization> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>WIN32;_DEBUG;_CONSOLE;_LIB;_CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS;%(
PreprocessorDefinitions)</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
      <SDLCheck>true</SDLCheck> 
      
<AdditionalIncludeDirectories>C:\Projects\SBE\gmp\include;C:\Projects\SBE\open
ssl\include;C:\Projects\SBE\pbc\include;C:\Projects\IBE\openssl\lib;%(Addition
alIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories> 
      <CompileAsManaged>true</CompileAsManaged> 
    </ClCompile> 
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    <Link> 
      <SubSystem>Console</SubSystem> 
      <GenerateDebugInformation>true</GenerateDebugInformation> 
      
<AdditionalDependencies>libgcc.a;libmingwex.a;libpbc.lib;libgmp.lib;libeay32.l
ib;ssleay32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies)</AdditionalDependencies> 
      
<AdditionalLibraryDirectories>$(SolutionDir)fodder;$(SolutionDir)lib;%(Additio
nalLibraryDirectories)</AdditionalLibraryDirectories> 
      <AdditionalOptions>/SAFESEH:NO %(AdditionalOptions)</AdditionalOptions> 
      
<LinkTimeCodeGeneration>UseLinkTimeCodeGeneration</LinkTimeCodeGeneration> 
      <OptimizeReferences>true</OptimizeReferences> 
      <EnableCOMDATFolding>true</EnableCOMDATFolding> 
    </Link> 
    <PostBuildEvent> 
      <Command>COPY /Y "$(SolutionDir)"\lib\*.DLL* "$(TargetDir)"</Command> 
    </PostBuildEvent> 
  </ItemDefinitionGroup> 
  <ItemDefinitionGroup 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|x64'"> 
    <ClCompile> 
      <PrecompiledHeader>Use</PrecompiledHeader> 
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel> 
      <Optimization>Disabled</Optimization> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>WIN32;_DEBUG;_CONSOLE;_LIB;%(PreprocessorDefinitions)
</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
      <SDLCheck>true</SDLCheck> 
      
<AdditionalIncludeDirectories>C:\Projects\SBE\pbc\include\pbc;%GMP%\include;%(
AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories> 
      <CompileAsManaged>true</CompileAsManaged> 
    </ClCompile> 
    <Link> 
      <SubSystem>Console</SubSystem> 
      <GenerateDebugInformation>true</GenerateDebugInformation> 
      
<AdditionalDependencies>libgcc.a;libmingwex.a;libpbc.lib;libgmp.lib;%(Addition
alDependencies)</AdditionalDependencies> 
      
<AdditionalLibraryDirectories>$(SolutionDir)fodder;$(SolutionDir)lib;%(Additio
nalLibraryDirectories)</AdditionalLibraryDirectories> 
    </Link> 
    <PostBuildEvent> 
      <Command>COPY /Y "$(SolutionDir)"\lib\*.DLL* "$(TargetDir)"</Command> 
    </PostBuildEvent> 
  </ItemDefinitionGroup> 
  <ItemDefinitionGroup 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|Win32'"> 
    <ClCompile> 
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel> 
      <PrecompiledHeader>Use</PrecompiledHeader> 
      <Optimization>MaxSpeed</Optimization> 
      <FunctionLevelLinking>true</FunctionLevelLinking> 
      <IntrinsicFunctions>true</IntrinsicFunctions> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>WIN32;NDEBUG;_CONSOLE;_LIB;_CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS;%(
PreprocessorDefinitions)</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
      <SDLCheck>true</SDLCheck> 
      
<AdditionalIncludeDirectories>C:\Projects\SBE\gmp\include;C:\Projects\SBE\open
ssl\include;C:\Projects\SBE\pbc\include;C:\Projects\IBE\openssl\lib;%(Addition
alIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories> 
      <CompileAsManaged>false</CompileAsManaged> 
    </ClCompile> 
    <Link> 
      <SubSystem>Console</SubSystem> 
      <GenerateDebugInformation>true</GenerateDebugInformation> 
      <EnableCOMDATFolding>true</EnableCOMDATFolding> 
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      <OptimizeReferences>true</OptimizeReferences> 
      
<AdditionalDependencies>libgcc.a;libmingwex.a;libpbc.lib;libgmp.lib;ssleay32.l
ib;libeay32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies)</AdditionalDependencies> 
      
<AdditionalLibraryDirectories>$(SolutionDir)fodder;$(SolutionDir)lib;%(Additio
nalLibraryDirectories)</AdditionalLibraryDirectories> 
      <AdditionalOptions>/SAFESEH:NO %(AdditionalOptions)</AdditionalOptions> 
    </Link> 
    <PostBuildEvent> 
      <Command>COPY /Y "$(SolutionDir)"\lib\*.DLL "$(TargetDir)"</Command> 
    </PostBuildEvent> 
  </ItemDefinitionGroup> 
  <ItemDefinitionGroup 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'"> 
    <ClCompile> 
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel> 
      <PrecompiledHeader>Use</PrecompiledHeader> 
      <Optimization>MaxSpeed</Optimization> 
      <FunctionLevelLinking>true</FunctionLevelLinking> 
      <IntrinsicFunctions>true</IntrinsicFunctions> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>WIN32;NDEBUG;_CONSOLE;_LIB;%(PreprocessorDefinitions)
</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
      <SDLCheck>true</SDLCheck> 
      
<AdditionalIncludeDirectories>C:\Projects\SBE\gmp\include;C:\Projects\SBE\pbc\
include;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories> 
    </ClCompile> 
    <Link> 
      <SubSystem>Console</SubSystem> 
      <GenerateDebugInformation>true</GenerateDebugInformation> 
      <EnableCOMDATFolding>true</EnableCOMDATFolding> 
      <OptimizeReferences>true</OptimizeReferences> 
      
<AdditionalDependencies>libgcc.a;libmingwex.a;libpbc.lib;libgmp.lib;%(Addition
alDependencies)</AdditionalDependencies> 
      
<AdditionalLibraryDirectories>$(SolutionDir)fodder;$(SolutionDir)lib;%(Additio
nalLibraryDirectories)</AdditionalLibraryDirectories> 
    </Link> 
    <PostBuildEvent> 
      <Command>COPY /Y "$(SolutionDir)"\lib\*.DLL "$(TargetDir)"</Command> 
    </PostBuildEvent> 
  </ItemDefinitionGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <Text Include="ReadMe.txt" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <ClInclude Include="stdafx.h" /> 
    <ClInclude Include="targetver.h" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <ClCompile Include="ConsoleApplication.cpp" /> 
    <ClCompile Include="stdafx.cpp"> 
      <PrecompiledHeader 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|Win32'">Create</PrecompiledH
eader> 
      <PrecompiledHeader 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|x64'">Create</PrecompiledHea
der> 
      <PrecompiledHeader 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|Win32'">Create</Precompile
dHeader> 
      <PrecompiledHeader 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">Create</PrecompiledH
eader> 
    </ClCompile> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.targets" /> 
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  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionTargets"> 
  </ImportGroup> 
</Project> 
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APPENDIX H IBE WITH ECC AND RSA EVALUATION – 
SBE\VC\CONSOLEAPPLICATION\CONSOLEAPPLICATION.CPP 	
#include "stdafx.h" 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <time.h> 
#include <assert.h>  
#include <fcntl.h> 
#include <math.h>    
#include <string.h> 
#include <openssl/aes.h> 
#include <openssl/err.h> 
#include <openssl/sha.h> 
#include <openssl/ssl.h> 
#include <pbc.h> 
#include <windows.h> 
 
static char *gen_file_date_time(char *file_text, char *file_extension) 
{ 
 const int TIME_SIZE = 16; 
 const char FORMATTER_DATETIME[] = "%Y%m%d-%H%M%S"; 
 const char FORMATTER_FILENAME[] = "%s%s.%s"; 
 time_t raw_time; 
 struct tm *info; 
 char staged_result[TIME_SIZE]; 
 char *file_name = (char*)malloc(TIME_SIZE + strlen(file_text) + 
strlen(file_extension) + 1); 
 
 time(&raw_time); 
 info = localtime(&raw_time); 
 
 strftime(staged_result, TIME_SIZE, FORMATTER_DATETIME, info); 
 
 sprintf(file_name, FORMATTER_FILENAME, file_text, staged_result, 
file_extension); 
 
 return file_name; 
} 
 
static void gen_random(int size, char *arr) 
{ 
 srand(time(0)); 
 arr[size + 1] = { 0 }; 
 for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) 
 { 
  arr[i] = (char)(rand() % 255 + 0); 
 } 
 arr[size] = '\0'; 
} 
 
static int to_base64(const unsigned char *data, int data_sz, char 
**base64encoded) 
{ 
 BIO *bio, *b64; 
 BUF_MEM *ptr_buffer; 
 
 b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); 
 bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 
 bio = BIO_push(b64, bio); 
 BIO_set_flags(bio, BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL); 
 BIO_write(b64, data, data_sz); 
 
 BIO_flush(b64); 
 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &ptr_buffer); 
 BIO_set_close(bio, BIO_NOCLOSE); 
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 *base64encoded = (char*)malloc((ptr_buffer->length + 1) * sizeof(char)); 
 memcpy(*base64encoded, ptr_buffer->data, ptr_buffer->length); 
 (*base64encoded)[ptr_buffer->length] = '\0'; 
 
 BIO_free_all(bio); 
 
 return (0); 
} 
 
size_t calcDecodeLength(const char* base64encoded) 
{ 
 size_t len = strlen(base64encoded), 
  padding = 0; 
 
 if (base64encoded[len - 1] == '=' && base64encoded[len - 2] == '=') 
  padding = 2; 
 else if (base64encoded[len - 1] == '=') 
  padding = 1; 
 
 return (len * 3) / 4 - padding; 
} 
 
int from_base64(const char* base64encoded, unsigned char** data, size_t* 
length) 
{ 
 BIO *bio, *b64; 
 
 int decodeLen = calcDecodeLength(base64encoded); 
 *data = (uint8_t*)malloc(decodeLen); 
 
 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *)base64encoded, -1); 
 b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); 
 bio = BIO_push(b64, bio); 
 
 BIO_set_flags(bio, BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL); 
 *length = BIO_read(bio, *data, strlen(base64encoded)); 
 
 BIO_free_all(bio); 
 
 return (0); 
} 
 
static void pbc_pairing_init(pairing_t pairing, int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 char s[16384]; 
 FILE *fp = stdin; 
 
 if (argc > 1) { 
  fp = fopen(argv[1], "r"); 
  if (!fp) pbc_die("error opening %s", argv[1]); 
 } 
 size_t count = fread(s, 1, 16384, fp); 
 if (!count) pbc_die("input error"); 
 fclose(fp); 
 
 if (pairing_init_set_buf(pairing, s, count)) pbc_die("pairing init 
failed"); 
} 
 
static unsigned char *get_text_from_file(char *file_path, long *bytes_read) 
{ 
 FILE *fp; 
 unsigned char *txt; 
 long file_sz; 
 
 fp = stdin; 
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 fp = fopen(file_path, "rb"); 
 if (!fp) pbc_die("error opening %s", file_path); 
 fseek(fp, 0L, SEEK_END); 
 
 file_sz = ftell(fp); 
 rewind(fp); 
 
 txt = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, file_sz + 1);  
 if (!txt) 
 { 
  fclose(fp); 
  pbc_die("memory alloc fails for new ID!"); 
 } 
 if (1 != fread(txt, file_sz, 1, fp)) 
 { 
  fclose(fp); 
  free(txt); 
  pbc_die("ID read fails!"); 
 } 
 fclose(fp); 
 *bytes_read = file_sz; 
 
 return txt; 
} 
 
static unsigned char *get_data_from_file(char *file_path, long *bytes_read) 
{ 
 FILE *fp; 
 unsigned char *data; 
 long file_sz; 
 
 fp = stdin; 
 fp = fopen(file_path, "rb"); 
 if (!fp) pbc_die("error opening %s", file_path); 
 fseek(fp, 0L, SEEK_END); 
 
 file_sz = ftell(fp); 
 rewind(fp); 
 
 data = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, file_sz + 1); 
 if (!data) 
 { 
  fclose(fp); 
  pbc_die("memory alloc fails for new ID!"); 
 } 
 if (1 != fread(data, file_sz, 1, fp)) 
 { 
  fclose(fp); 
  free(data); 
  pbc_die("ID read fails!"); 
 } 
 fclose(fp); 
 *bytes_read = file_sz; 
 
 return data; 
} 
 
static int ibe_encrypt(element_t r, element_t U, element_t P, element_t gid, 
element_t mapped_id_hash_Qid, element_t Ppub, unsigned char *data, int 
data_len, unsigned char *cipher, char *err) 
{ 
 const int HASH_LEN = 32; 
 char hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 }; 
 unsigned char *gs; 
 
 element_random(r); 
 element_mul_zn(U, P, r); 
 element_pairing(gid, mapped_id_hash_Qid, Ppub); 
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 element_pow_zn(gid, gid, r); 
 gs = (unsigned char*)malloc(element_length_in_bytes(gid)); 
 
 element_to_bytes(gs, gid); 
 
 if (SHA256((unsigned char*)gs, element_length_in_bytes(gid), (unsigned 
char *)hash) == NULL) 
 { 
  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
  printf("%s\n", err); 
 } 
 
 //if (SHA1(gs, HASH_LEN, (unsigned char *)hash) == NULL) 
 //{ 
 // ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
 // printf("%s\n", err); 
 //} 
 for (int i = 0; i < data_len; i++) 
 { 
  cipher[i] = data[i] ^ hash[i % HASH_LEN]; 
 } 
 free(gs); 
 
 return (0); 
} 
 
void aes256_encrypt(const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *key, 
unsigned char **cipher) 
{ 
 AES_KEY enc_key; 
 AES_set_encrypt_key(key, 256, &enc_key); 
 AES_encrypt((unsigned char*)data, (unsigned char*)*cipher, &enc_key); 
} 
 
void aes256_decrypt(const unsigned char *cipher, const unsigned char *key, 
unsigned char **data) 
{ 
 AES_KEY dec_key; 
 AES_set_decrypt_key(key, 256, &dec_key); 
 AES_decrypt((unsigned char*)cipher, (unsigned char*)*data, &dec_key); 
} 
 
int aes_evp256_encrypt(unsigned char *plaintext, int plaintext_len, unsigned 
char *key, unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *ciphertext) 
{ 
 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; 
 
 int len; 
 
 int ciphertext_len; 
 
 /* Create and initialise the context */ 
 if (!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())) 
 { 
  ; 
 } 
 
 if (1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key, iv)) 
 { 
  ; 
 } 
 
 if (1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext, 
plaintext_len)) 
 { 
  ; 
 } 
 ciphertext_len = len; 
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 if (1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + len, &len)) 
 { 
  ; 
 } 
 
 ciphertext_len += len; 
 
 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 
 
 return ciphertext_len; 
} 
 
int aes_evp256_decrypt(unsigned char *ciphertext, int ciphertext_len, unsigned 
char *key, unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *plaintext) 
{ 
 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; 
 
 int len; 
 
 int plaintext_len; 
 
 if (!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())) 
 { 
  ; 
 } 
 
 if (1 != EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key, iv)) 
 { 
  ; 
 } 
 
 if (1 != EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, plaintext, &len, ciphertext, 
ciphertext_len)) 
 { 
  ; 
 } 
 plaintext_len = len; 
 
 if (1 != EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, plaintext + len, &len)) 
 { 
  ; 
 } 
 
 plaintext_len += len; 
 
 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); 
 
 return plaintext_len; 
} 
 
static int ibe_bf_aes256_encrypt(element_t r, element_t U, element_t P, 
element_t gid, element_t mapped_id_hash_Qid, element_t Ppub, unsigned char 
*data, long data_len, unsigned char *cipher, char *err) 
{ 
 const int HASH_LEN = 32; 
 char hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 }; 
 unsigned char *gs; 
 
 element_random(r); 
 element_mul_zn(U, P, r); 
 
 /******** 
 ++++INIT_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 //LARGE_INTEGER frequency;        // ticks per second 
 //LARGE_INTEGER t1, t2;           // ticks 
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 //double time_spent; 
 //QueryPerformanceFrequency(&frequency); 
 /******** 
 ----INIT_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 //FILE *file_key_gen; 
 //file_key_gen = fopen(gen_file_date_time("C:\\Projects\\Evaluation\\IBE-
Pairing_Policy-Public-", "csv"), "w"); 
 //for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
  ++++BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
  ----BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  element_pairing(gid, mapped_id_hash_Qid, Ppub); 
 
  /******** 
  ++++END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
 
  //time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC / 
frequency.QuadPart; 
  //printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
  //fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
  /******** 
  ----END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 } 
 
 element_pow_zn(gid, gid, r); 
 gs = (unsigned char*)malloc(element_length_in_bytes(gid)); 
 
 element_to_bytes(gs, gid); 
 
 if (SHA256((unsigned char*)gs, element_length_in_bytes(gid), (unsigned 
char *)hash) == NULL) 
 { 
  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
  printf("%s\n", err); 
 } 
 unsigned char iv[128] = { 0 }; 
 int cipher_len = aes_evp256_encrypt((unsigned char*)data, data_len, 
(unsigned char*)hash, iv, cipher); 
 
 free(gs); 
 
 return cipher_len; 
} 
 
static int ibe_bf_decrypt(element_t xt, element_t private_key_Did, element_t 
U, unsigned char *data, unsigned char *cipher, int cipher_len, char *err) 
{ 
 unsigned char *gs; 
 const int HASH_LEN = 32; 
 char hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 }; 
 
 element_pairing(xt, private_key_Did, U); 
 gs = (unsigned char*)malloc(element_length_in_bytes(xt)); 
 element_to_bytes(gs, xt); 
 
 if (SHA256((unsigned char*)gs, element_length_in_bytes(xt), (unsigned 
char *)hash) == NULL) 
 { 
  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
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  printf("%s\n", err); 
 } 
/* 
 if (SHA1((unsigned char*)gs, HASH_LEN, (unsigned char *)hash) == NULL) 
 { 
  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
  printf("%s\n", err); 
 }*/ 
 
 for (int i = 0; i < cipher_len; i++) 
 { 
  data[i] = cipher[i] ^ hash[i % HASH_LEN]; 
 } 
 
 free(gs); 
 return (0); 
} 
 
static int ibe_bf_aes256_decrypt(element_t xt, element_t private_key_Did, 
element_t U, unsigned char *data, unsigned char *cipher, long cipher_len, char 
*err) 
{ 
 unsigned char *gs; 
 const int HASH_LEN = 32; 
 char hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 }; 
 
 /******** 
 ++++INIT_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 //LARGE_INTEGER frequency;        // ticks per second 
 //LARGE_INTEGER t1, t2;           // ticks 
 //double time_spent; 
 //QueryPerformanceFrequency(&frequency); 
 /******** 
 ----INIT_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 //FILE *file_key_gen; 
 //file_key_gen = fopen(gen_file_date_time("C:\\Projects\\Evaluation\\IBE-
Pairing_Policy-Private-", "csv"), "w"); 
 //for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
  ++++BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
  ----BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  element_pairing(xt, private_key_Did, U); 
  /******** 
  ++++END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
 
  //time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC / 
frequency.QuadPart; 
  //printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
  //fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
  /******** 
  ----END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 } 
 
 
 gs = (unsigned char*)malloc(element_length_in_bytes(xt)); 
 element_to_bytes(gs, xt); 
 
 if (SHA256((unsigned char*)gs, element_length_in_bytes(xt), (unsigned 
char *)hash) == NULL) 
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 { 
  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
  printf("%s\n", err); 
 } 
 
 unsigned char iv[128] = { 0 }; 
 int data_len = aes_evp256_decrypt((unsigned char*)cipher, cipher_len, 
(unsigned char*)hash, iv, data); 
 
 free(gs); 
 
 return data_len; 
} 
 
static int ibe_bf_set_public_key(const unsigned char *id, long id_size, 
unsigned char *key, const int key_size, char *err) 
{ 
 const int HASH_LEN = 32; 
 unsigned char hash[HASH_LEN] = { 0 }; 
 
 key = (unsigned char *)malloc(key_size+1); 
 
 if (SHA256(id, id_size, hash) == NULL) 
 { 
  ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), err); 
  printf("%s\n", err); 
 
  return -1; 
 } 
 for (int i = 0; i < key_size; i++) 
 { 
  key[i] = hash[i % HASH_LEN]; 
 } 
 key[key_size] = '\0'; 
 
 return strlen((char *)key); 
} 
 
static int ibe_bf_pkg_gen(pairing_t pairing, element_t master_key, element_t 
private_key) 
{ 
 
} 
 
static int element_serialize(element_t element, char **serialized_element) 
{ 
 int element_sz = element_length_in_bytes(element); 
 unsigned char *data = (byte*)malloc(element_sz); 
 
 element_to_bytes(data, element); 
 to_base64(data, element_sz, serialized_element); 
 free(data); 
 
 return (0); 
} 
 
static int element_deserialize(const char *serialized_element, element_t 
element) 
{ 
 unsigned char *data; 
 size_t data_size; 
 
 from_base64(serialized_element, &data, &data_size); 
 element_from_bytes(element, (unsigned char *)data); 
 
 free(data); 
 return (0); 
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} 
 
static inline void element_write(element_t elem, FILE *myfile) 
{ 
 int sz = element_length_in_bytes(elem); 
 fwrite(&sz, 4, 1, myfile); 
 unsigned char* data = (unsigned char*)pbc_malloc(sz); 
 if (!data) printf("DATA IS NULL\n"); 
 element_to_bytes(data, elem); 
 fwrite(data, sz, 1, myfile); 
 pbc_free(data); 
} 
 
static inline void element_read(element_t elem, FILE *myfile) { 
 int sz; 
 fread(&sz, 4, 1, myfile); 
 unsigned char* data = (unsigned char*)pbc_malloc(sz); 
 fread(data, sz, 1, myfile); 
 element_from_bytes(elem, data); 
 pbc_free(data); 
} 
 
static RSA *rsa_create_key_pair(unsigned char **public_key, int 
*public_key_size, unsigned char **private_key, int *private_key_size) 
{ 
 const int KEY_SIZE = 1024; 
 const int PUB_EXP = 3; 
 RSA *key_pair; 
 
 key_pair = RSA_generate_key(KEY_SIZE, PUB_EXP, NULL, NULL); 
 
 BIO *bio_private_key = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 
 BIO *bio_public_key = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 
 
 PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio_private_key, key_pair, NULL, NULL, 0, 
NULL, NULL); 
 PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey(bio_public_key, key_pair); 
 
 *private_key_size = BIO_pending(bio_private_key); 
 *public_key_size = BIO_pending(bio_public_key); 
 
 *private_key = (unsigned char *)malloc(*private_key_size); 
 *public_key = (unsigned char *)malloc(*public_key_size); 
 
 BIO_read(bio_private_key, *private_key, *private_key_size); 
 BIO_read(bio_public_key, *public_key, *public_key_size); 
 
 return key_pair; 
} 
 
static void ibe_eval(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 const int KEY_SZ = 32; //Bytes 
 const int KEY_SPACE_LENGTH = 256; 
 pairing_t pairing; 
 element_t gen_P, Ppub, private_key_Did, mapped_id_hash_Qid, U, r, xt, 
gid; 
 element_t master_key_s; 
 
 unsigned char *key = (unsigned char *)malloc(KEY_SZ); 
 char err[80] = { 0 }; 
 
 long data_sz; 
 long id_sz; 
 
 unsigned char *gs = NULL; 
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 unsigned char *id = 
get_text_from_file("C:\\Projects\\SBE\\vc\\ConsoleApplication\\IIA007Policy.xm
l", &id_sz); 
 unsigned char *data = 
get_data_from_file("C:\\Projects\\SBE\\vc\\ConsoleApplication\\ProgressReportT
emplate.docx", &data_sz); 
 
 unsigned char *cipher = (unsigned char *)malloc(data_sz); 
 int cipher_sz; 
 unsigned char *mv = (byte*)malloc(data_sz); 
 
 LARGE_INTEGER frequency;        // ticks per second 
 LARGE_INTEGER t1, t2;           // ticks 
 double time_spent; 
 QueryPerformanceFrequency(&frequency); 
 
 /*** 
 errors strings initialization for SHA1 & clock initialization for times 
computation 
 ***/ 
 ERR_load_crypto_strings(); 
 SSL_load_error_strings(); 
 
 printf("IBE\n\n"); 
 
 /*** 
 pairing function initalization from the input file which contains the 
pairing parameters 
 ***/ 
 pbc_pairing_init(pairing, argc, argv); 
 if (!pairing_is_symmetric(pairing)) pbc_die("pairing must be symmetric"); 
 
 //G1 
 element_init_G1(gen_P, pairing); 
 element_init_G1(Ppub, pairing); 
 element_init_G1(mapped_id_hash_Qid, pairing); 
 element_init_G1(private_key_Did, pairing); 
 element_init_G1(U, pairing); 
 
 //Zr 
 element_init_Zr(master_key_s, pairing); 
 element_init_Zr(r, pairing); 
 
 //GT 
 element_init_GT(gid, pairing); 
 element_init_GT(xt, pairing); 
 
 //PKG generation of P, master_key_s and Ppub 
 element_random(gen_P); 
 element_random(master_key_s); 
 
 //FILE *file_key_gen; 
 //file_key_gen = fopen(gen_file_date_time("C:\\Projects\\Evaluation\\IBE-
Key_Gen_Policy-Public-", "csv"), "w"); 
 //for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
  ++++BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
//  QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
  ----BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  element_mul_zn(Ppub, gen_P, master_key_s); 
  //element_printf("++s: %B\n", master_key_s); 
  //element_printf("++P:  %B\n", gen_P); 
  //element_printf("++Ppub: %B\n", Ppub); 
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  /******** 
  ++++END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
 
  //time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC / 
frequency.QuadPart; 
  //printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
  //fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
  /******** 
  ----END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 } 
 
 //generate 256 long key 
 int pkey_sz = ibe_bf_set_public_key(id, id_sz, key, KEY_SPACE_LENGTH, 
err); 
 
/* char *b64IdHash; 
 to_base64((unsigned char *)key, KEY_SZ, &b64IdHash); 
 printf("++idHash: %s\n", b64IdHash); 
*/ 
 //FILE *file_key_gen; 
 //file_key_gen = fopen(gen_file_date_time("C:\\Projects\\Evaluation\\IBE-
Key_Gen_Policy-Private-", "csv"), "w"); 
 //for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
  ++++BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
  ----BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  element_from_hash(mapped_id_hash_Qid, key, pkey_sz); 
  /******** 
  ++++END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
 
  //time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC / 
frequency.QuadPart; 
  //printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
  //fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
  /******** 
  ----END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 } 
 
 /* char *serialized; 
 element_serialize(master_key_s, &serialized); 
 printf("+++serialized: %s", serialized); 
 free(serialized); 
 
 element_deserialize(serialized, master_key_s); 
 */ 
 
 
 //FILE *file_key_gen; 
 //file_key_gen = fopen(gen_file_date_time("C:\\Projects\\Evaluation\\IBE-
AES256-Enc_Policy-", "csv"), "w"); 
 //for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 { 
  /******** 
  ++++BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 // QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
  ----BEG_TIMING 
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  *********/ 
 
  //ENCRYPTION 
  //ibe_encrypt(r, U, P, gid, mapped_id_hash_Qid, Ppub, data, data_sz, 
cipher, err); 
  cipher_sz = ibe_bf_aes256_encrypt(r, U, gen_P, gid, mapped_id_hash_Qid, 
Ppub, data, data_sz, cipher, err); 
  //char *b64MsgHash; 
  //to_base64(cipher, data_sz, &b64MsgHash); 
  //element_printf("++m: %s\n", b64MsgHash); 
 
  /******** 
  ++++END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 // QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
  ///******** 
  //----END_TIMING 
  //*********/ 
 
 // time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC 
/ frequency.QuadPart; 
 // printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
 // fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
 } 
 
 element_mul_zn(private_key_Did, mapped_id_hash_Qid, master_key_s); 
 //element_printf("++Qid: %B\n", mapped_id_hash_Qid); 
 //element_printf("++Did: %B\n", private_key_Did); 
 
 //FILE *file_key_gen; 
 //file_key_gen = fopen(gen_file_date_time("C:\\Projects\\Evaluation\\IBE-
Dec_Policy-", "csv"), "w"); 
 //for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 //{ 
 /******** 
 ++++BEG_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
 /******** 
 ----BEG_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 int data_len = ibe_bf_aes256_decrypt(xt, private_key_Did, U, mv, cipher, 
cipher_sz, err); 
 /******** 
 ++++END_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
 /******** 
 ----END_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 
 // time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC 
/ frequency.QuadPart; 
 // printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
 // fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
 //} 
 //printf("\n%d\n", memcmp(data, mv, data_len)); 
 
 /***free mem***/ 
 element_clear(gen_P); 
 element_clear(Ppub); 
 element_clear(mapped_id_hash_Qid); 
 element_clear(private_key_Did); 
 element_clear(U); 
 element_clear(gid); 
 element_clear(r); 
 element_clear(xt); 
 element_clear(master_key_s); 
 pairing_clear(pairing); 
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 free(gs); 
 free(id); 
 free(key); 
 //free(cipher); 
 free(data); 
} 
 
static void rsa_eval() 
{ 
 const int KEY_SPACE_LENGTH = 256; 
 const int AES_KEY_SZ = 256; 
 const int RSA_KEY_SZ = 4096; 
 const int PUB_EXP = 3; 
 
 unsigned char aes_key_seed[AES_KEY_SZ] = { 1 }; 
 unsigned char aes_key[AES_KEY_SZ]; 
 unsigned char aes_key_v[AES_KEY_SZ]; 
 
 printf("RSA\n\n"); 
 
 
 LARGE_INTEGER frequency;        // ticks per second 
 LARGE_INTEGER t1, t2;           // ticks 
 double time_spent; 
 QueryPerformanceFrequency(&frequency); 
 
 //Key_Gen 
 int aes_key_bytes = ibe_bf_set_public_key(aes_key_seed, AES_KEY_SZ, 
aes_key, KEY_SPACE_LENGTH, NULL); 
 
 //FILE *file_key_gen; 
 //file_key_gen = fopen(gen_file_date_time("C:\\Projects\\Evaluation\\RSA-
Key_Gen-4096-", "csv"), "w"); 
 //for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 //{ 
  /******** 
  ++++BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 // QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
  ----BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 
 // RSA *key_pair = RSA_generate_key(RSA_KEY_SZ, PUB_EXP, NULL, 
NULL); 
 
  /******** 
  ++++END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 // QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
  ///******** 
  //----END_TIMING 
  //*********/ 
 
 // RSA_free(key_pair); 
 // time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC 
/ frequency.QuadPart; 
 // printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
 // fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
 //} 
 
 RSA *key_pair = RSA_generate_key(RSA_KEY_SZ, PUB_EXP, NULL, NULL); 
 unsigned char *cipher = (unsigned char*)malloc(RSA_size(key_pair)); 
 
 //FILE *file_key_gen; 
 //file_key_gen = fopen(gen_file_date_time("C:\\Projects\\Evaluation\\RSA-
Enc_AES256Key-4096-", "csv"), "w"); 
 //for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
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 //{ 
 /******** 
 ++++BEG_TIMING 
 *********/ 
// QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
 /******** 
 ----BEG_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 
 int size_enc = RSA_public_encrypt(AES_KEY_SZ, aes_key, cipher, key_pair, 
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 
 /******** 
 ++++END_TIMING 
 *********/ 
// QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
 /******** 
 ----END_TIMING 
 *********/ 
 
 // time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC 
/ frequency.QuadPart; 
 // printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
 // fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
 //} 
 //fclose(file_key_gen); 
 
 //printf("%d\n", size_enc); 
 
 //FILE *file_key_gen; 
 //file_key_gen = fopen(gen_file_date_time("C:\\Projects\\Evaluation\\RSA-
Dec_AES256Key-4096-", "csv"), "w"); 
 //for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
 //{ 
  /******** 
  ++++BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t1); 
  /******** 
  ----BEG_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  int size_dec = RSA_private_decrypt(size_enc, cipher, aes_key_v, 
key_pair, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 
 
  /******** 
  ++++END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
  //QueryPerformanceCounter(&t2); 
  /******** 
  ----END_TIMING 
  *********/ 
 
 // time_spent = (t2.QuadPart - t1.QuadPart) * (double)CLOCKS_PER_SEC 
/ frequency.QuadPart; 
 // printf("%f\n", time_spent); 
 // fprintf(file_key_gen, "%f;[ms]\n", time_spent); 
 //} 
 //fclose(file_key_gen); 
 
 // printf("\n%d\n", memcmp(aes_key, aes_key_v, size_dec)); 
 
 /*for (int i = 0; i < size_enc; i++) 
 { 
  printf("\n%d  -  %d::%d", i, aes_key[i], aes_key_v[i]); 
 }*/ 
 
 RSA_free(key_pair); 
 //free(aes_key); 
 //free(aes_key_v); 
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 //free(cipher); 
 //free(rsa_private_key); 
 //free(rsa_public_key); 
} 
 
int main(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 ibe_eval(argc, argv); 
 rsa_eval(); 
 
 return 0; 
} 
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APPENDIX I XACML XML POLICY (1 OF 400) 	
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Policy 
      xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy" 
      xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
      xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy 
        cs-xacml-schema-policy-01.xsd" 
      PolicyId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:conformance-test:IIA002:policy" 
      RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-
algorithm:deny-overrides"> 
    <Description> 
        Policy for Conformance Test IIA002. 
    </Description> 
    <Target> 
        <Subjects> 
            <AnySubject/> 
        </Subjects> 
        <Resources> 
            <AnyResource/> 
        </Resources> 
        <Actions> 
            <AnyAction/> 
        </Actions> 
    </Target> 
    <Rule 
          RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:conformance-test:IIA002:rule" 
          Effect="Permit"> 
        <Description> 
            A subject with a role attribute of "Physician" can read or 
            write Bart Simpson's medical record. 
        </Description> 
        <Target> 
            <Subjects> 
                <Subject> 
                    <SubjectMatch 
                          
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
                        <AttributeValue 
                              
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Physician</AttributeValue> 
                        <SubjectAttributeDesignator 
                              
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:example:attribute:role" 
                              
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
                    </SubjectMatch> 
                </Subject> 
            </Subjects> 
            <Resources> 
                <Resource> 
                    <ResourceMatch 
                          
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:anyURI-equal"> 
                        <AttributeValue 
                              
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">http://medico.com/record/pa
tient/BartSimpson</AttributeValue> 
                        <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
                              
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" 
                              
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"/> 
                    </ResourceMatch> 
                </Resource> 
            </Resources> 
            <Actions> 
                <Action> 
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                    <ActionMatch 
                          
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
                        <AttributeValue 
                              
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">read</AttributeValue> 
                        <ActionAttributeDesignator 
                              
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
                              
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
                    </ActionMatch> 
                </Action> 
                <Action> 
                    <ActionMatch 
                          
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
                        <AttributeValue 
                              
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">write</AttributeValue> 
                        <ActionAttributeDesignator 
                              
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
                              
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
                    </ActionMatch> 
                </Action> 
            </Actions> 
        </Target> 
    </Rule> 
</Policy> 	
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APPENDIX J XACML XML POLICY REQUEST (1 OF 400) 	
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Request 
      xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context" 
      xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
      xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context 
        cs-xacml-schema-context-01.xsd"> 
    <Subject> 
        <Attribute 
              AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" 
              DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
            <AttributeValue>B65172AD-4D9E-4440-8745-
2AC3C1B9FC49</AttributeValue> 
        </Attribute> 
    </Subject> 
    <Resource> 
        <Attribute 
              AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" 
              DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"> 
            <AttributeValue>http://nhs.uk/services/API/FE5A064C-0C55-449F-
9EB4-45596370AE96</AttributeValue> 
        </Attribute> 
    </Resource> 
    <Action> 
        <Attribute 
              AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
              DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
            <AttributeValue>read</AttributeValue> 
        </Attribute> 
    </Action> 
</Request> 	
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APPENDIX K XACML XML POLICY RESPONSE (1 OF 400) 	
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Response 
      xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context" 
      xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
      xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context 
        cs-xacml-schema-context-01.xsd"> 
    <Result> 
        <Decision>Permit</Decision> 
        <Status> 
            <StatusCode 
                  Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
        </Status> 
    </Result> 
</Response> 	
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APPENDIX L XACML JSON-FORMATTED POLICY (1 OF 400) 	
{ 
    "?xml": { 
        "@version": "1.0", 
        "@encoding": "UTF-8" 
    }, 
    "Policy": { 
        "@xmlns": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy", 
        "@xmlns:xacml-context": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context", 
        "@xmlns:md": "http://www.medico.com/schemas/record", 
        "@xmlns:xsi": "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance", 
        "@xsi:schemaLocation": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy\r\n        
cs-xacml-schema-policy-01.xsd", 
        "@PolicyId": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:conformance-
test:IIIG006:policy", 
        "@RuleCombiningAlgId": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-
algorithm:deny-overrides", 
        "Description": "Evaluation Policy 398", 
        "PolicyDefaults": { 
            "XPathVersion": "http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/Rec-xpath-19991116" 
        }, 
        "Target": { 
            "Subjects": { 
                "AnySubject": null 
            }, 
            "Resources": { 
                "AnyResource": null 
            }, 
            "Actions": { 
                "AnyAction": null 
            } 
        }, 
        "Rule": { 
            "@RuleId": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:conformance-
test:IIIG006:rule", 
            "@Effect": "Permit", 
            "Condition": { 
                "@FunctionId": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and", 
                "Apply": [ 
                          { 
                          "@FunctionId": 
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-equal", 
                          "Apply": { 
                          "@FunctionId": 
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:xpath-node-count", 
                          "AttributeValue": { 
                          "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                          "#text": "./xacml-context:Resource/xacml-
context:ResourceContent/md:record//md:name" 
                          } 
                          }, 
                          "AttributeValue": { 
                          "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer", 
                          "#text": "2" 
                          } 
                          }, 
                          { 
                          "@FunctionId": 
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:xpath-node-equal", 
                          "AttributeValue": [ 
                                             { 
                                             "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                                             "#text": "./xacml-
context:Resource/xacml-context:ResourceContent/md:record" 
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                                             }, 
                                             { 
                                             "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                                             "#text": "//md:record" 
                                             } 
                                             ] 
                          }, 
                          { 
                          "@FunctionId": 
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:xpath-node-match", 
                          "AttributeValue": [ 
                                             { 
                                             "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                                             "#text": "." 
                                             }, 
                                             { 
                                             "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                                             "#text": "./xacml-
context:Resource/xacml-context:ResourceContent/md:record" 
                                             } 
                                             ] 
                          } 
                          ] 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 	
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APPENDIX M XACML JSON-FORMATTED POLICY REQUEST (1 OF 400) 	
{ 
    "?xml": { 
        "@version": "1.0", 
        "@encoding": "UTF-8" 
    }, 
    "Request": { 
        "@xmlns": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context", 
        "@xmlns:md": "http://www.medico.com/schemas/record", 
        "@xmlns:xsi": "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance", 
        "@xsi:schemaLocation": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context\r\n        
cs-xacml-schema-context-01.xsd", 
        "Subject": { 
            "Attribute": [ 
                          { 
                          "@AttributeId": 
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id", 
                          "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                          "AttributeValue": "B65172AD-4D9E-4440-8745-
2AC3C1B9FC49" 
                          }, 
                          { 
                          "@AttributeId": 
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:conformance-eva:test-attr", 
                          "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                          "AttributeValue": { 
                          "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                          "#text": "Evaluation 398" 
                          } 
                          }, 
                          { 
                          "@AttributeId": 
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:conformance-test:test-attr", 
                          "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                          "AttributeValue": { 
                          "@DataType": 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                          "#text": "Evaluation 398" 
                          } 
                          } 
                          ] 
        }, 
        "Resource": { 
            "ResourceContent": { 
                "md:record": { 
                    "md:hospital_info": { 
                        "md:name": "Balmoral Hospital", 
                        "md:department": "Urology" 
                    }, 
                    "md:patient_info": { 
                        "md:name": "James Lovelock", 
                        "md:age": "80", 
                        "md:sex": "male", 
                        "md:health_insurance": "201510120000" 
                    }, 
                    "md:diagnosis_info": { 
                        "md:diagnosis": { 
                            "md:item": [ 
                                        { 
                                        "@type": "primary", 
                                        "#text": " Acute Bacterial 
Prostatitis" 
                                        }, 
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                                        { 
                                        "@type": "secondary", 
                                        "#text": "Asymptomatic Inflammatory 
Prostatitis" 
                                        } 
                                        ] 
                        }, 
                        "md:pathological_diagnosis": { 
                            "md:diagnosis": { 
                                "md:item": { 
                                    "@type": "primary", 
                                    "#text": "Acute Bacterial Prostatitis 
(Prostatitis (Inflammation of the Prostate Gland))" 
                                } 
                            }, 
                            "md:date": "2015-10-05", 
                            "md:malignancy": { 
                                "@type": "yes" 
                            } 
                        } 
                    } 
                } 
            }, 
            "Attribute": { 
                "@AttributeId": 
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id", 
                "@DataType": "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI", 
                "AttributeValue": "http://nhs.uk/services/API/FE5A064C-0C55-
449F-9EB4-45596370AE96" 
            } 
        }, 
        "Action": { 
            "Attribute": { 
                "@AttributeId": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-
id", 
                "@DataType": "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string", 
                "AttributeValue": "read" 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 	
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APPENDIX N XACML JSON-FORMATTED POLICY RESPONSE (1 OF 400) 	
{ 
    "?xml": { 
        "@version": "1.0", 
        "@encoding": "UTF-8" 
    }, 
    "Response": { 
        "@xmlns": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context", 
        "@xmlns:xsi": "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance", 
        "@xsi:schemaLocation": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context\r\n        
cs-xacml-schema-context-01.xsd", 
        "Result": { 
            "Decision": "Permit", 
            "Status": { 
                "StatusCode": { 
                    "@Value": "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok" 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 	
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APPENDIX O OOXML HELPER 	
#*****************************************************************************
* 
# Script Name: ModelEvaluation.py 
# Language: Python 
# Author: Greg Spyra G$ 
# 
# Project: Sticky-Policies Eval400 
# Date Written: 
# Reason:Sticky-Policies Model Workflows 
# Notes: 
# Version: 1.0 
# Version History: 
# 1.0G$ 25 Jan 2016 
#*****************************************************************************
* 
#!/usr/bin/python 
 
 
#***********************************Variables*********************************
* 
CONST_WORD_DOC_PATH = 'word/document.xml' 
CONST_DOC_PATH = 'Z:\\University\\Publications\\Dissertation_PhD-
2013\\Thesis\\Evaluation\\400\\XUnitTest.zip' 
 
#***********************************Functions*********************************
* 
#*********************************** 
#extract_word_doc_path extracts doc section from OOXML file 
#*********************************** 
def extract_word_doc_path(full_doc_path): 
 file_handle = open(full_doc_path, 'rb') 
 with zipfile.ZipFile(file_handle) as zip_file: 
  for arch_elem in zip_file.namelist(): 
   if arch_elem.startswith(CONST_WORD_DOC_PATH): 
    zip_file.extract(arch_elem) 
 
#*********************************** 
#zip_word_doc_path encapsulates doc section into OOXML file 
#*********************************** 
def zip_word_doc_path(full_doc_path, full_word_doc_path, word_doc_path): 
 with zipfile.ZipFile(full_doc_path, 'w') as zip_file: 
  zip_file.write(full_word_doc_path, word_doc_path, zipfile.ZIP_STORED) 
  
#*************************************Main************************************
* 
import zipfile 
 
extract_word_doc_path(CONST_DOC_PATH) 
#zip_word_doc_path(CONST_DOC_PATH, CONST_WORD_DOC_PATH, CONST_WORD_DOC_PATH) 
 
 
 
 
#*****************************************************************************
* 
#*****************************************************************************
* 
#*****************************************************************************
* 
#*****************************************************************************
* 
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APPENDIX P XACML POLICY TESTER – XACML-
EVALUATION\MAINCLASS.CS 	
using Xacml.Core; 
using Xacml.Core.Runtime; 
using System; 
using System.Xml; 
 
namespace XacmlTest 
{ 
  internal class MainClass 
  { 
    private static void Main(string[] args) 
    { 
      string policyDocument = string.Empty; 
      string contextDocument = string.Empty; 
      bool verbose = false; 
      foreach (string str in args) 
      { 
        if ((int) str[0] == 47 || (int) str[0] == 45) 
        { 
          if ((int) str[1] == 112 || (int) str[1] == 80) 
            policyDocument = str.Substring(3); 
          if ((int) str[1] == 114 || (int) str[1] == 82) 
            contextDocument = str.Substring(3); 
          if ((int) str[1] == 118 || (int) str[1] == 86) 
            verbose = true; 
        } 
      } 
      try 
      { 
        if (contextDocument.Length == 0 || policyDocument.Length == 0) 
          throw new Exception("Request or policy file not specified."); 
        new EvaluationEngine(verbose).Evaluate(policyDocument, 
contextDocument, XacmlVersion.Version11).WriteDocument((XmlWriter) new 
XmlTextWriter(Console.Out) 
        { 
          Formatting = Formatting.Indented 
        }); 
      } 
      catch (Exception ex) 
      { 
        Console.WriteLine(ex.Message); 
        Console.WriteLine(); 
        Console.WriteLine("Usage:"); 
        Console.WriteLine("\t-p:[policyFilePath]  - The path to the policy 
file"); 
        Console.WriteLine("\t-r:[requestFilePath] - The path to the request 
file"); 
        Console.WriteLine("\t-v                   - Makes the execution 
verbose"); 
      } 
    } 
  } 
} 
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APPENDIX Q OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\ISTICKY.SLN (VISUAL STUDIO SOLUTION) 
 
Microsoft Visual Studio Solution File, Format Version 12.00 
# Visual Studio 2013 
VisualStudioVersion = 12.0.30501.0 
MinimumVisualStudioVersion = 10.0.40219.1 
Project("{FAE04EC0-301F-11D3-BF4B-00C04F79EFBC}") = "ConsoleApplication", 
"ConsoleApplication\ConsoleApplication.csproj", "{EC1FD466-EB9A-46EC-8B0C-
AF7DF9AC866E}" 
EndProject 
Project("{FAE04EC0-301F-11D3-BF4B-00C04F79EFBC}") = "AppHandler", 
"AppHandler\AppHandler.csproj", "{7F9EEEB1-3698-4AB5-BE66-8B82F7161A8A}" 
EndProject 
Project("{2150E333-8FDC-42A3-9474-1A3956D46DE8}") = "pep", "pep", "{496C2933-
A2CA-4E11-9E44-10753B15E0BD}" 
EndProject 
Project("{FAE04EC0-301F-11D3-BF4B-00C04F79EFBC}") = "UnitTest", 
"UnitTest\UnitTest.csproj", "{8E832E59-61E2-4C07-B80B-72182C913427}" 
EndProject 
Project("{E24C65DC-7377-472B-9ABA-BC803B73C61A}") = "Web", 
"http://localhost:1607", "{131694CE-5D98-41D6-BA98-918E4923A288}" 
 ProjectSection(WebsiteProperties) = preProject 
  UseIISExpress = "true" 
  TargetFrameworkMoniker = ".NETFramework,Version%3Dv3.5" 
  Debug.AspNetCompiler.VirtualPath = "/localhost_1607" 
  Debug.AspNetCompiler.PhysicalPath = "Web\" 
  Debug.AspNetCompiler.TargetPath = "PrecompiledWeb\localhost_1607\" 
  Debug.AspNetCompiler.Updateable = "true" 
  Debug.AspNetCompiler.ForceOverwrite = "true" 
  Debug.AspNetCompiler.FixedNames = "false" 
  Debug.AspNetCompiler.Debug = "True" 
  Release.AspNetCompiler.VirtualPath = "/localhost_1607" 
  Release.AspNetCompiler.PhysicalPath = "Web\" 
  Release.AspNetCompiler.TargetPath = "PrecompiledWeb\localhost_1607\" 
  Release.AspNetCompiler.Updateable = "true" 
  Release.AspNetCompiler.ForceOverwrite = "true" 
  Release.AspNetCompiler.FixedNames = "false" 
  Release.AspNetCompiler.Debug = "False" 
  SlnRelativePath = "Web\" 
 EndProjectSection 
EndProject 
Global 
 GlobalSection(SubversionScc) = preSolution 
  Svn-Managed = True 
  Manager = AnkhSVN - Subversion Support for Visual Studio 
 EndGlobalSection 
 GlobalSection(SolutionConfigurationPlatforms) = preSolution 
  Debug|Any CPU = Debug|Any CPU 
  Release|Any CPU = Release|Any CPU 
 EndGlobalSection 
 GlobalSection(ProjectConfigurationPlatforms) = postSolution 
  {EC1FD466-EB9A-46EC-8B0C-AF7DF9AC866E}.Debug|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = 
Debug|Any CPU 
  {EC1FD466-EB9A-46EC-8B0C-AF7DF9AC866E}.Debug|Any CPU.Build.0 = 
Debug|Any CPU 
  {EC1FD466-EB9A-46EC-8B0C-AF7DF9AC866E}.Release|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = 
Release|Any CPU 
  {EC1FD466-EB9A-46EC-8B0C-AF7DF9AC866E}.Release|Any CPU.Build.0 = 
Release|Any CPU 
  {7F9EEEB1-3698-4AB5-BE66-8B82F7161A8A}.Debug|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = 
Debug|Any CPU 
  {7F9EEEB1-3698-4AB5-BE66-8B82F7161A8A}.Debug|Any CPU.Build.0 = 
Debug|Any CPU 
  {7F9EEEB1-3698-4AB5-BE66-8B82F7161A8A}.Release|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = 
Release|Any CPU 
  {7F9EEEB1-3698-4AB5-BE66-8B82F7161A8A}.Release|Any CPU.Build.0 = 
Release|Any CPU 
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  {8E832E59-61E2-4C07-B80B-72182C913427}.Debug|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = 
Debug|Any CPU 
  {8E832E59-61E2-4C07-B80B-72182C913427}.Debug|Any CPU.Build.0 = 
Debug|Any CPU 
  {8E832E59-61E2-4C07-B80B-72182C913427}.Release|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = 
Release|Any CPU 
  {8E832E59-61E2-4C07-B80B-72182C913427}.Release|Any CPU.Build.0 = 
Release|Any CPU 
  {131694CE-5D98-41D6-BA98-918E4923A288}.Debug|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = 
Debug|Any CPU 
  {131694CE-5D98-41D6-BA98-918E4923A288}.Debug|Any CPU.Build.0 = 
Debug|Any CPU 
  {131694CE-5D98-41D6-BA98-918E4923A288}.Release|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = 
Debug|Any CPU 
  {131694CE-5D98-41D6-BA98-918E4923A288}.Release|Any CPU.Build.0 = 
Debug|Any CPU 
 EndGlobalSection 
 GlobalSection(SolutionProperties) = preSolution 
  HideSolutionNode = FALSE 
 EndGlobalSection 
 GlobalSection(NestedProjects) = preSolution 
  {EC1FD466-EB9A-46EC-8B0C-AF7DF9AC866E} = {496C2933-A2CA-4E11-9E44-
10753B15E0BD} 
  {7F9EEEB1-3698-4AB5-BE66-8B82F7161A8A} = {496C2933-A2CA-4E11-9E44-
10753B15E0BD} 
  {131694CE-5D98-41D6-BA98-918E4923A288} = {496C2933-A2CA-4E11-9E44-
10753B15E0BD} 
 EndGlobalSection 
EndGlobal 
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APPENDIX R OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\APPHANDLER.CSPROJ (VISUAL STUDIO PROJECT) 	
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<Project ToolsVersion="12.0" DefaultTargets="Build" 
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003"> 
  <Import 
Project="$(MSBuildExtensionsPath)\$(MSBuildToolsVersion)\Microsoft.Common.prop
s" 
Condition="Exists('$(MSBuildExtensionsPath)\$(MSBuildToolsVersion)\Microsoft.C
ommon.props')" /> 
  <PropertyGroup> 
    <Configuration Condition=" '$(Configuration)' == '' 
">Debug</Configuration> 
    <Platform Condition=" '$(Platform)' == '' ">AnyCPU</Platform> 
    <ProjectGuid>{7F9EEEB1-3698-4AB5-BE66-8B82F7161A8A}</ProjectGuid> 
    <OutputType>Library</OutputType> 
    <AppDesignerFolder>Properties</AppDesignerFolder> 
    <RootNamespace>AppHandler</RootNamespace> 
    <AssemblyName>AppHandler</AssemblyName> 
    <TargetFrameworkVersion>v4.5</TargetFrameworkVersion> 
    <FileAlignment>512</FileAlignment> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition=" '$(Configuration)|$(Platform)' == 'Debug|AnyCPU' 
"> 
    <DebugSymbols>true</DebugSymbols> 
    <DebugType>full</DebugType> 
    <Optimize>false</Optimize> 
    <OutputPath>bin\Debug\</OutputPath> 
    <DefineConstants>DEBUG;TRACE</DefineConstants> 
    <ErrorReport>prompt</ErrorReport> 
    <WarningLevel>4</WarningLevel> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition=" '$(Configuration)|$(Platform)' == 
'Release|AnyCPU' "> 
    <DebugType>pdbonly</DebugType> 
    <Optimize>true</Optimize> 
    <OutputPath>bin\Release\</OutputPath> 
    <DefineConstants>TRACE</DefineConstants> 
    <ErrorReport>prompt</ErrorReport> 
    <WarningLevel>4</WarningLevel> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup> 
    <SignAssembly>true</SignAssembly> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup> 
    <AssemblyOriginatorKeyFile>keyPair.snk</AssemblyOriginatorKeyFile> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <Reference Include="DocumentFormat.OpenXml, Version=2.5.5631.0, 
Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35, processorArchitecture=MSIL" 
/> 
    <Reference Include="System" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Core" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Transactions" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Xml.Linq" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Data.DataSetExtensions" /> 
    <Reference Include="Microsoft.CSharp" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Data" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Xml" /> 
    <Reference Include="WindowsBase" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <Compile Include="CandyDelivery\FileStreamer.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="CandyDelivery\SingleStream.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="CandyStore\Candy.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="CandyStore\PDF\Document.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="CandyStore\PDF\HPDF.cs" /> 
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    <Compile Include="CandyStore\ICandy.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="CandyStore\IDocument.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="CandyStore\OOXML\Document.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="CandyStore\OOXML\Master.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="Properties\AssemblyInfo.cs" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <None Include="keyPair.snk" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <Import Project="$(MSBuildToolsPath)\Microsoft.CSharp.targets" /> 
</Project> 
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APPENDIX S OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\CANDYSTORE\IDOCUMENT.CS 
(PEP.APPHANDLER.CANDYSTORE.IDOCUMENT INTERFACE) 	
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
namespace pep.AppHandler.CandyStore 
{ 
 interface IDocument 
 { 
 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX T OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\CANDYSTORE\ICANDY.CS 
(PEP.APPHANDLER.CANDYSTORE.ICANDY INTERFACE) 	
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
namespace pep.AppHandler.CandyStore 
{ 
 /// <summary> 
 /// Interface for wrapped data content 
 /// Delivers secure execution space for sticky policy data 
 /// </summary> 
 public interface ICandy : IDisposable 
 { 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Builds interpreted XACML master document wrapper 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="documents">Documents file streams</param> 
  void Wrap(List<FileStream> documents); 
 
//  void PlantFile(byte[] FileContent); 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX U OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\CANDYSTORE\CANDY.CS 
(PEP.APPHANDLER.CANDYSTORE.CANDY CLASS) 	
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
namespace pep.AppHandler.CandyStore 
{ 
 /// <summary> 
 /// Class provides information about different documents (candies) 
supported 
 /// </summary> 
 public class Candy 
 { 
  #region Enums 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Enumerator for supported document types 
  /// </summary> 
  enum Type 
  { 
   OOXML = 0x01, 
   PDF = 0x02 
  }; 
  #endregion 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX V OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\CANDYSTORE\PDF\DOCUMENT.CS 
(PEP.APPHANDLER.CANDYSTORE.PDF.DOCUMENT CLASS) 	
using System; 
using System.Collections; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
namespace pep.AppHandler.CandyStore.PDF 
{ 
 class Document 
 { 
  #region Enums 
  public enum FileTypeExtension 
  { 
   Unsupported = 0, 
   PDF = 1 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Variables 
  private static readonly byte[] FILE_SIGNATURE_PDF = new byte[] { 0x25, 
0x50, 0x44, 0x46 }; 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Public Static Methods 
  public static FileTypeExtension GetFileTypeExtensionFromSignature(ref 
byte[] FileContent) 
  { 
   byte[] temp = 
FileContent.Take(FILE_SIGNATURE_PDF.Length).ToArray(); 
   if( 
StructuralComparisons.StructuralEqualityComparer.Equals(FILE_SIGNATURE_PDF, 
FileContent.Take(FILE_SIGNATURE_PDF.Length).ToArray()) ) 
   { 
    return FileTypeExtension.PDF; 
   } 
   return FileTypeExtension.Unsupported; 
  } 
  #endregion 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX W OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\CANDYSTORE\PDF\HPDF.CS 
(PEP.APPHANDLER.CANDYSTORE.PDF.HPDF CLASS) 	
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Diagnostics; 
using System.IO; 
using System.IO.MemoryMappedFiles; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Security.AccessControl; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
namespace pep.AppHandler.CandyStore.PDF 
{ 
    public class HPDF : IDisposable 
 { 
  #region Variables 
  private bool _bDisposed; 
  private FileStream _fileStream; 
  private string _filePath; 
 
  private FileSystemRights _fileSystemRights; 
  private FileSecurity _fileSecurity; 
  private FileOptions _fileOptions; 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Constructors 
  public HPDF() 
  { 
 
  } 
 
  public HPDF(byte[] FileContent) 
  { 
   this.PlantFile(FileContent, out this._filePath); 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Public Methods 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Method opens data using default assigned Windows appliction 
  /// Data with only NoCoat enabled policy can be opened. 
  /// Data with disabled NoCoat policy can be opened only if data type 
  /// is supported for secure file management 
  /// </summary> 
  public void OpenDefault() 
  { 
   try 
   { 
    using(Process processHandle = new Process {StartInfo =  
new ProcessStartInfo(this._filePath)}) 
    { 
     processHandle.Start(); 
     processHandle.WaitForExit(); 
    } 
   } 
   catch (Exception eX) 
   { 
    throw new Exception(string.Format("{0}::{1}", new 
StackFrame(0, true).GetMethod().Name, eX.Message)); 
   } 
  } 
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  /// <summary> 
  /// Creates MemoryMappedFile for unwrapped policy data 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="FileContent">Data file content</param> 
  public void PlantFile(byte[] FileContent) 
  { 
   this.PlantFile(FileContent, out this._filePath); 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Creates MemoryMappedFile for unwrapped policy data 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="FileContent">Data file content</param> 
  /// <param name="FilePath">Path for newly generated file</param> 
  private void PlantFile(byte[] FileContent, out string FilePath) 
  { 
   Document.FileTypeExtension fileExtension = 
Document.GetFileTypeExtensionFromSignature(ref FileContent); 
   FilePath = String.Format(@"{0}\{1}.{2}", Path.GetTempPath(), 
Guid.NewGuid(), fileExtension); 
    
   this._fileSystemRights = FileSystemRights.Read | 
FileSystemRights.CreateFiles; 
   this._fileOptions = FileOptions.Encrypted; 
    
   //Define complete access control rights 
   //this._fileSecurity. 
 
   this._fileStream = new FileStream(FilePath, FileMode.CreateNew, 
this._fileSystemRights, FileShare.None, 8, this._fileOptions, 
this._fileSecurity); 
     
   using ( BinaryWriter binWriter = new 
BinaryWriter(this._fileStream)) 
   { 
    binWriter.Write(FileContent); 
   } 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region IDisposable Members 
  public void Dispose() 
  { 
   Dispose(true); 
   GC.SuppressFinalize(this); 
  } 
 
  protected virtual void Dispose(bool bDisposing) 
  { 
   if (!this._bDisposed) 
   { 
    if (bDisposing) 
    { 
     this._fileStream.Dispose(); 
     File.Delete(this._filePath); 
    } 
 
    this._bDisposed = true; 
   } 
  } 
  #endregion 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX X OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\CANDYSTORE\OOXML\DOCUMENT.CS 
(PEP.APPHANDLER.CANDYSTORE.OOXML.XDOCUMENT CLASS) 	
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Packaging; 
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Wordprocessing; 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
using System.Xml; 
 
using pep.AppHandler.CandyDelivery; 
 
namespace pep.AppHandler.CandyStore.OOXML 
{ 
 /// <summary> 
 /// Class handing low level OOXML document operations 
 /// </summary> 
 public class XDocument : IDisposable 
 { 
  #region Variables 
  private bool disposed = false; 
  private WordprocessingDocument data; 
  private SingleStream singleStream; 
  private byte[] policy; 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Properties 
  /// <summary> 
  /// OOXML document property 
  /// </summary> 
  public WordprocessingDocument Data 
  { 
   get 
   { 
    return this.data; 
   } 
   set 
   { 
    this.data = value; 
   } 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Constructors 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Creates an instance of a single OOXML document 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="singleStream">Document file stream</param> 
  public XDocument(SingleStream singleStream) 
  { 
   this.singleStream = singleStream; 
   this.WrapDocument(FileAccess.Read); 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Creates an instance of a single OOXML document supporting basic 
access control functionality 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="singleStream">Document file stream</param> 
  /// <param name="fileAccess">Access type</param> 
  public XDocument(SingleStream singleStream, FileAccess fileAccess) 
  { 
 162 
   this.singleStream = singleStream; 
   this.WrapDocument(fileAccess); 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Public Methods 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Returns single OOXML document 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <returns>Single OOXML document</returns> 
  public WordprocessingDocument GetDocument() 
  { 
   return this.data; 
  } 
 
  public void AddPolicy(XmlDocument xmlDocument) 
  { 
   CustomFilePropertiesPart customProperty; 
   if (this.data.CustomFilePropertiesPart == null) 
   { 
    customProperty = this.data.AddCustomFilePropertiesPart(); 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    customProperty = this.data.CustomFilePropertiesPart; 
   } 
   xmlDocument.Save(customProperty.GetStream()); 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Private Methods 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Method wraps document stream into OOXML document 
  /// </summary> 
  private void WrapDocument(FileAccess fileAccess) 
  { 
   OpenSettings settings = new OpenSettings(); 
   settings.AutoSave = false; 
   this.data = WordprocessingDocument.Open(singleStream.Stream, 
(fileAccess == FileAccess.ReadWrite), settings); 
  } 
 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Method tries openning OOXML document from the stream 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="singleStream">Document stream</param> 
  /// <param name="document">Opened out OOXML document</param> 
  /// <returns></returns> 
  private bool TryOpenFromStream(SingleStream singleStream, out 
WordprocessingDocument document) 
  { 
   OpenSettings settings = new OpenSettings(); 
   settings.AutoSave = false; 
   try 
   { 
    document = 
WordprocessingDocument.Open(singleStream.Stream, false, settings); 
   } 
   catch 
   { 
    document = null; 
    return false; 
   } 
   return true; 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region IDisposable Members 
  public void Dispose() 
 163 
  { 
   Dispose(true); 
   GC.SuppressFinalize(this); 
  } 
 
  protected virtual void Dispose(bool disposing) 
  { 
   if (!this.disposed) 
   { 
    if (disposing) 
    { 
     if (this.data != null) 
      this.data.Close(); 
      this.data.Dispose(); 
     if (this.singleStream != null) 
     { 
      singleStream.Dispose(); 
     } 
    } 
 
    this.disposed = true; 
   } 
  } 
  #endregion 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX Y OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\CANDYSTORE\OOXML\MASTER.CS 
(PEP.APPHANDLER.CANDYSTORE.OOXML.XMASTER CLASS) 	
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Packaging; 
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Wordprocessing; 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
using pep.AppHandler.CandyDelivery; 
 
namespace pep.AppHandler.CandyStore.OOXML 
{ 
 /// <summary> 
 /// Class responsible for handling OOXML master document generation 
 /// </summary> 
 public class XMaster : IDisposable 
 { 
  #region Variables 
  private bool disposed = false; 
  private string name; 
  private WordprocessingDocument data; 
        private MemoryStream memoryStream; 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Constructors 
  public XMaster() 
  { 
   this.name = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(); 
            this.memoryStream = new MemoryStream(); 
   this.data = WordprocessingDocument.Create(this.memoryStream, 
DocumentFormat.OpenXml.WordprocessingDocumentType.Document, true); 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Public Methods 
  /// <summary> 
  /// Builds interpreted XACML master document wrapper 
  /// </summary> 
  /// <param name="documents">Documents file streams</param> 
  public void Wrap(List<SingleStream> documents) 
  { 
   string altChunkId = "AltChunkId1"; 
            MainDocumentPart mainPart = this.data.AddMainDocumentPart(); 
   AlternativeFormatImportPart chunk = 
mainPart.AddAlternativeFormatImportPart( 
    AlternativeFormatImportPartType.WordprocessingML, 
altChunkId); 
   foreach(SingleStream singleStream in documents) 
   { 
                OpenSettings settings = new OpenSettings(); 
                settings.AutoSave = false; 
                WordprocessingDocument doc = 
WordprocessingDocument.Open(singleStream.Stream, false, settings); 
 
                //FileMode.Open 
    chunk.FeedData((Stream)singleStream.Stream); 
    AltChunk altChunk = new AltChunk(); 
    altChunk.Id = altChunkId; 
    mainPart.Document 
     .Body 
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     .InsertAfter(altChunk, 
mainPart.Document.Body.Elements<Paragraph>().Last()); 
   } 
   mainPart.Document.Save(); 
  } 
  public void PlantFile() { } 
  //public  
  #endregion 
 
  #region IDisposable Members 
  public void Dispose() 
  { 
   Dispose(true); 
   GC.SuppressFinalize(this); 
  } 
 
  protected virtual void Dispose(bool disposing) 
  { 
   if (!this.disposed) 
   { 
    if (disposing) 
    { 
     if (this.data != null) 
      this.data.Dispose(); 
    } 
 
    this.disposed = true; 
   } 
  } 
  #endregion 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX Z OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\ CANDYDELIVERY\FILESTREAMER.CS 
(PEP.APPHANDLER.CANDYDELIVERY.FILESTREAMER CLASS) 	
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Data.SqlClient; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
 
namespace pep.AppHandler.CandyDelivery 
{ 
 public class FileStreamer : IDisposable 
 { 
  #region Variables 
  private bool disposed = false; 
  private string sqlConnectionString; 
  private SqlConnection sqlConnection; 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Properties 
  public SqlConnection SqlConnection 
  { 
   get 
   { 
    return this.sqlConnection; 
   } 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Constructors 
  public FileStreamer(string sqlConnectionString) 
  { 
   this.sqlConnectionString = sqlConnectionString; 
   this.sqlConnection = new SqlConnection(sqlConnectionString); 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region IDisposable Members 
  public void Dispose() 
  { 
   Dispose(true); 
   GC.SuppressFinalize(this); 
  } 
 
  protected virtual void Dispose(bool disposing) 
  { 
   if (!this.disposed) 
   { 
    if (disposing) 
    { 
     if (this.sqlConnection != null) 
      this.sqlConnection.Dispose(); 
    } 
 
    this.disposed = true; 
   } 
  } 
 
  #endregion 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX AA OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
ISTICKY\APPHANDLER\ CANDYDELIVERY\SINGLESTREAM.CS 
(PEP.APPHANDLER.CANDYDELIVERY.SINGLESTREAM CLASS) 	
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Packaging; 
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Wordprocessing; 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Data.SqlClient; 
using System.Data.SqlTypes; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Security; 
using System.Security.AccessControl; 
using System.Security.Permissions; 
using System.Security.Principal; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
using System.Transactions; 
 
namespace pep.AppHandler.CandyDelivery 
{ 
 /// <summary> 
 /// Class handing SqlFileStreams for documents 
 /// </summary> 
 public class SingleStream : IDisposable 
    { 
        #region Constants 
        private const int packetSize = 10 * 1000 * 1024; //[MB] 
        #endregion 
 
        #region Variables 
        private bool disposed = false; 
  private string metaDataID; 
  private FileStreamer fileStreamer; 
  private Stream stream; 
  SqlTransaction sqlTransaction; 
  private FileAccess fileAccess; 
  private byte[] streamHandle; 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Properties 
  public Stream Stream 
  { 
   get 
   { 
    return this.stream; 
   } 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Constructors 
 
  public SingleStream(FileStreamer fileStreamer, Stream stream) 
  { 
   this.fileStreamer = fileStreamer; 
   this.fileAccess = FileAccess.ReadWrite; 
   this.UploadData(stream); 
   this.stream = GetData(); 
  } 
 
  public SingleStream(FileStreamer fileStreamer, string metaDataID) 
  { 
   this.fileAccess = FileAccess.ReadWrite; 
   this.fileStreamer = fileStreamer; 
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   this.metaDataID = metaDataID; 
   this.stream = GetData(); 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  #region Public Methods 
  
  #endregion 
 
  #region Private Methods 
  public void UploadData(Stream stream) 
  { 
   const string sqlTransactionQuery = @" 
INSERT INTO 
 MetaData 
 (MetaDataFile) 
OUTPUT 
 INSERTED.MetaDataFile.PathName(), 
 INSERTED.MetaDataID, 
 GET_FILESTREAM_TRANSACTION_CONTEXT() 
VALUES (0x)"; 
   try 
   { 
    if (this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection.State == 
System.Data.ConnectionState.Closed) 
    { 
     this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection.Open(); 
    } 
    using (SqlCommand sqlCommand = new 
SqlCommand(sqlTransactionQuery, this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection)) 
    { 
     this.sqlTransaction = 
this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection.BeginTransaction(); 
     sqlCommand.Transaction = this.sqlTransaction; 
     sqlCommand.CommandText = sqlTransactionQuery; 
 
     string sqlStreamFullPath; 
     byte[] data; 
 
     using (SqlDataReader sqlReader = 
sqlCommand.ExecuteReader()) 
     { 
      sqlReader.Read(); 
      sqlStreamFullPath = sqlReader.GetString(0); 
      this.metaDataID = 
sqlReader.GetGuid(1).ToString(); 
      data = sqlReader.GetSqlBytes(2).Buffer; 
     } 
 
     using (SqlFileStream sqlFileStream = new 
SqlFileStream(sqlStreamFullPath, data, FileAccess.Write)) 
     { 
      stream.CopyTo(sqlFileStream); 
     } 
 
     sqlCommand.Transaction.Commit(); 
    } 
   } 
   catch 
   { 
   } 
  } 
 
  private SqlFileStream GetData() 
  { 
   const string SQL_TRANS_QUERY = @"SELECT 
GET_FILESTREAM_TRANSACTION_CONTEXT()"; 
            //byte[] buffer; 
            //UInt32 position = 0; 
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   string sqlQuery = String.Format(@" 
SELECT TOP 1 
 [MetaDataFile].PathName() 
FROM 
 [NEHST].[dbo].[MetaData] 
WHERE 
 [MetaDataID] = '{0}'", this.metaDataID); 
             
   if( this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection.State == 
System.Data.ConnectionState.Closed) 
   { 
    this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection.Open(); 
   } 
   using (SqlCommand sqlCommand = new SqlCommand(sqlQuery, 
this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection)) 
   { 
    //using (SqlTransaction sqlTransaction  
    this.sqlTransaction = 
this.fileStreamer.SqlConnection.BeginTransaction(this.metaDataID.Replace("-", 
String.Empty)); 
    sqlCommand.Transaction = this.sqlTransaction; 
 
    string filePath = (string)sqlCommand.ExecuteScalar(); 
    //SetRemoteSecurityContext(filePath); 
 
    sqlCommand.CommandText = SQL_TRANS_QUERY; 
 
    this.streamHandle = (byte[])sqlCommand.ExecuteScalar(); 
    return new SqlFileStream(filePath, this.streamHandle, 
this.fileAccess); 
   } 
  } 
  #endregion 
 
  private void SetRemoteSecurityContext(string filePath) 
  { 
   string securityContext = Thread.CurrentPrincipal.Identity.Name; 
   FileSystemAccessRule rule = new 
FileSystemAccessRule(securityContext, FileSystemRights.Write, 
AccessControlType.Allow);  
 
   PermissionSet permissionSet = new 
PermissionSet(PermissionState.Unrestricted); 
   permissionSet.AddPermission(new 
FileIOPermission(FileIOPermissionAccess.Read, new string[] { filePath })); 
   permissionSet.AddPermission(new 
FileIOPermission(FileIOPermissionAccess.Write | 
FileIOPermissionAccess.PathDiscovery, new string[] { filePath }));  
   permissionSet.Assert(); 
 
   DirectoryInfo dirInfo = new 
DirectoryInfo(Path.GetDirectoryName(filePath));  
 
 
   bool what = false;  
   DirectorySecurity security = dirInfo.GetAccessControl();  
 
   security.ModifyAccessRule(AccessControlModification.Add, rule, 
out what);  
   dirInfo.SetAccessControl(security);  
  } 
  #region IDisposable Members 
  public void Dispose() 
  { 
   Dispose(true); 
   GC.SuppressFinalize(this); 
  } 
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  protected virtual void Dispose(bool disposing) 
  { 
   if (!this.disposed) 
   { 
    if (disposing) 
    { 
     if (this.stream != null) 
      this.stream.Dispose(); 
     if (this.sqlTransaction != null) 
      this.sqlTransaction.Dispose(); 
    } 
 
    this.disposed = true; 
   } 
  } 
 
  #endregion 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX BB OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
UNITTEST\UNITTEST.CSPROJ (VISUAL STUDIO PROJECT) 	
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<Project ToolsVersion="12.0" DefaultTargets="Build" 
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003"> 
  <PropertyGroup> 
    <Configuration Condition=" '$(Configuration)' == '' 
">Debug</Configuration> 
    <Platform Condition=" '$(Platform)' == '' ">AnyCPU</Platform> 
    <ProjectGuid>{8E832E59-61E2-4C07-B80B-72182C913427}</ProjectGuid> 
    <OutputType>Library</OutputType> 
    <AppDesignerFolder>Properties</AppDesignerFolder> 
    <RootNamespace>UnitTest</RootNamespace> 
    <AssemblyName>UnitTest</AssemblyName> 
    <TargetFrameworkVersion>v4.5</TargetFrameworkVersion> 
    <FileAlignment>512</FileAlignment> 
    <ProjectTypeGuids>{3AC096D0-A1C2-E12C-1390-A8335801FDAB};{FAE04EC0-301F-
11D3-BF4B-00C04F79EFBC}</ProjectTypeGuids> 
    <VisualStudioVersion Condition="'$(VisualStudioVersion)' == 
''">10.0</VisualStudioVersion> 
    <VSToolsPath Condition="'$(VSToolsPath)' == 
''">$(MSBuildExtensionsPath32)\Microsoft\VisualStudio\v$(VisualStudioVersion)<
/VSToolsPath> 
    <ReferencePath>$(ProgramFiles)\Common Files\microsoft 
shared\VSTT\$(VisualStudioVersion)\UITestExtensionPackages</ReferencePath> 
    <IsCodedUITest>False</IsCodedUITest> 
    <TestProjectType>UnitTest</TestProjectType> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition=" '$(Configuration)|$(Platform)' == 'Debug|AnyCPU' 
"> 
    <DebugSymbols>true</DebugSymbols> 
    <DebugType>full</DebugType> 
    <Optimize>false</Optimize> 
    <OutputPath>bin\Debug\</OutputPath> 
    <DefineConstants>DEBUG;TRACE</DefineConstants> 
    <ErrorReport>prompt</ErrorReport> 
    <WarningLevel>4</WarningLevel> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition=" '$(Configuration)|$(Platform)' == 
'Release|AnyCPU' "> 
    <DebugType>pdbonly</DebugType> 
    <Optimize>true</Optimize> 
    <OutputPath>bin\Release\</OutputPath> 
    <DefineConstants>TRACE</DefineConstants> 
    <ErrorReport>prompt</ErrorReport> 
    <WarningLevel>4</WarningLevel> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <Reference Include="DocumentFormat.OpenXml, Version=2.5.5631.0, 
Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35, processorArchitecture=MSIL" 
/> 
    <Reference Include="System" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.XML" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Xml.Linq" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <Choose> 
    <When Condition="('$(VisualStudioVersion)' == '10.0' or 
'$(VisualStudioVersion)' == '') and '$(TargetFrameworkVersion)' == 'v3.5'"> 
      <ItemGroup> 
        <Reference 
Include="Microsoft.VisualStudio.QualityTools.UnitTestFramework, 
Version=10.1.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a, 
processorArchitecture=MSIL" /> 
      </ItemGroup> 
    </When> 
    <Otherwise> 
      <ItemGroup> 
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        <Reference 
Include="Microsoft.VisualStudio.QualityTools.UnitTestFramework" /> 
      </ItemGroup> 
    </Otherwise> 
  </Choose> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <Compile Include="UnitTest1.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="Properties\AssemblyInfo.cs" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <ProjectReference Include="..\AppHandler\AppHandler.csproj"> 
      <Project>{7f9eeeb1-3698-4ab5-be66-8b82f7161a8a}</Project> 
      <Name>AppHandler</Name> 
    </ProjectReference> 
    <ProjectReference 
Include="..\ConsoleApplication\ConsoleApplication.csproj"> 
      <Project>{ec1fd466-eb9a-46ec-8b0c-af7df9ac866e}</Project> 
      <Name>ConsoleApplication</Name> 
    </ProjectReference> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <Choose> 
    <When Condition="'$(VisualStudioVersion)' == '10.0' And '$(IsCodedUITest)' 
== 'True'"> 
      <ItemGroup> 
        <Reference 
Include="Microsoft.VisualStudio.QualityTools.CodedUITestFramework, 
Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a, 
processorArchitecture=MSIL"> 
          <Private>False</Private> 
        </Reference> 
        <Reference Include="Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UITest.Common, 
Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a, 
processorArchitecture=MSIL"> 
          <Private>False</Private> 
        </Reference> 
        <Reference Include="Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UITest.Extension, 
Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a, 
processorArchitecture=MSIL"> 
          <Private>False</Private> 
        </Reference> 
        <Reference Include="Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UITesting, 
Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a, 
processorArchitecture=MSIL"> 
          <Private>False</Private> 
        </Reference> 
      </ItemGroup> 
    </When> 
  </Choose> 
  <Import Project="$(VSToolsPath)\TeamTest\Microsoft.TestTools.targets" 
Condition="Exists('$(VSToolsPath)\TeamTest\Microsoft.TestTools.targets')" /> 
  <Import Project="$(MSBuildToolsPath)\Microsoft.CSharp.targets" /> 
  <!-- To modify your build process, add your task inside one of the targets 
below and uncomment it.  
       Other similar extension points exist, see Microsoft.Common.targets. 
  <Target Name="BeforeBuild"> 
  </Target> 
  <Target Name="AfterBuild"> 
  </Target> 
  --> 
</Project> 
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APPENDIX CC OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
UNITTEST\UNITTEST1.CS (TEST CLASS) 	
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Packaging; 
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Wordprocessing; 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Xml; 
using Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting; 
using pep.AppHandler.CandyStore.OOXML; 
using pep.AppHandler.CandyDelivery; 
 
namespace UnitTest 
{ 
 [TestClass] 
 public class UnitTest1 
 { 
  [TestMethod] 
  public void TestMethod1() 
  { 
 
   string connectionString = @"Persist Security 
Info=False;Integrated Security=SSPI;database=NEHST;server=WIN-
TK7VVQF2IT3;Connect Timeout=120"; 
   //string connectionString = @"Persist Security 
Info=False;Trusted_Connection=False;database=NEHST;server=WIN-
TK7VVQF2IT3;Connect Timeout=120;User ID=developer;password=Secure123"; 
    
 
   using( SingleStream singleStream = new SingleStream (new 
FileStreamer(connectionString), @"FE8F3116-99A4-E411-9403-000C29E5BED1" ) ) 
   { 
    using (XDocument candy = new XDocument(singleStream, 
FileAccess.ReadWrite)) 
    { 
     XmlDocument xmlDocument = new XmlDocument(); 
    
 xmlDocument.Load(@"Z:\Projects\Hamster2.5\policy.xml"); 
     candy.AddPolicy(xmlDocument); 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 
  [TestMethod] 
  public void TestMethod2() 
  { 
   string connectionString = @"Persist Security 
Info=False;Integrated Security=SSPI;database=NEHST;server=WIN-
TK7VVQF2IT3;Connect Timeout=120"; 
   //string connectionString = @"Persist Security 
Info=False;Trusted_Connection=False;database=NEHST;server=WIN-
TK7VVQF2IT3;Connect Timeout=120;User ID=developer;password=Secure123"; 
 
   using (FileStream fileStream = new 
FileStream(@"Z:\Projects\Hamster2.5\Hamster2_Ewa.docx", FileMode.Open)) 
   { 
    using (SingleStream singleStream = new SingleStream(new 
FileStreamer(connectionString),  (Stream)fileStream)) 
    { 
     using (XDocument candy = new 
XDocument(singleStream, FileAccess.ReadWrite)) 
     { 
      XmlDocument xmlDocument = new XmlDocument(); 
     
 xmlDocument.Load(@"Z:\Projects\Hamster2.5\policy.xml"); 
      candy.AddPolicy(xmlDocument); 
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     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX DD OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
WEB\DOWNLOADER.ASHX (DOWNLOADER CLASS) 	
<%@ WebHandler Language="C#" Class="downloader" %> 
 
using System; 
using System.Web; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Text; 
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Packaging; 
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml.Wordprocessing; 
using DocumentFormat.OpenXml; 
 
public class downloader : IHttpHandler { 
     
    public void ProcessRequest (HttpContext context)  
    { 
        try 
        { 
            string fileName = Guid.NewGuid().ToString() + ".docx"; 
            string path = context.Server.MapPath("~/docs/") + fileName; 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(context.Request["what"])) && 
(context.Request["what"].ToLower() == "saveasword") 
                && !(string.IsNullOrEmpty(context.Request.Form[0]))) 
            { 
                SaveAsWord(context.Request.Form[0], path, fileName); 
            }  
 
        } 
        catch (Exception ex) 
        { 
            context.Response.ContentType = "text/plain"; 
            context.Response.Write(ex.ToString()); 
            System.Diagnostics.Trace.WriteLine(ex.ToString()); 
        } 
         
    } 
  
    public bool IsReusable { 
        get { 
            return false; 
        } 
    } 
 
 
    /// <summary> 
    /// Wrapper function to save the richtext values as word 
    /// </summary> 
    /// <param name="input">rich text</param> 
    private void SaveAsWord(string input, string fullFilePath, string 
fileNameOnly) 
    { 
        CreateDocument(fullFilePath); 
        input = ReplaceMailMerge(input); 
        generateWordDocument(input, fullFilePath, fileNameOnly); 
 
    } 
 
 
    /// <summary> 
    /// Replace the merge field with some custom text 
    /// In real world this may come from database 
    /// </summary> 
    /// <param name="input">input text</param> 
    /// <returns>Mail merged text</returns> 
    private string ReplaceMailMerge(string input) 
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    { 
        input = input.Replace("{^FirstName^}", "Billy"); 
        input = input.Replace("{^LastName^}", "Bob"); 
        input = input.Replace("{^Title^}", "Dr."); 
        return input; 
    } 
 
    /// <summary> 
    /// Create a new docx 
    /// </summary> 
    /// <param name="path">Path where the doc file is to be created</param> 
    private void CreateDocument(string path) 
    { 
 
        // Create a Wordprocessing document.  
        using (WordprocessingDocument myDoc = 
WordprocessingDocument.Create(path, WordprocessingDocumentType.Document)) 
        { 
            // Add a new main document part.  
            MainDocumentPart mainPart = myDoc.AddMainDocumentPart(); 
            //Create DOM tree for simple document.  
            mainPart.Document = new Document(); 
            Body body = new Body(); 
            Paragraph p = new Paragraph(); 
            Run r = new Run(); 
            Text t = new Text(""); 
            //Append elements appropriately.  
            r.Append(t); 
            p.Append(r); 
            body.Append(p); 
            mainPart.Document.Append(body); 
            // Save changes to the main document part.  
            mainPart.Document.Save(); 
        } 
    } 
 
    /// <summary> 
    /// Add the HTML markup in the file 
    /// Save the document 
    /// Send the path of this document to the caller 
    /// </summary> 
    /// <param name="htmlMarkup">Rich text</param> 
    /// <param name="fullFilePath">Path of the file</param> 
    /// <param name="fileNameOnly">Name of the file</param> 
    public void generateWordDocument(string htmlMarkup, string fullFilePath, 
string fileNameOnly) 
    { 
        try 
        { 
            /*----------- Generate the Document -----------------------*/ 
            //put some title 
            string pageTitle = Guid.NewGuid().ToString(); 
            //open the document 
            using (WordprocessingDocument wordDoc = 
WordprocessingDocument.Open(fullFilePath, true)) 
            { 
                //get the document 
                MainDocumentPart mainPart = wordDoc.MainDocumentPart; 
                int altChunkIdCounter = 1; 
                int blockLevelCounter = 1; 
 
                string mainhtml = "<html><head><style 
type='text/css'>.catalogGeneralTable{border-collapse: collapse;text-align: 
left;} .catalogGeneralTable td, th{ padding: 5px; border: 1px solid #999999; 
}</style></head><body style='font-family:Trebuchet MS;font-size:.9em;'>" + 
htmlMarkup + "</body></html>"; 
                string altChunkId = String.Format("AltChunkId{0}", 
altChunkIdCounter++); 
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                //Import data as html content using Altchunk 
                AlternativeFormatImportPart chunk = 
mainPart.AddAlternativeFormatImportPart(AlternativeFormatImportPartType.Html, 
altChunkId); 
 
                //add the chunk to the doc 
                using (Stream chunkStream = chunk.GetStream(FileMode.Create, 
FileAccess.Write)) 
                { 
                    using (StreamWriter stringWriter = new 
StreamWriter(chunkStream, Encoding.UTF8)) //Encoding.UTF8 is important to 
remove special characters 
                    { 
                        stringWriter.Write(mainhtml); 
                    } 
                } 
 
                AltChunk altChunk = new AltChunk(); 
                altChunk.Id = altChunkId; 
                //insert the text in the doc 
                mainPart.Document.Body.InsertAt(altChunk, 
blockLevelCounter++); 
                //save the document 
                mainPart.Document.Save(); 
            } 
            /*----------- End Generate the Document -----------------------*/ 
             
            /* ------- Send the response -----------*/ 
            //clear the response object 
            HttpContext.Current.Response.ClearContent(); 
            //add the demilited string to the response object and write it.  
            string url = HttpContext.Current.Request.ApplicationPath + 
"/docs/" + fileNameOnly; 
            HttpContext.Current.Response.Write(url); 
            HttpContext.Current.Response.End(); 
 
            /* -------End Send the response -----------*/ 
        } 
        catch (Exception ex) 
        { 
            HttpContext.Current.Response.Write(ex.Message.ToString()); 
        } 
    } 
 
 
    /// <summary> 
    /// Function to download the newly generated doc file 
    /// </summary> 
    /// <param name="completeFilePath">File path</param> 
    /// <param name="contentType">Content type</param> 
    private void DownloadFile(string completeFilePath, string fileNameOnly, 
string contentType) 
    { 
        Stream iStream = null; 
 
        // Buffer to read 10K bytes in chunk: 
        byte[] buffer = new Byte[10000]; 
 
        // Length of the file: 
        int length; 
 
        // Total bytes to read: 
        long dataToRead; 
 
        try 
        { 
            // Open the file. 
            iStream = new FileStream(completeFilePath, FileMode.Open, 
 178 
            FileAccess.Read, FileShare.Read); 
 
            // Total bytes to read: 
            dataToRead = iStream.Length; 
 
            HttpContext.Current.Response.ContentType = contentType; 
            HttpContext.Current.Response.AddHeader("Content-Disposition", 
"attachment; filename=" + fileNameOnly); 
 
            // Read the bytes. 
            while (dataToRead > 0) 
            { 
                // Verify that the client is connected. 
                if (HttpContext.Current.Response.IsClientConnected) 
                { 
                    // Read the data in buffer. 
                    length = iStream.Read(buffer, 0, 10000); 
 
                    // Write the data to the current output stream. 
                    HttpContext.Current.Response.OutputStream.Write(buffer, 0, 
length); 
 
                    // Flush the data to the HTML output. 
                    HttpContext.Current.Response.Flush(); 
 
                    buffer = new Byte[10000]; 
                    dataToRead = dataToRead - length; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    //prevent infinite loop if user disconnects 
                    dataToRead = -1; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        catch (Exception ex) 
        { 
            // Trap the error, if any. 
            HttpContext.Current.Response.Write("Error : " + ex.Message); 
        } 
        finally 
        { 
            if (iStream != null) 
            { 
                //Close the file. 
                iStream.Close(); 
            } 
            HttpContext.Current.Response.Close(); 
        } 
    } 
} 
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APPENDIX EE OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
WEB\DEFAULT.ASPX (DEFAULT PAGE) 	
<%@ Page Language="C#" AutoEventWireup="true"  CodeFile="Default.aspx.cs" 
Inherits="_Default" ValidateRequest="false"  %> 
 
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> 
 
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<head runat="server"> 
    <title>Online Editor with Mail Merge</title> 
    <script src="scripts/ckeditor/ckeditor.js" 
type="text/javascript"></script> 
    <script src="scripts/ckeditor/adapters/jquery.js" 
type="text/javascript"></script> 
    <script type="text/javascript" src="scripts/jquery-1.3.2.min.js"></script> 
    <script src="scripts/myAjax.js" type="text/javascript"></script> 
    <script language="javascript" type="text/javascript"> 
        //select the merge fields dropdown and implement the onchange event  
        //to insert the selected value in the text area 
        $(document).ready(function() { 
            $("#MergeFields").val('0'); 
            $("#MergeFields").change(onSelectChange); 
        }); 
         
        function onSelectChange() { 
            var selected = $("#MergeFields option:selected"); 
            var oEditor = CKEDITOR.instances.editor1; 
 
            if (selected.val() != 0) { 
                var valueToInsert = selected.text(); 
                // Check the active editing mode. 
                if (oEditor.mode == 'wysiwyg') { 
                    // Insert the desired HTML. 
                    oEditor.insertHtml(valueToInsert); 
                } 
                else { 
                    alert('You must be on WYSIWYG mode!'); 
                } 
            } 
            $("#MergeFields").val('0'); 
        } 
    </script> 
 
</head> 
<body> 
    <form id="form1" runat="server"> 
    <div> 
        <h2> 
      Online Richtext editor with Mail Merge 
     </h2> 
     <!-- This <div> holds alert messages to be display in the sample 
page. --> 
     <div id="alerts"> 
      <noscript> 
       <p> 
        <strong>Online Richtext editor requires JavaScript to 
run</strong>.  
        In a browser with no JavaScript support, like yours, 
you should still see  
        the contents (HTML data) and you should be able to 
edit it normally,  
        without a rich editor interface. 
       </p> 
      </noscript> 
     </div> 
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        <p> 
            This is online rich text editor sample with mail merge.<br /> 
            Use the text area below to type in your document. <br /> 
            Use the dropdowns below that have mail merge fields.  
        </p> 
     <textarea cols="50" id="editor1" name="editor1" rows="10"></textarea> 
        <!-- instantiate a new instance of CKEDITOR --> 
  <script type="text/javascript"> 
      //<![CDATA[ 
      // Replace the <textarea id="editor1"> with an CKEditor instance. 
      var editor = CKEDITOR.replace('editor1', 
            { 
                toolbar: 'myToolBar', skin: 'office2003', width: '60%' 
            }); 
      //]]> 
  </script> 
      
     <div id="eMessage"> 
  </div> 
  <div id="eButtons"> 
      <span><b>Insert Merge Fields from here</b></span> 
      <select id="MergeFields" > 
          <option value="0" selected="selected">Select Merge 
Fields</option> 
          <option value="1">{^Title^}</option> 
          <option value="2">{^FirstName^}</option> 
          <option value="3">{^LastName^}</option> 
      </select> 
       
      <input type="button" name="saveAsWord" id="saveAsWord"  
           onclick="javascript:ajaxDownloadDoc()" value="Download as 
word" /> 
   </div> 
 
    </div> 
    </form> 
</body> 
</html> 
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APPENDIX FF OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER EVALUATION – 
SPIBEDRV\SPIBEDRV.SLN 
 
Microsoft Visual Studio Solution File, Format Version 12.00 
# Visual Studio 14 
VisualStudioVersion = 14.0.25123.0 
MinimumVisualStudioVersion = 12.0 
Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "spibedrv", 
"spibedrv.vcxproj", "{18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}" 
EndProject 
Global 
 GlobalSection(SolutionConfigurationPlatforms) = preSolution 
  Debug|Win32 = Debug|Win32 
  Debug|x64 = Debug|x64 
  Release|Win32 = Release|Win32 
  Release|x64 = Release|x64 
 EndGlobalSection 
 GlobalSection(ProjectConfigurationPlatforms) = postSolution 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Debug|Win32.ActiveCfg = 
Debug|Win32 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Debug|Win32.Build.0 = 
Debug|Win32 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Debug|Win32.Deploy.0 = 
Debug|Win32 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|x64 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|x64 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Debug|x64.Deploy.0 = Debug|x64 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Release|Win32.ActiveCfg = 
Release|Win32 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Release|Win32.Build.0 = 
Release|Win32 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Release|Win32.Deploy.0 = 
Release|Win32 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = 
Release|x64 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Release|x64.Build.0 = 
Release|x64 
  {18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}.Release|x64.Deploy.0 = 
Release|x64 
 EndGlobalSection 
 GlobalSection(SolutionProperties) = preSolution 
  HideSolutionNode = FALSE 
 EndGlobalSection 
EndGlobal 	
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APPENDIX GG OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER 
EVALUATION – SPIBEDRV\SPIBEDRV.VCXPROJ 	
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<Project DefaultTargets="Build" ToolsVersion="12.0" 
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003"> 
  <ItemGroup Label="ProjectConfigurations"> 
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Debug|Win32"> 
      <Configuration>Debug</Configuration> 
      <Platform>Win32</Platform> 
    </ProjectConfiguration> 
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|Win32"> 
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration> 
      <Platform>Win32</Platform> 
    </ProjectConfiguration> 
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Debug|x64"> 
      <Configuration>Debug</Configuration> 
      <Platform>x64</Platform> 
    </ProjectConfiguration> 
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|x64"> 
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration> 
      <Platform>x64</Platform> 
    </ProjectConfiguration> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Label="Globals"> 
    <ProjectGuid>{18A7AC9C-B3DA-4935-9A35-56FD35FF2705}</ProjectGuid> 
    <RootNamespace>$(MSBuildProjectName)</RootNamespace> 
    <Configuration Condition="'$(Configuration)' == ''">Debug</Configuration> 
    <Platform Condition="'$(Platform)' == ''">Win32</Platform> 
    <SampleGuid>{740DFB1D-45E5-406F-BBB6-4AF0E6C30DBA}</SampleGuid> 
    <ProjectName>spibedrv</ProjectName> 
    
<WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>$(LatestTargetPlatformVersion)</WindowsTargetPla
tformVersion> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.Default.props" /> 
  <PropertyGroup Label="Configuration" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'"> 
    <TargetVersion>Windows10</TargetVersion> 
    <UseDebugLibraries>False</UseDebugLibraries> 
    <DriverTargetPlatform>Universal</DriverTargetPlatform> 
    <DriverType>WDM</DriverType> 
    <PlatformToolset>WindowsKernelModeDriver10.0</PlatformToolset> 
    <ConfigurationType>Driver</ConfigurationType> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Label="Configuration" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|x64'"> 
    <TargetVersion>Windows10</TargetVersion> 
    <UseDebugLibraries>True</UseDebugLibraries> 
    <DriverTargetPlatform>Universal</DriverTargetPlatform> 
    <DriverType>WDM</DriverType> 
    <PlatformToolset>WindowsKernelModeDriver10.0</PlatformToolset> 
    <ConfigurationType>Driver</ConfigurationType> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Label="Configuration" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|Win32'"> 
    <TargetVersion>Windows10</TargetVersion> 
    <UseDebugLibraries>False</UseDebugLibraries> 
    <DriverTargetPlatform>Universal</DriverTargetPlatform> 
    <DriverType>WDM</DriverType> 
    <PlatformToolset>WindowsKernelModeDriver10.0</PlatformToolset> 
    <ConfigurationType>Driver</ConfigurationType> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Label="Configuration" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|Win32'"> 
    <TargetVersion>Windows10</TargetVersion> 
    <UseDebugLibraries>True</UseDebugLibraries> 
    <DriverTargetPlatform>Universal</DriverTargetPlatform> 
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    <DriverType>WDM</DriverType> 
    <PlatformToolset>WindowsKernelModeDriver10.0</PlatformToolset> 
    <ConfigurationType>Driver</ConfigurationType> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.props" /> 
  <PropertyGroup> 
    <OutDir>$(IntDir)</OutDir> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'"> 
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" 
Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" /> 
  </ImportGroup> 
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|x64'"> 
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" 
Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" /> 
  </ImportGroup> 
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|Win32'"> 
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" 
Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" /> 
  </ImportGroup> 
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|Win32'"> 
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" 
Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" /> 
  </ImportGroup> 
  <ItemGroup Label="WrappedTaskItems" /> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'"> 
    <TargetName>spibedrv</TargetName> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|x64'"> 
    <TargetName>spibedrv</TargetName> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|Win32'"> 
    <TargetName>spibedrv</TargetName> 
    <EnableInf2cat>false</EnableInf2cat> 
    <Inf2CatUseLocalTime>true</Inf2CatUseLocalTime> 
    <Inf2CatNoCatalog>false</Inf2CatNoCatalog> 
    <IntDir>$(ConfigurationName)\</IntDir> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|Win32'"> 
    <TargetName>spibedrv</TargetName> 
    <EnableInf2cat>false</EnableInf2cat> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <ItemDefinitionGroup 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'"> 
    <ClCompile> 
      <TreatWarningAsError>true</TreatWarningAsError> 
      <WarningLevel>Level4</WarningLevel> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
      <ExceptionHandling> 
      </ExceptionHandling> 
    </ClCompile> 
    <Link> 
      
<AdditionalDependencies>%(AdditionalDependencies);$(DDK_LIB_PATH)\fltMgr.lib</
AdditionalDependencies> 
    </Link> 
    <Midl> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
    </Midl> 
    <ResourceCompile> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
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POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
    </ResourceCompile> 
  </ItemDefinitionGroup> 
  <ItemDefinitionGroup 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|x64'"> 
    <ClCompile> 
      <TreatWarningAsError>true</TreatWarningAsError> 
      <WarningLevel>Level4</WarningLevel> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
      <ExceptionHandling> 
      </ExceptionHandling> 
    </ClCompile> 
    <Link> 
      
<AdditionalDependencies>%(AdditionalDependencies);$(DDK_LIB_PATH)\fltMgr.lib</
AdditionalDependencies> 
    </Link> 
    <Midl> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
    </Midl> 
    <ResourceCompile> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
    </ResourceCompile> 
  </ItemDefinitionGroup> 
  <ItemDefinitionGroup 
Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|Win32'"> 
    <ClCompile> 
      <TreatWarningAsError>true</TreatWarningAsError> 
      <WarningLevel>Level4</WarningLevel> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
      <ExceptionHandling> 
      </ExceptionHandling> 
      <Inf2CatAdditionalOptions> 
      </Inf2CatAdditionalOptions> 
    </ClCompile> 
    <Link> 
      
<AdditionalDependencies>%(AdditionalDependencies);$(DDK_LIB_PATH)\fltMgr.lib</
AdditionalDependencies> 
    </Link> 
    <Midl> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
    </Midl> 
    <ResourceCompile> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
    </ResourceCompile> 
    <Inf> 
      <DateStamp>04/08/2018</DateStamp> 
      <DriverVersionSectionName>1.0.0.0</DriverVersionSectionName> 
      <CatalogFileName>spibedrv.cat</CatalogFileName> 
    </Inf> 
    <PostBuildEvent> 
      <Command>"$(WindowsSdkDir)bin\$(DDKPlatform)\inf2cat.exe" 
/os:10_$(DDKPlatform) 
/driver:"$(ProjectDir)$(IntDir)$(MSBuildProjectName)"</Command> 
    </PostBuildEvent> 
  </ItemDefinitionGroup> 
  <ItemDefinitionGroup 
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Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Debug|Win32'"> 
    <ClCompile> 
      <TreatWarningAsError>true</TreatWarningAsError> 
      <WarningLevel>Level4</WarningLevel> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
      <ExceptionHandling> 
      </ExceptionHandling> 
    </ClCompile> 
    <Link> 
      
<AdditionalDependencies>%(AdditionalDependencies);$(DDK_LIB_PATH)\fltMgr.lib</
AdditionalDependencies> 
    </Link> 
    <Midl> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
    </Midl> 
    <ResourceCompile> 
      
<PreprocessorDefinitions>%(PreprocessorDefinitions);_WIN2K_COMPAT_SLIST_USAGE;
POOL_NX_OPTIN=1</PreprocessorDefinitions> 
    </ResourceCompile> 
  </ItemDefinitionGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <ClCompile Include="spibedrv.c" /> 
    <ClCompile Include="spibelib.c" /> 
    <ResourceCompile Include="spibedrv.rc" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <Inf Exclude="@(Inf)" Include="*.inf" /> 
    <FilesToPackage Include="$(TargetPath)" 
Condition="'$(ConfigurationType)'=='Driver' or 
'$(ConfigurationType)'=='DynamicLibrary'" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <None Exclude="@(None)" Include="*.txt;*.htm;*.html" /> 
    <None Exclude="@(None)" 
Include="*.ico;*.cur;*.bmp;*.dlg;*.rct;*.gif;*.jpg;*.jpeg;*.wav;*.jpe;*.tiff;*
.tif;*.png;*.rc2" /> 
    <None Exclude="@(None)" Include="*.def;*.bat;*.hpj;*.asmx" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <ClInclude Include="resource.h" /> 
    <ClInclude Include="spibelib.h" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.targets" /> 
</Project> 	
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APPENDIX HH OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER 
EVALUATION – SPIBEDRV\SPIBELIB.C 	
#include <fltKernel.h> 
 
#define OOXML_EXTENSION_SIZE 4 
 
long XOrBuffer(PUCHAR buffer, const long BUFFER_SIZE) 
{ 
 if (buffer) 
 { 
  for (long i = 0; i < BUFFER_SIZE; i++) 
  { 
   buffer[i] ^= 0xFF; 
  } 
 
  return BUFFER_SIZE; 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  return (long)-1; 
 } 
} 
 
BOOLEAN IsOOXML(PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data) 
{ 
 WCHAR string[OOXML_EXTENSION_SIZE]; 
 UNICODE_STRING oOxmlExtension; 
 oOxmlExtension.Buffer = string; 
 oOxmlExtension.MaximumLength = OOXML_EXTENSION_SIZE; 
 oOxmlExtension.Length = OOXML_EXTENSION_SIZE; 
 
 RtlInitUnicodeString(&oOxmlExtension, L"docx"); 
 
 PFLT_FILE_NAME_INFORMATION FileNameInformation = NULL; 
 NTSTATUS status; 
 
 status = 
  FltGetFileNameInformation(Data, FLT_FILE_NAME_NORMALIZED, 
&FileNameInformation); 
 
 if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
 { 
  status = FltParseFileNameInformation(FileNameInformation); 
 
  if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
   //KdPrint(("Parent Dir is %S\n", FileNameInformation-
>ParentDir.Buffer)); 
   if (RtlCompareUnicodeString(&FileNameInformation->Extension, 
&oOxmlExtension, TRUE) == 0) 
   { 
    FltReleaseFileNameInformation(FileNameInformation); 
    return TRUE; 
   } 
 
   FltReleaseFileNameInformation(FileNameInformation); 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   KdPrint(("Error FltParseFileNameInformation")); 
  } 
 } 
 else if (status == STATUS_FLT_INVALID_NAME_REQUEST) 
 { 
  KdPrint(("Error STATUS_FLT_INVALID_NAME_REQUEST")); 
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 } 
 else if (status == STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES) 
 { 
  KdPrint(("Error STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES")); 
 } 
 else if (status == STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER) 
 { 
  KdPrint(("Error STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER")); 
 } 
 return FALSE; 
} 	
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APPENDIX II OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER 
EVALUATION – SPIBEDRV\SPIBELIB.C 	
#ifndef SPIBE_LIB_ 
#define SPIBE_LIB_ 
 
long  XOrBuffer(PUCHAR buffer, const long BUFFER_SIZE); 
//long  XOrBuffer(unsigned char **buffer, const long BUFFER_SIZE); 
 
#endif //SPIBE_LIB_ 	
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APPENDIX JJ OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER 
EVALUATION – SPIBEDRV\SPIBEDRV.C 	
#include <fltKernel.h> 
#include "spibelib.h" 
#include <suppress.h> 
 
/* 
Based on Microsoft SwapBuffers template 
*/ 
 
#pragma prefast(disable:__WARNING_ENCODE_MEMBER_FUNCTION_POINTER, "Not valid 
for kernel mode drivers") 
 
PFLT_FILTER gFilterHandle; 
 
#define BUFFER_SWAP_TAG     'bdBS' 
#define CONTEXT_TAG         'xcBS' 
#define NAME_TAG            'mnBS' 
#define PRE_2_POST_TAG      'ppBS' 
 
typedef struct _VOLUME_CONTEXT 
{ 
 UNICODE_STRING Name; 
 
 ULONG SectorSize; 
 
} VOLUME_CONTEXT, *PVOLUME_CONTEXT; 
 
#define MIN_SECTOR_SIZE 0x200 
 
typedef struct _PRE_2_POST_CONTEXT 
{ 
 PVOLUME_CONTEXT VolCtx; 
 
 PVOID UnpackedCandy; 
 
} PRE_2_POST_CONTEXT, *PPRE_2_POST_CONTEXT; 
 
NPAGED_LOOKASIDE_LIST Pre2PostContextList; 
 
NTSTATUS 
InstanceSetup( 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ FLT_INSTANCE_SETUP_FLAGS Flags, 
 _In_ DEVICE_TYPE VolumeDeviceType, 
 _In_ FLT_FILESYSTEM_TYPE VolumeFilesystemType 
); 
 
VOID 
CleanupVolumeContext( 
 _In_ PFLT_CONTEXT Context, 
 _In_ FLT_CONTEXT_TYPE ContextType 
); 
 
NTSTATUS 
InstanceQueryTeardown( 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ FLT_INSTANCE_QUERY_TEARDOWN_FLAGS Flags 
); 
 
DRIVER_INITIALIZE DriverEntry; 
NTSTATUS 
DriverEntry( 
 _In_ PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject, 
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 _In_ PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath 
); 
 
NTSTATUS 
FilterUnload( 
 _In_ FLT_FILTER_UNLOAD_FLAGS Flags 
); 
 
FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPreReadBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _Flt_CompletionContext_Outptr_ PVOID *CompletionContext 
); 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostReadBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
); 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostReadBuffersWhenSafe( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
); 
 
FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPreDirCtrlBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _Flt_CompletionContext_Outptr_ PVOID *CompletionContext 
); 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostDirCtrlBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
); 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostDirCtrlBuffersWhenSafe( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
); 
 
FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPreWriteBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _Flt_CompletionContext_Outptr_ PVOID *CompletionContext 
); 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostWriteBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
); 
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VOID 
ReadDriverParameters( 
 _In_ PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath 
); 
 
#ifdef ALLOC_PRAGMA 
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE, InstanceSetup) 
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE, CleanupVolumeContext) 
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE, InstanceQueryTeardown) 
#pragma alloc_text(INIT, DriverEntry) 
#pragma alloc_text(INIT, ReadDriverParameters) 
#pragma alloc_text(PAGE, FilterUnload) 
#endif 
 
CONST FLT_OPERATION_REGISTRATION Callbacks[] = 
{ 
 
{ IRP_MJ_READ, 
  0, 
  SwapPreReadBuffers, 
  SwapPostReadBuffers }, 
 
 
{ IRP_MJ_WRITE, 
  0, 
  SwapPreWriteBuffers, 
  SwapPostWriteBuffers }, 
 
 
{ IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL, 
  0, 
  SwapPreDirCtrlBuffers, 
  SwapPostDirCtrlBuffers }, 
 
 
{ IRP_MJ_OPERATION_END } 
}; 
 
 
CONST FLT_CONTEXT_REGISTRATION ContextNotifications[] = 
{ 
 
 
{ FLT_VOLUME_CONTEXT, 
   0, 
   CleanupVolumeContext, 
   sizeof(VOLUME_CONTEXT), 
   CONTEXT_TAG }, 
 
{ FLT_CONTEXT_END } 
}; 
 
 
CONST FLT_REGISTRATION FilterRegistration = 
{ 
sizeof(FLT_REGISTRATION),         //  Size 
FLT_REGISTRATION_VERSION,           //  Version 
0,                                  //  Flags 
 
ContextNotifications,               //  Context 
Callbacks,                          //  Operation callbacks 
 
FilterUnload,                       //  MiniFilterUnload 
 
InstanceSetup,                      //  InstanceSetup 
InstanceQueryTeardown,              //  InstanceQueryTeardown 
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NULL,                               //  InstanceTeardownStart 
NULL,                               //  InstanceTeardownComplete 
 
NULL,                               //  GenerateFileName 
NULL,                               //  GenerateDestinationFileName 
NULL                                //  NormalizeNameComponent 
 
}; 
 
#define LOGFL_ERRORS    0x00000001  // if set, display error messages 
#define LOGFL_READ      0x00000002  // if set, display READ operation info 
#define LOGFL_WRITE     0x00000004  // if set, display WRITE operation info 
#define LOGFL_DIRCTRL   0x00000008  // if set, display DIRCTRL operation info 
#define LOGFL_VOLCTX    0x00000010  // if set, display VOLCTX operation info 
 
ULONG LoggingFlags = 0;             // all disabled by default 
 
#define LOG_PRINT( _logFlag, _string )                              \ 
    (FlagOn(LoggingFlags,(_logFlag)) ?                              \ 
        DbgPrint _string  :                                         \ 
        ((int)0)) 
 
NTSTATUS 
InstanceSetup( 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ FLT_INSTANCE_SETUP_FLAGS Flags, 
 _In_ DEVICE_TYPE VolumeDeviceType, 
 _In_ FLT_FILESYSTEM_TYPE VolumeFilesystemType 
) 
{ 
 PDEVICE_OBJECT devObj = NULL; 
 PVOLUME_CONTEXT ctx = NULL; 
 NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS; 
 ULONG retLen; 
 PUNICODE_STRING workingName; 
 USHORT size; 
 UCHAR volPropBuffer[sizeof(FLT_VOLUME_PROPERTIES) + 512]; 
 PFLT_VOLUME_PROPERTIES volProp = (PFLT_VOLUME_PROPERTIES)volPropBuffer; 
 
 PAGED_CODE(); 
 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Flags); 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(VolumeDeviceType); 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(VolumeFilesystemType); 
 
 try 
 { 
  status = FltAllocateContext(FltObjects->Filter, 
   FLT_VOLUME_CONTEXT, 
   sizeof(VOLUME_CONTEXT), 
   NonPagedPool, 
   &ctx); 
 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  status = FltGetVolumeProperties(FltObjects->Volume, 
   volProp, 
   sizeof(volPropBuffer), 
   &retLen); 
 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
   leave; 
  } 
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  FLT_ASSERT((volProp->SectorSize == 0) || (volProp->SectorSize >= 
MIN_SECTOR_SIZE)); 
 
  ctx->SectorSize = max(volProp->SectorSize, MIN_SECTOR_SIZE); 
 
  ctx->Name.Buffer = NULL; 
 
  status = FltGetDiskDeviceObject(FltObjects->Volume, &devObj); 
 
  if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
   status = IoVolumeDeviceToDosName(devObj, &ctx->Name); 
  } 
 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
   FLT_ASSERT(ctx->Name.Buffer == NULL); 
 
   if (volProp->RealDeviceName.Length > 0) 
   { 
    workingName = &volProp->RealDeviceName; 
   } 
   else if (volProp->FileSystemDeviceName.Length > 0) 
   { 
    workingName = &volProp->FileSystemDeviceName; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    status = STATUS_FLT_DO_NOT_ATTACH; 
    leave; 
   } 
 
   size = workingName->Length + sizeof(WCHAR); 
 
#pragma prefast(suppress:__WARNING_MEMORY_LEAK, "ctx->Name.Buffer will not be 
leaked because it is freed in CleanupVolumeContext") 
   ctx->Name.Buffer = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(NonPagedPool, 
    size, 
    NAME_TAG); 
   if (ctx->Name.Buffer == NULL) 
   { 
    status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
    leave; 
   } 
 
   ctx->Name.Length = 0; 
   ctx->Name.MaximumLength = size; 
 
   RtlCopyUnicodeString(&ctx->Name, 
    workingName); 
 
   RtlAppendUnicodeToString(&ctx->Name, 
    L":"); 
  } 
 
  status = FltSetVolumeContext(FltObjects->Volume, 
   FLT_SET_CONTEXT_KEEP_IF_EXISTS, 
   ctx, 
   NULL); 
 
 
  LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_VOLCTX, 
   ("spibedrv!InstanceSetup:                  Real SectSize=0x%04x, 
Used SectSize=0x%04x, Name=\"%wZ\"\n", 
    volProp->SectorSize, 
    ctx->SectorSize, 
    &ctx->Name)); 
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  if (status == STATUS_FLT_CONTEXT_ALREADY_DEFINED) 
  { 
   status = STATUS_SUCCESS; 
  } 
 } 
 finally 
 { 
  if (ctx) 
  { 
   FltReleaseContext(ctx); 
  } 
 
 
  if (devObj) 
  { 
   ObDereferenceObject(devObj); 
  } 
 } 
 return status; 
} 
 
 
VOID 
CleanupVolumeContext( 
 _In_ PFLT_CONTEXT Context, 
 _In_ FLT_CONTEXT_TYPE ContextType 
) 
{ 
 PVOLUME_CONTEXT ctx = Context; 
 
 PAGED_CODE(); 
 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(ContextType); 
 
 FLT_ASSERT(ContextType == FLT_VOLUME_CONTEXT); 
 
 if (ctx->Name.Buffer != NULL) 
 { 
  ExFreePool(ctx->Name.Buffer); 
  ctx->Name.Buffer = NULL; 
 } 
} 
 
NTSTATUS 
InstanceQueryTeardown( 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ FLT_INSTANCE_QUERY_TEARDOWN_FLAGS Flags 
) 
{ 
 PAGED_CODE(); 
 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(FltObjects); 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Flags); 
 
 return STATUS_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
NTSTATUS 
DriverEntry( 
 _In_ PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject, 
 _In_ PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath 
) 
{ 
 NTSTATUS status; 
 
 ExInitializeDriverRuntime(DrvRtPoolNxOptIn); 
 
 ReadDriverParameters(RegistryPath); 
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 ExInitializeNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList, 
  NULL, 
  NULL, 
  0, 
  sizeof(PRE_2_POST_CONTEXT), 
  PRE_2_POST_TAG, 
  0); 
 
 status = FltRegisterFilter(DriverObject, 
  &FilterRegistration, 
  &gFilterHandle); 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
 { 
 
  goto SwapDriverEntryExit; 
 } 
 
 status = FltStartFiltering(gFilterHandle); 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
 { 
  FltUnregisterFilter(gFilterHandle); 
  goto SwapDriverEntryExit; 
 } 
 
SwapDriverEntryExit: 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
 { 
  ExDeleteNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList); 
 } 
 
 return status; 
} 
 
NTSTATUS 
FilterUnload( 
 _In_ FLT_FILTER_UNLOAD_FLAGS Flags 
) 
{ 
 PAGED_CODE(); 
 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Flags); 
 
 FltUnregisterFilter(gFilterHandle); 
 
 ExDeleteNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList); 
 
 return STATUS_SUCCESS; 
} 
 
FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPreReadBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _Flt_CompletionContext_Outptr_ PVOID *CompletionContext 
) 
{ 
 PFLT_IO_PARAMETER_BLOCK iopb = Data->Iopb; 
 FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS retValue = FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_NO_CALLBACK; 
 PVOID newBuf = NULL; 
 PMDL newMdl = NULL; 
 PVOLUME_CONTEXT volCtx = NULL; 
 PPRE_2_POST_CONTEXT p2pCtx; 
 NTSTATUS status; 
 ULONG readLen = iopb->Parameters.Read.Length; 
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 try 
 { 
  if (readLen == 0) 
  { 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  status = FltGetVolumeContext(FltObjects->Filter, 
   FltObjects->Volume, 
   &volCtx); 
 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreReadBuffers:             Error getting 
volume context, status=%x\n", 
     status)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  if (FlagOn(IRP_NOCACHE, iopb->IrpFlags)) 
  { 
   readLen = (ULONG)ROUND_TO_SIZE(readLen, volCtx->SectorSize); 
  } 
 
  newBuf = FltAllocatePoolAlignedWithTag(FltObjects->Instance, 
   NonPagedPool, 
   (SIZE_T)readLen, 
   BUFFER_SWAP_TAG); 
  if (newBuf == NULL) 
  { 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreReadBuffers:             %wZ Failed to 
allocate %d bytes of memory\n", 
     &volCtx->Name, 
     readLen)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  if (FlagOn(Data->Flags, FLTFL_CALLBACK_DATA_IRP_OPERATION)) 
  { 
   newMdl = IoAllocateMdl(newBuf, 
    readLen, 
    FALSE, 
    FALSE, 
    NULL); 
 
   if (newMdl == NULL) 
   { 
 
    LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
     ("spibedrv!SwapPreReadBuffers:             %wZ 
Failed to allocate MDL\n", 
      &volCtx->Name)); 
 
    leave; 
   } 
 
   MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool(newMdl); 
  } 
 
  p2pCtx = ExAllocateFromNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList); 
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  if (p2pCtx == NULL) 
  { 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreReadBuffers:             %wZ Failed to 
allocate pre2Post context structure\n", 
     &volCtx->Name)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_READ, 
   ("spibedrv!SwapPreReadBuffers:             %wZ newB=%p newMdl=%p 
oldB=%p oldMdl=%p len=%d\n", 
    &volCtx->Name, 
    newBuf, 
    newMdl, 
    iopb->Parameters.Read.ReadBuffer, 
    iopb->Parameters.Read.MdlAddress, 
    readLen)); 
 
  iopb->Parameters.Read.ReadBuffer = newBuf; 
  iopb->Parameters.Read.MdlAddress = newMdl; 
  FltSetCallbackDataDirty(Data); 
 
  p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy = newBuf; 
  p2pCtx->VolCtx = volCtx; 
 
  *CompletionContext = p2pCtx; 
 
  retValue = FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_WITH_CALLBACK; 
 } 
 finally 
 { 
  if (retValue != FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_WITH_CALLBACK) 
  { 
 
   if (newBuf != NULL) 
   { 
 
    FltFreePoolAlignedWithTag(FltObjects->Instance, 
     newBuf, 
     BUFFER_SWAP_TAG); 
   } 
 
   if (newMdl != NULL) 
   { 
 
    IoFreeMdl(newMdl); 
   } 
 
   if (volCtx != NULL) 
   { 
 
    FltReleaseContext(volCtx); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 return retValue; 
} 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostReadBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
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) 
{ 
 PVOID origBuf; 
 PFLT_IO_PARAMETER_BLOCK iopb = Data->Iopb; 
 FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS retValue = FLT_POSTOP_FINISHED_PROCESSING; 
 PPRE_2_POST_CONTEXT p2pCtx = CompletionContext; 
 BOOLEAN cleanupAllocatedBuffer = TRUE; 
 
 FLT_ASSERT(!FlagOn(Flags, FLTFL_POST_OPERATION_DRAINING)); 
 
 try 
 { 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS(Data->IoStatus.Status) || 
   (Data->IoStatus.Information == 0)) 
  { 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_READ, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPostReadBuffers:            %wZ newB=%p No 
data read, status=%x, info=%Iu\n", 
     &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
     p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
     Data->IoStatus.Status, 
     Data->IoStatus.Information)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  if (iopb->Parameters.Read.MdlAddress != NULL) 
  { 
   FLT_ASSERT(((PMDL)iopb->Parameters.Read.MdlAddress)->Next == 
NULL); 
 
   origBuf = MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(iopb-
>Parameters.Read.MdlAddress, 
    NormalPagePriority | MdlMappingNoExecute); 
 
   if (origBuf == NULL) 
   { 
    LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
     ("spibedrv!SwapPostReadBuffers:            %wZ 
Failed to get system address for MDL: %p\n", 
      &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
      iopb->Parameters.Read.MdlAddress)); 
 
    Data->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
    Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
    leave; 
   } 
 
  } 
  else if (FlagOn(Data->Flags, FLTFL_CALLBACK_DATA_SYSTEM_BUFFER) || 
   FlagOn(Data->Flags, FLTFL_CALLBACK_DATA_FAST_IO_OPERATION)) 
  { 
   origBuf = iopb->Parameters.Read.ReadBuffer; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   if (FltDoCompletionProcessingWhenSafe(Data, 
    FltObjects, 
    CompletionContext, 
    Flags, 
    SwapPostReadBuffersWhenSafe, 
    &retValue)) 
   { 
    cleanupAllocatedBuffer = FALSE; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
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    LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
     ("spibedrv!SwapPostReadBuffers:            %wZ 
Unable to post to a safe IRQL\n", 
      &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name)); 
 
    Data->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; 
    Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
   } 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  try 
  { 
   XOrBuffer((p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy), 
    Data->IoStatus.Information); 
 
   RtlCopyMemory(origBuf, 
    p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
    Data->IoStatus.Information); 
  } 
  except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) 
  { 
   Data->IoStatus.Status = GetExceptionCode(); 
   Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPostReadBuffers:            %wZ Invalid 
user buffer, oldB=%p, status=%x\n", 
     &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
     origBuf, 
     Data->IoStatus.Status)); 
  } 
 
 } 
 finally 
 { 
  if (cleanupAllocatedBuffer) 
  { 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_READ, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPostReadBuffers:            %wZ newB=%p 
info=%Iu Freeing\n", 
     &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
     p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
     Data->IoStatus.Information)); 
 
   FltFreePoolAlignedWithTag(FltObjects->Instance, 
    p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
    BUFFER_SWAP_TAG); 
 
   FltReleaseContext(p2pCtx->VolCtx); 
 
   ExFreeToNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList, 
    p2pCtx); 
  } 
 } 
 return retValue; 
} 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostReadBuffersWhenSafe( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
) 
{ 
 PFLT_IO_PARAMETER_BLOCK iopb = Data->Iopb; 
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 PPRE_2_POST_CONTEXT p2pCtx = CompletionContext; 
 PVOID origBuf; 
 NTSTATUS status; 
 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(FltObjects); 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Flags); 
 FLT_ASSERT(Data->IoStatus.Information != 0); 
 
 status = FltLockUserBuffer(Data); 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
 { 
  LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
   ("spibedrv!SwapPostReadBuffersWhenSafe:    %wZ Could not lock 
user buffer, oldB=%p, status=%x\n", 
    &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
    iopb->Parameters.Read.ReadBuffer, 
    status)); 
 
  Data->IoStatus.Status = status; 
  Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  origBuf = MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(iopb-
>Parameters.Read.MdlAddress, 
   NormalPagePriority | MdlMappingNoExecute); 
 
  if (origBuf == NULL) 
  { 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPostReadBuffersWhenSafe:    %wZ Failed to 
get system address for MDL: %p\n", 
     &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
     iopb->Parameters.Read.MdlAddress)); 
 
   Data->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
   Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   XOrBuffer(p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
    Data->IoStatus.Information); 
 
   RtlCopyMemory(origBuf, 
    p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
    Data->IoStatus.Information); 
  } 
 } 
 
 LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_READ, 
  ("spibedrv!SwapPostReadBuffersWhenSafe:    %wZ newB=%p info=%Iu 
Freeing\n", 
   &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
   p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
   Data->IoStatus.Information)); 
 
 FltFreePoolAlignedWithTag(FltObjects->Instance, 
  p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
  BUFFER_SWAP_TAG); 
 
 FltReleaseContext(p2pCtx->VolCtx); 
 
 ExFreeToNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList, 
  p2pCtx); 
 
 return FLT_POSTOP_FINISHED_PROCESSING; 
} 
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FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPreDirCtrlBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _Flt_CompletionContext_Outptr_ PVOID *CompletionContext 
) 
{ 
 PFLT_IO_PARAMETER_BLOCK iopb = Data->Iopb; 
 FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS retValue = FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_NO_CALLBACK; 
 PVOID newBuf = NULL; 
 PMDL newMdl = NULL; 
 PVOLUME_CONTEXT volCtx = NULL; 
 PPRE_2_POST_CONTEXT p2pCtx; 
 NTSTATUS status; 
 
 try 
 { 
  if (iopb->Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.Length == 0) 
  { 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  status = FltGetVolumeContext(FltObjects->Filter, 
   FltObjects->Volume, 
   &volCtx); 
 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreDirCtrlBuffers:          Error getting 
volume context, status=%x\n", 
     status)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  newBuf = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(NonPagedPool, 
   iopb->Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.Length, 
   BUFFER_SWAP_TAG); 
 
  if (newBuf == NULL) 
  { 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreDirCtrlBuffers:          %wZ Failed to 
allocate %d bytes of memory.\n", 
     &volCtx->Name, 
     iopb-
>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.Length)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  RtlZeroMemory(newBuf, iopb-
>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.Length); 
 
  newMdl = IoAllocateMdl(newBuf, 
   iopb->Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.Length, 
   FALSE, 
   FALSE, 
   NULL); 
 
  if (newMdl == NULL) 
  { 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
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    ("spibedrv!SwapPreDirCtrlBuffers:          %wZ Failed to 
allocate MDL.\n", 
     &volCtx->Name)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool(newMdl); 
 
  p2pCtx = ExAllocateFromNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList); 
 
  if (p2pCtx == NULL) 
  { 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreDirCtrlBuffers:          %wZ Failed to 
allocate pre2Post context structure\n", 
     &volCtx->Name)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_DIRCTRL, 
   ("spibedrv!SwapPreDirCtrlBuffers:          %wZ newB=%p newMdl=%p 
oldB=%p oldMdl=%p len=%d\n", 
    &volCtx->Name, 
    newBuf, 
    newMdl, 
    iopb-
>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.DirectoryBuffer, 
    iopb-
>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.MdlAddress, 
    iopb->Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.Length)); 
 
  iopb->Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.DirectoryBuffer = 
newBuf; 
  iopb->Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.MdlAddress = newMdl; 
  FltSetCallbackDataDirty(Data); 
 
  p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy = newBuf; 
  p2pCtx->VolCtx = volCtx; 
 
  *CompletionContext = p2pCtx; 
 
  retValue = FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_WITH_CALLBACK; 
 
 } 
 finally 
 { 
  if (retValue != FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_WITH_CALLBACK) 
  { 
   if (newBuf != NULL) 
   { 
 
    ExFreePool(newBuf); 
   } 
 
   if (newMdl != NULL) 
   { 
 
    IoFreeMdl(newMdl); 
   } 
 
   if (volCtx != NULL) 
   { 
 
    FltReleaseContext(volCtx); 
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   } 
  } 
 } 
 
 return retValue; 
} 
 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostDirCtrlBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
) 
 
{ 
 PVOID origBuf; 
 PFLT_IO_PARAMETER_BLOCK iopb = Data->Iopb; 
 FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS retValue = FLT_POSTOP_FINISHED_PROCESSING; 
 PPRE_2_POST_CONTEXT p2pCtx = CompletionContext; 
 BOOLEAN cleanupAllocatedBuffer = TRUE; 
 
 FLT_ASSERT(!FlagOn(Flags, FLTFL_POST_OPERATION_DRAINING)); 
 
 try 
 { 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS(Data->IoStatus.Status) || 
   (Data->IoStatus.Information == 0)) 
  { 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_DIRCTRL, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPostDirCtrlBuffers:         %wZ newB=%p No 
data read, status=%x, info=%Ix\n", 
     &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
     p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
     Data->IoStatus.Status, 
     Data->IoStatus.Information)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  if (iopb->Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.MdlAddress != 
NULL) 
  { 
   origBuf = MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(iopb-
>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.MdlAddress, 
    NormalPagePriority | MdlMappingNoExecute); 
 
   if (origBuf == NULL) 
   { 
    LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
     ("spibedrv!SwapPostDirCtrlBuffers:         %wZ 
Failed to get system address for MDL: %p\n", 
      &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
      iopb-
>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.MdlAddress)); 
 
    Data->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
    Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
    leave; 
   } 
 
  } 
  else if (FlagOn(Data->Flags, FLTFL_CALLBACK_DATA_SYSTEM_BUFFER) || 
   FlagOn(Data->Flags, FLTFL_CALLBACK_DATA_FAST_IO_OPERATION)) 
  { 
   origBuf = iopb-
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>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.DirectoryBuffer; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   if (FltDoCompletionProcessingWhenSafe(Data, 
    FltObjects, 
    CompletionContext, 
    Flags, 
    SwapPostDirCtrlBuffersWhenSafe, 
    &retValue)) 
   { 
    cleanupAllocatedBuffer = FALSE; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
     ("spibedrv!SwapPostDirCtrlBuffers:         %wZ 
Unable to post to a safe IRQL\n", 
      &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name)); 
 
    Data->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; 
    Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
   } 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  try 
  { 
 
   RtlCopyMemory(origBuf, 
    p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
    /*Data->IoStatus.Information*/ 
    iopb->Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.Length); 
 
  } 
  except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) 
  { 
   Data->IoStatus.Status = GetExceptionCode(); 
   Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPostDirCtrlBuffers:         %wZ Invalid 
user buffer, oldB=%p, status=%x, info=%Iu\n", 
     &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
     origBuf, 
     Data->IoStatus.Status, 
     Data->IoStatus.Information)); 
  } 
 } 
 finally 
 { 
  if (cleanupAllocatedBuffer) 
  { 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_DIRCTRL, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPostDirCtrlBuffers:         %wZ newB=%p 
info=%Iu Freeing\n", 
     &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
     p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
     Data->IoStatus.Information)); 
 
   ExFreePool(p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy); 
   FltReleaseContext(p2pCtx->VolCtx); 
 
   ExFreeToNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList, 
    p2pCtx); 
  } 
 } 
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 return retValue; 
} 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostDirCtrlBuffersWhenSafe( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
) 
{ 
 PFLT_IO_PARAMETER_BLOCK iopb = Data->Iopb; 
 PPRE_2_POST_CONTEXT p2pCtx = CompletionContext; 
 PVOID origBuf; 
 NTSTATUS status; 
 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(FltObjects); 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Flags); 
 FLT_ASSERT(Data->IoStatus.Information != 0); 
 
 status = FltLockUserBuffer(Data); 
 
 if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
 { 
  LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
   ("spibedrv!SwapPostDirCtrlBuffersWhenSafe: %wZ Could not lock 
user buffer, oldB=%p, status=%x\n", 
    &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
    iopb-
>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.DirectoryBuffer, 
    status)); 
 
  Data->IoStatus.Status = status; 
  Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  origBuf = MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(iopb-
>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.MdlAddress, 
   NormalPagePriority | MdlMappingNoExecute); 
 
  if (origBuf == NULL) 
  { 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPostDirCtrlBuffersWhenSafe: %wZ Failed to 
get System address for MDL: %p\n", 
     &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
     iopb-
>Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.MdlAddress)); 
 
   Data->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
   Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   RtlCopyMemory(origBuf, 
    p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
    /*Data->IoStatus.Information*/ 
    iopb->Parameters.DirectoryControl.QueryDirectory.Length); 
  } 
 } 
 
 LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_DIRCTRL, 
  ("spibedrv!SwapPostDirCtrlBuffersWhenSafe: %wZ newB=%p info=%Iu 
Freeing\n", 
   &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
   p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
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   Data->IoStatus.Information)); 
 
 ExFreePool(p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy); 
 FltReleaseContext(p2pCtx->VolCtx); 
 
 ExFreeToNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList, 
  p2pCtx); 
 
 return FLT_POSTOP_FINISHED_PROCESSING; 
} 
 
FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPreWriteBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _Flt_CompletionContext_Outptr_ PVOID *CompletionContext 
) 
{ 
 PFLT_IO_PARAMETER_BLOCK iopb = Data->Iopb; 
 FLT_PREOP_CALLBACK_STATUS retValue = FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_NO_CALLBACK; 
 PVOID newBuf = NULL; 
 PMDL newMdl = NULL; 
 PVOLUME_CONTEXT volCtx = NULL; 
 PPRE_2_POST_CONTEXT p2pCtx; 
 PVOID origBuf; 
 NTSTATUS status; 
 ULONG writeLen = iopb->Parameters.Write.Length; 
 
 try 
 { 
  if (writeLen == 0) 
  { 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  status = FltGetVolumeContext(FltObjects->Filter, 
   FltObjects->Volume, 
   &volCtx); 
 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreWriteBuffers:            Error getting 
volume context, status=%x\n", 
     status)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  if (FlagOn(IRP_NOCACHE, iopb->IrpFlags)) 
  { 
   writeLen = (ULONG)ROUND_TO_SIZE(writeLen, volCtx->SectorSize); 
  } 
 
  newBuf = FltAllocatePoolAlignedWithTag(FltObjects->Instance, 
   NonPagedPool, 
   (SIZE_T)writeLen, 
   BUFFER_SWAP_TAG); 
 
  if (newBuf == NULL) 
  { 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreWriteBuffers:            %wZ Failed to 
allocate %d bytes of memory.\n", 
     &volCtx->Name, 
     writeLen)); 
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   leave; 
  } 
 
  if (FlagOn(Data->Flags, FLTFL_CALLBACK_DATA_IRP_OPERATION)) 
  { 
   newMdl = IoAllocateMdl(newBuf, 
    writeLen, 
    FALSE, 
    FALSE, 
    NULL); 
 
   if (newMdl == NULL) 
   { 
 
    LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
     ("spibedrv!SwapPreWriteBuffers:            %wZ 
Failed to allocate MDL.\n", 
      &volCtx->Name)); 
 
    leave; 
   } 
   MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool(newMdl); 
  } 
 
  if (iopb->Parameters.Write.MdlAddress != NULL) 
  { 
   FLT_ASSERT(((PMDL)iopb->Parameters.Write.MdlAddress)->Next == 
NULL); 
 
   origBuf = MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(iopb-
>Parameters.Write.MdlAddress, 
    NormalPagePriority | MdlMappingNoExecute); 
 
   if (origBuf == NULL) 
   { 
    LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
     ("spibedrv!SwapPreWriteBuffers:            %wZ 
Failed to get system address for MDL: %p\n", 
      &volCtx->Name, 
      iopb->Parameters.Write.MdlAddress)); 
 
    Data->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES; 
    Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
    retValue = FLT_PREOP_COMPLETE; 
    leave; 
   } 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   origBuf = iopb->Parameters.Write.WriteBuffer; 
  } 
 
  try 
  { 
   RtlCopyMemory(newBuf, 
    origBuf, 
    writeLen); 
   XOrBuffer(newBuf, writeLen); 
  } 
  except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) 
  { 
   Data->IoStatus.Status = GetExceptionCode(); 
   Data->IoStatus.Information = 0; 
   retValue = FLT_PREOP_COMPLETE; 
 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreWriteBuffers:            %wZ Invalid 
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user buffer, oldB=%p, status=%x\n", 
     &volCtx->Name, 
     origBuf, 
     Data->IoStatus.Status)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  p2pCtx = ExAllocateFromNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList); 
 
  if (p2pCtx == NULL) 
  { 
   LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_ERRORS, 
    ("spibedrv!SwapPreWriteBuffers:            %wZ Failed to 
allocate pre2Post context structure\n", 
     &volCtx->Name)); 
 
   leave; 
  } 
 
  LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_WRITE, 
   ("spibedrv!SwapPreWriteBuffers:            %wZ newB=%p newMdl=%p 
oldB=%p oldMdl=%p len=%d\n", 
    &volCtx->Name, 
    newBuf, 
    newMdl, 
    iopb->Parameters.Write.WriteBuffer, 
    iopb->Parameters.Write.MdlAddress, 
    writeLen)); 
 
  iopb->Parameters.Write.WriteBuffer = newBuf; 
  iopb->Parameters.Write.MdlAddress = newMdl; 
  FltSetCallbackDataDirty(Data); 
 
  p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy = newBuf; 
  p2pCtx->VolCtx = volCtx; 
 
  *CompletionContext = p2pCtx; 
 
  retValue = FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_WITH_CALLBACK; 
 } 
 finally 
 { 
  if (retValue != FLT_PREOP_SUCCESS_WITH_CALLBACK) 
  { 
 
   if (newBuf != NULL) 
   { 
 
    FltFreePoolAlignedWithTag(FltObjects->Instance, 
     newBuf, 
     BUFFER_SWAP_TAG); 
 
   } 
 
   if (newMdl != NULL) 
   { 
 
    IoFreeMdl(newMdl); 
   } 
 
   if (volCtx != NULL) 
   { 
 
    FltReleaseContext(volCtx); 
   } 
  } 
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 } 
 
 return retValue; 
} 
 
 
FLT_POSTOP_CALLBACK_STATUS 
SwapPostWriteBuffers( 
 _Inout_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, 
 _In_ PCFLT_RELATED_OBJECTS FltObjects, 
 _In_ PVOID CompletionContext, 
 _In_ FLT_POST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags 
) 
{ 
 PPRE_2_POST_CONTEXT p2pCtx = CompletionContext; 
 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(FltObjects); 
 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Flags); 
 
 LOG_PRINT(LOGFL_WRITE, 
  ("spibedrv!SwapPostWriteBuffers:           %wZ newB=%p info=%Iu 
Freeing\n", 
   &p2pCtx->VolCtx->Name, 
   p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
   Data->IoStatus.Information)); 
 
 
 FltFreePoolAlignedWithTag(FltObjects->Instance, 
  p2pCtx->UnpackedCandy, 
  BUFFER_SWAP_TAG); 
 
 FltReleaseContext(p2pCtx->VolCtx); 
 
 ExFreeToNPagedLookasideList(&Pre2PostContextList, 
  p2pCtx); 
 
 return FLT_POSTOP_FINISHED_PROCESSING; 
} 
 
 
VOID 
ReadDriverParameters( 
 _In_ PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath 
) 
{ 
 OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attributes; 
 HANDLE driverRegKey; 
 NTSTATUS status; 
 ULONG resultLength; 
 UNICODE_STRING valueName; 
 UCHAR buffer[sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION) + sizeof(LONG)]; 
 
 if (0 == LoggingFlags) 
 { 
  InitializeObjectAttributes(&attributes, 
   RegistryPath, 
   OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, 
   NULL, 
   NULL); 
 
  status = ZwOpenKey(&driverRegKey, 
   KEY_READ, 
   &attributes); 
 
  if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
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   return; 
  } 
 
  RtlInitUnicodeString(&valueName, L"DebugFlags"); 
 
  status = ZwQueryValueKey(driverRegKey, 
   &valueName, 
   KeyValuePartialInformation, 
   buffer, 
   sizeof(buffer), 
   &resultLength); 
 
  if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) 
  { 
 
   LoggingFlags = *((PULONG) 
&(((PKEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION)buffer)->Data)); 
  } 
 
  ZwClose(driverRegKey); 
 } 
} 
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APPENDIX KK OOXML STICKY POLICY HANDLER 
EVALUATION – SPIBEDRV\SPIBEDRV.INF 	
[Version] 
signature   = "$Windows NT$" 
Class       = "Encryption" 
ClassGuid   = {46b682d4-a96f-409b-b450-f56d3a6f703b} 
Provider    = %ProviderString% 
DriverVer   = 04/08/2018,1.0.0.0 
CatalogFile = spibedrv.cat 
 
[DestinationDirs] 
DefaultDestDir          = 12 
MiniFilter.DriverFiles  = 12            ;%windir%\system32\drivers 
 
[DefaultInstall] 
OptionDesc          = %ServiceDescription% 
CopyFiles           = MiniFilter.DriverFiles 
 
[DefaultInstall.Services] 
AddService          = %ServiceName%,,MiniFilter.Service 
 
[DefaultUninstall] 
DelFiles = MiniFilter.DriverFiles 
DelReg  = MiniFilter.DelRegistry 
 
[DefaultUninstall.Services] 
DelService = spibedrv,0x200 
 
[MiniFilter.Service] 
DisplayName      = %ServiceName% 
Description      = %ServiceDescription% 
ServiceBinary    = %12%\%DriverName%.sys        ;%windir%\system32\drivers\ 
Dependencies     = "FltMgr" 
ServiceType      = 2                            ;SERVICE_FILE_SYSTEM_DRIVER 
StartType        = 0                           ;SERVICE_BOOT_START 
StartType        = 3                            ;SERVICE_DEMAND_START 
ErrorControl     = 1                            ;SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL 
LoadOrderGroup   = "FSFilter Encryption" 
AddReg           = MiniFilter.AddRegistry 
 
[MiniFilter.AddRegistry] 
HKR,,"SupportedFeatures",0x00010001,0x3 
HKR,"Instances","DefaultInstance",0x00000000,%Instance1.Name% 
HKR,"Instances\"%Instance1.Name%,"Altitude",0x00000000,%Instance1.Altitude% 
HKR,"Instances\"%Instance1.Name%,"Flags",0x00010001,%Instance1.Flags% 
 
[MiniFilter.DelRegistry] 
HKR,,"SupportedFeatures",0x00010001,0x3 
HKR,"Instances","DefaultInstance",0x00000000,%Instance1.Name% 
HKR,"Instances\"%Instance1.Name%,"Altitude",0x00000000,%Instance1.Altitude% 
HKR,"Instances\"%Instance1.Name%,"Flags",0x00010001,%Instance1.Flags% 
 
[MiniFilter.DriverFiles] 
%DriverName%.sys 
 
[SourceDisksFiles] 
spibedrv.sys = 1,, 
 
[SourceDisksNames] 
1 = %DiskId1%,,, 
 
[Strings] 
ProviderString          = "Napier" 
ServiceDescription      = "Sticky Policy Identity-based Encryption Mini-Filter 
Driver" 
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ServiceName             = "spibedrv" 
DriverName              = "spibedrv" 
DiskId1                 = "spibedrv Device Installation Disk" 
 
Instance1.Name          = "spibedrv Instance" 
Instance1.Altitude      = "141000" 
Instance1.Flags         = 0x0          ; allow automatic attachments 	
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APPENDIX LL OOXML MASTER DOCUMENT RENDERING 
	
 214 
APPENDIX MM OOXML MASTER DOCUMENT ACCESS CONTROL – 
UNLOCKED 
	
 215 
APPENDIX NN OOXML MASTER DOCUMENT ACCESS CONTROL – EWA 
EXPLICITLY PROTECTED OWN UPDATE 
	
 216 
APPENDIX OO OOXML MASTER DOCUMENT ACCESS CONTROL – 
CURRENT DOCUMENT PROCESSOR WAS GRANTED READONLY RIGHTS 
OVER ENTIRE CONTENT 
	
